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F or five years during THe seCond WorLd War, Denmark was occupied by Germany. While the Danish reaction to this period 
of its history has been extensively discussed in Danish-language 
publications, it has not until now received a thorough treatment in 
English. Set in the context of modern Danish foreign relations, and 
tracing the country’s responses to successive crises and wars in the 
region, Danish Reactions to German Occupation brings a full overview 
of the occupation to an English-speaking audience. Holbraad carefully 
dissects the motivations and ideologies driving conduct during the 
occupation, and his authoritative coverage of the preceding century 
provides a crucial link to understanding the forces behind Danish 
foreign policy divisions.
Analysing the conduct of a traumatized and strategically exposed 
small state bordering on an aggressive great power, the book traces a 
development from reluctant cooperation to active resistance. Holbraad 
goes on to survey and examine the subsequent, and not yet quite 
finished, debate among historians about this contested period. That 
debate is between those still siding with the resistance and a majority 
more inclined to justify limited cooperation with the occupiers – and 
sometimes even condone various acts of collaboration.
Carsten Holbraad  studied at the LSE with a Leverhulme 
undergraduate scholarship, and gained a DPhil at the University 
of Sussex in the field of European history of ideas. He has held 
research and teaching positions at  the Institute of Advanced 
Studies of the ANU in Canberra, Carleton University and Queen’s 
University in Canada, El Collegio de Mexico and at LSE and UCL. 
His previous books include Internationalism and Nationalism 
in European Political Thought (2003) and Danish Neutrality (1991).
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To the memory of Jørgen Hæstrup – who started it all. 
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Preface
In Danish Neutrality:  A  Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991), I identified and analysed certain ideas 
and attitudes behind Danish foreign policy in modern and contemporary 
history. Focusing on situations of crisis or war in the region, I detected 
two opposing tendencies in Danish reactions, namely towards engage-
ment in and withdrawal from international conflict.
At one stage, I considered the idea of following up with a briefer 
work which would explore a similar duality of attitudes to foreign 
affairs to be found in some modern Danish fictional literature. Instead, 
I decided to narrow the historical focus, and examine Danish reactions 
to the country’s most traumatic experience in recent history:  the five 
years of German occupation during the Second World War. There were 
two reasons for this choice.
In a conversation with my son and his friend Morten A. Pedersen – 
both members of the small and exclusive group of Danish anthropol-
ogists with a PhD  from King’s College, now known as the Cambridge 
Danes – Morten pointed out that there was a need for someone to get 
on top of the ongoing debate among historians and others about Danish 
conduct during the German occupation.
On a more personal level, a topic focusing on that relatively brief 
period had the attraction of taking me back to the subject matter of my 
initial introduction to historical research. As a high- school student at 
Sct. Knuds Gymnasium in Odense who had mastered the skills of ste-
nography and typing, I spent most of my spare time in 1947– 48 working 
as a secretary to Jørgen Hæstrup, a young and dynamic history mas-
ter who recently had started collecting material about the resistance 
movement for the Danish Public Record Office. Destined to become the 
leading historian of Danish resistance and its links with Britain, he was 
in the process of locating secret archives and securing written verbal 
reports from key resistance figures.
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Taking down reports and typing out archival material, I met quite 
a few members of the resistance and gained some knowledge of its activ-
ities. I also formed a good working relationship with Hæstrup. Though 
I was unable to accept repeated invitations in later decades to join his 
group of young occupation historians, my friendship with him lasted 
till his death in 1998. Thus, it is appropriate to dedicate this work to 
the memory of Jørgen Hæstrup. It offers a spectral analysis of Danish 
reactions to the German occupation and presents a critical overview of 
subsequent and recent historiographical debate about a crucial national 
experience not yet fully digested.
The first part of the book presents Danish conduct in the Second 
World War in a historical context by sketching out the foreign relations 
of the country in modern times and tracing its reactions to successive 
crises and wars in the region. For its earlier sections, I draw on my first 
book about the history of Danish foreign policy, mentioned above.
The second part lays out the historically attested and widely known 
reactions to German occupation from the invasion on 9 April 1940 to the 
liberation on 5 May 1945. However, for analytical reasons, the order of 
presentation is logical rather than chronological, ranging from willing 
cooperation at one end to armed resistance at the other. Yet, that order 
happens to correspond fairly well with the actual chronological develop-
ment over the five years.
The third part of the book deals with the historiography about the 
occupation period, from the first post- war decades till well into the pres-
ent century. Three waves of writings have been distinguished. The post- 
war works, mostly written by historians and other writers who identified 
with the resistance movement, tended to present a picture of growing 
resistance backed by increasing public support. Subsequently a revision-
ist wave of scholarship took a more critical view of resistance, perhaps 
at the same time adopting a more sympathetic attitude to cooperation. 
More recently, a second wave of revisionism, less interested in the his-
tory of resistance, took up the cases of various groups of individuals who 
had engaged in some form of collaboration with the occupiers. That part 
closes with a tentative overview of recent trends in scholarly debate and 
a brief presentation of recurrent public discourse about Danish reactions 
to the occupation.
Though Norway occasionally has been brought into the picture, no 
attempt has been made in this book to make comparisons and draw par-
allels with other countries under German occupation. Each such coun-
try was in a geopolitical situation of its own in relation to the European 
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conflict, and had its own history of interacting with rivalling great pow-
ers and its own tradition of dealing with a preponderant and threaten-
ing power. Moreover, the policy and conduct of the occupying power 
varied from country to country. Thus, as for both its situation and its 
conduct during the Second World War, Denmark was a special case, 
which should be examined separately rather than fitted into some quasi- 
comparative framework.
Much of the book was researched and written while I was Honorary 
Research Associate in the Department of Scandinavian Studies at UCL. 
As such, I much enjoyed the use of the UCL Library’s excellent collection 
of books about the history, politics and culture of Denmark and other 
Nordic countries.
I am grateful to Knud J.V. Jespersen, professor emeritus at the 
University of Southern Denmark in Odense, for generous and useful 
comments on an early draft. The constructive criticism and good advice 
of the anonymous reviewers are also much appreciated. In particular, I 
am indebted to the expert on Danish occupation historiography for help-
ing me find a way through recent literature.
London
C. H.
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Introduction
For Denmark, the most momentous experience of the twentieth century 
was the five years of German occupation during the Second World War. 
As a crisis in the political history of the country, it was in some respects 
comparable to the two major traumas of the nineteenth century, namely 
the unfortunate involvement in the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars 
and the disastrous defeat in the war with the German Confederation 
half a century later. As in those earlier crises, the impact of the war pro-
foundly affected the Danish conception of the international situation of 
the country and influenced its foreign policy for a long time.
But the nature of the experience of invasion, occupation and lib-
eration, and its effects on the national psyche and future foreign policy, 
made it very different from the two low points in the earlier century. Both 
the involvement with Napoleonic France and the war with Bismarck’s 
Prussia in 1864 led to defeat and very substantial losses of territory and 
population. After 1814 and, even more so, after 1864 Denmark went 
through a crisis of anxiety about survival as a sovereign state. In both 
situations the most significant political outcome was a reinforcement 
of an already existing tendency to try to steer clear of European power 
politics. On the other hand, the period of German occupation, which 
was marked initially by reluctant cooperation with the authorities of 
the occupying power but later also by growing active resistance, led to 
a national soul- searching and a reconsideration of the country’s role in 
international relations. One outcome was a tentative revival of a much 
older tradition of Danish foreign policy, which had been characterized 
by a more active engagement in the international politics of the region. 
However, the inclination inherited from the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, towards disengagement and neutrality in international 
conflict, survived. Thus the years of occupation became a quasi turning- 
point in the history of Danish foreign policy.
For much of the second half of the twentieth century Danish pol-
itics became marked by a recurrent debate between those who sought 
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a fuller and more committed involvement in the policies and activities 
of the Western alliance and a more willing participation in the drive 
towards a degree of European integration and, on the other hand, 
those who stuck to a more cautious and hesitant line in both NATO 
and EC relations. Thus, in periods of the East– West conflict, the alli-
ance and security policies as well as the European policy of the coun-
try often came to appear half- hearted. The debate continued, though 
in a lower key, after the end of the cold war, when it at stages came 
to focus on Danish participation in the US- led wars against Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
Throughout, the issue was essentially between those who recog-
nized that the wider issues of international politics were crucial enough 
for Denmark to engage actively in the conflicts and pursuits of the region 
and those who were content with guarding customary Danish values 
and interests by keeping a low profile in international politics. In terms 
of party politics, the division between the former and the latter was 
largely between right- of- centre and left- of- centre sections of the Danish 
political spectrum.
On a more intellectual level, the debate may even be seen as 
roughly reflected in the works of historians and other writers dealing 
with the Danish reactions to German occupation. The first post- war writ-
ings on that subject, most of them written by people who identified with 
the resistance movement, tended to present the period of occupation as 
a picture of growing resistance backed by wide popular support, and 
to give less attention to the presence of cooperation with the German 
authorities and divisions of opinion in the country. The first wave of revi-
sionist writings queried the strength and efficacy of the resistance, cast 
doubt on the degree of support it enjoyed and often took a more sympa-
thetic view of the policy and practice of governmental and administra-
tive cooperation with the enemy. A later revisionist wave subjected the 
resistance movement to criticism more on moral grounds, condemning 
in particular the practice of shooting informers, and dealt sympatheti-
cally with various sets of individuals who, in one way or another, had 
engaged in personal collaboration with agents of the occupying power. 
The first post- war historians, to the extent that they accepted the goals 
and means of the resistance, were in tune with those who advocated a 
more active engagement in international politics. The revisionists, judg-
ing by their antipathies as well as their sympathies, on the whole seemed 
closer to those who kept an eye on the narrow and immediate interests 
of the Danish people and opted for a more passive or minimal role in 
foreign politics.
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In more recent years the historical debate intensified, with not 
only historians and writers but also some politicians and other promi-
nent persons, including a few survivors of the resistance, taking part. 
The behaviour of the Danes during those five years, at official as well 
as more private and individual levels, once again became the subject 
of heated exchanges in the media. Now, more than 70 years after the 
end of the occupation, the politics and morality of the people who 
lived through it still seem to be divisive issues, for scholars as well as 
a wider public.
That the conflict between cooperation and resistance under 
occupation remains unresolved may be seen as evidence of a profound 
ambivalence in the mentality of a people conditioned by traumatic 
defeats and losses and split between opposite reactions to conflict and 
crisis. On a deeper level of analysis, however, the issue can be under-
stood in terms of the history and geography of a country for centuries 
burdened with the predicament of being a small state in an exposed 
strategic location.
The aims of the present study are, first, to consider the whole 
range of Danish reactions to German occupation, from willing collab-
oration at one end to armed resistance at the other; then to examine 
the long debate since 1945 and explore the political and moral dimen-
sions of both the policy of cooperation and the course of resistance; 
and finally to view those opposite positions in the context of tradi-
tional ideas and attitudes relating to conflict and war. It follows that a 
brief preparatory overview of the trends of thought and tendencies of 
behaviour that came to characterize Danish conduct of external rela-
tions in the centuries preceding the invasion of Denmark in 1940 will 
be useful.
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1
Traumas and trends
The foremost watershed in the history of Danish– Norwegian and Danish 
foreign policy is the end of the Great Northern War in 1720. In the cen-
turies before that year Denmark– Norway, with Iceland and Greenland, 
colonies in the Caribbean, India and West Africa and a powerful navy, 
played a very active part in the politics of the region. As a major power 
situated by the Baltic Sea, it fought aggressive and defensive wars, mostly 
against Sweden, and gained and lost territories. In the centuries follow-
ing 1720 Denmark– Norway, and later Denmark, adopted an increas-
ingly passive role in European politics. Taking leave of one means after 
another of conducting foreign policy, the kingdom gradually resigned 
itself to the fate of a small state. While becoming ever more preoccupied 
with international trade, international law, international morality and 
international organization, Denmark eventually came close to turning 
its back on international politics.
The retreat from power politics, which went on till the middle of the 
twentieth century, comprised several stages. Each stage may be defined 
by reference to the character of the policy pursued by the kingdom in 
conflicts among the European powers. The first one lasted from the end 
of the Great Northern War to the country’s involuntary involvement in 
the Napoleonic Wars in 1807. During this long period Denmark– Norway 
managed to secure neutral status in the various wars that occurred. 
However, while steering clear of actual hostilities between the emerg-
ing great powers, it participated in the shifting alliances of the European 
balance of power, which was possible under the loose and rather accom-
modating rules of neutrality then prevailing. The second stage began at 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars and finished soon after the First World 
War. Apart from its own wars with its southern neighbours, Denmark 
again stayed neutral in all wars in this period. But its position among the 
powers changed. While most of the time armed with fairly substantial 
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military forces, the country was now so isolated that it played only a 
minimal role in the working of the balance of power. The last stage of 
the Danish retreat from international politics lasted from the initial 
years of the League of Nations to the later part of the Second World War. 
In this period Denmark remained diplomatically isolated, but now based 
its policy of neutrality on extremely weak military foundations.
Apart from 1720 itself, the most formative years in the history 
of Danish foreign policy were 1814, when the kingdom lost Norway to 
Sweden only half a dozen years after losing its navy to Britain; 1864, 
when German forces defeated the Danes and all of Schleswig- Holstein 
went to Prussia; and 1914, when Denmark declared strict neutrality in 
the hostilities but gave Germany certain assurances. While the events 
marked by the year 1814 dwarfed the kingdom and those of 1864 
checked its territorial ambitions, the conjuncture of 1914 established 
Denmark on its course of disengagement and neutrality. Twenty- five 
years later, when another major war broke out in its vicinity, Denmark 
again declared its neutrality, in the hope that this policy would once 
more see the country through the hostilities unscathed. Instead, it led to 
German invasion and five years of occupation. That experience started a 
debate about the prudence and morality of Danish international conduct 
which is not yet over.
Though a member of one or other of the great European alli-
ance systems most of the time since 1720, Denmark did not become 
involved in the actual hostilities of any of the major wars during the 
period. Despite several close shaves, it also managed to avoid wars 
with its northern and North German neighbours. Thus, much of the 
time during more than 80 years of peace Denmark was in the fortu-
nate position of being able to concentrate its international efforts on 
the economic interests of the country. When major powers were at war, 
it could carry on its shipping and develop its commerce, and enjoy the 
advantages of increased demand for such services brought about by the 
war. This lenient and prolonged experience of European politics was 
bound to affect the style of the kingdom’s diplomacy and the nature of 
its foreign policy, and perhaps even the Danish conception of interna-
tional politics in general.
In playing the European balance of power cautiously and defen-
sively, and exploiting the absence of established conventions of neutral-
ity through skilful bargaining with belligerents, Denmark developed a 
decidedly pragmatic and opportunistic form of diplomacy. ‘To plead our 
case and steal our way through as best we can,’ as O.H. Guldberg, head 
of government from 1780 to 1784, once put it, became the Danish way.1
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The circumstance that Denmark, usually enjoying the protection 
or support of some powerful ally, often could afford to devote its efforts 
to championing the rights and exploiting the advantages of neutrals 
tended to give its foreign policy a mercenary character. In crisis or war, 
when some other states might have to struggle for security and survival, 
Denmark could go on enriching itself. The prosperity that the kingdom 
enjoyed in the second half of the century helped to substantiate the 
notion of foreign policy as largely a pursuit of economic interests.
The long- lasting combination of peace and prosperity also helped 
to foster a conception of international politics as essentially a competi-
tion for economic advantage, rather than a rivalry for power and strug-
gle for survival. Among those responsible for shaping and directing the 
kingdom’s foreign policy it may even have given rise to a certain smug-
ness about Danish conduct in European affairs. In a confidential letter 
written in 1757, J.H.E. Bernstorff, who conducted the foreign policy of 
the kingdom from 1751 to 1770, told a friend that ‘a war started without 
just reason – I will go even further: without necessity, seems to me to be 
the most dreadful of all decisions that human beings could take’.2 In ret-
rospect, eighteenth- century Danish neutrality may be seen as not only 
the first phase of a withdrawal from European power politics, but also as 
the beginning of what might be described as a process of sentimentaliz-
ing the nature of international relations. Though the sovereign identity, 
territorial extent, political system and social structure of Denmark, as 
well as the international conditions of Europe, all changed, that process 
continued in the following centuries.
1.1 1814
In the final decades of the first long period of neutrality distinguished 
here, the diplomatic situation of Denmark– Norway worsened consid-
erably. During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars it soon 
became more difficult to secure the basic interests of the kingdom by 
playing the European balance of power the way earlier statesmen had 
done, and sometimes also more dangerous to champion the rights and 
exploit the advantages of neutrals. Having tried, in rapidly changing 
international circumstances, to steer a safe course between great- power 
rivals and, at the same time, uphold its preferred principles of neutrality, 
Denmark ended up as an ally of Napoleonic France. The seven years of 
war that followed started with a major disaster for the kingdom and 
ended with an even greater one.
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In the crises and wars of the earlier part of the period, Denmark had 
predominantly followed its own neutral course, which on the whole had 
been cautious and defensive. In the later decades, however, it moved, 
sometimes by force of events and sometimes deliberately, towards a 
collective and more offensive policy of neutrality. In 1794 Denmark 
and Sweden signed a neutrality convention, and in the following years 
demonstrated their willingness jointly to defend their neutral status in 
the French Revolutionary War. However, while making the most of the 
economic opportunities presented by a war which involved all the great 
powers of Europe, the Danish government refused to provide convoys 
for its ships and avoided challenging Britain diplomatically.
This measure of restraint disappeared after 1797, when crown 
prince Frederick as regent took over the direction of foreign policy. 
Within a year his government provided convoys and ordered com-
manding officers to refuse visitations by belligerent powers, and if nec-
essary to back the refusal with armed force. Eventually the new policy 
led to clashes in the Mediterranean between Danish convoys and ships 
of the British navy. When the British government reacted, the Danes 
refused to back down, and maintained the principle of the inviolabil-
ity of neutral convoys in the expectation that Denmark would have the 
support of Russia, which by then had left the coalition against France. 
While Denmark appealed to Russia to revive the Armed Neutrality 
League of 1780, Britain sent a diplomat to Copenhagen to enforce 
an agreement. Faced with a threat of bombardment by a squadron 
of the British navy, the Danish government gave way temporarily. 
Shortly thereafter the tsar invited Denmark, Sweden and Prussia to 
join Russia in re- establishing an Armed Neutrality League, a principal 
aim of which would be to enforce the inviolability of neutral convoys. 
Hopeful that such an alignment would lead to a negotiated settlement 
with Britain and a formal acknowledgement of the principles of neu-
trality that Denmark had long been championing, the Danish govern-
ment decided to accept the invitation.
However, far from strengthening its bargaining position by this 
move, Denmark soon ended up a victim of new developments in the 
relationships of the great powers. While tension between Russia and 
Britain rapidly rose, the tsar and Napoleon moved closer to each other. 
Denmark, aware that Sweden had been trying to secure Russian sup-
port for an attempt to conquer Norway, recognized that it would be geo-
politically dependent on Russia in an armed conflict between Britain 
and the two strongest powers on the Continent. So when Britain sent 
a fleet to Danish waters and presented an offer of a defensive alliance, 
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the government refused, and engaged in an unequal battle with Nelson’s 
squadron at Copenhagen. In the armistice negotiations it procrasti-
nated, and accepted the British terms only after the death of Tsar Paul 
and the succession of his pro- British son Alexander I.
A few months later Denmark’s diplomatic situation became even 
more difficult. In a Russo– British convention Alexander renounced not 
only the principle of the inviolability of neutral convoys but also the 
rather more important one of ‘free ship, free cargo’ which Denmark had 
championed for generations. Unable to secure a release of the Danish 
ships captured and a return of the colonies occupied by Britain during 
the hostilities unless it accepted unconditionally the terms of the con-
vention, the government gave in to the pressures of the two powers and 
acceded to their convention. This was the end of the Danish policy of 
offensive neutrality. When, in 1803, the war with Napoleon broke out 
again, the government returned to the tradition of defensive neutrality, 
forbidding those practices which in the past had provoked Britain while, 
at the same time, taking care not to provoke France.
Thus, when four years later Denmark found itself exposed to dip-
lomatic pressures even severer than those experienced after Frederick 
assumed responsibility for foreign policy it had little to do with the 
nature of its neutrality policy. The reason was another realignment 
of the great powers. Following the defeat of the Russian army by the 
French in 1807, the tsar signed a peace treaty by which he undertook 
to accede to the Continental System of blockade and to join Napoleon 
in forcing the remaining neutrals to close their ports to all British ship-
ping. A  month later Denmark received ultimatums from both France 
and Britain, each of which presented the government with the choice 
between becoming an ally and being treated as an enemy. For Britain, 
the real concern was with the Danish navy, which, if it fell under French 
control, would complicate British naval movements and economic war-
fare. Hence the British government demanded that Denmark either 
became an ally and put its navy under British command or handed it 
over as a pledge of Danish neutrality. When the crown prince turned 
down the ultimatum, a British fleet prepared to blockade Zealand and 
landed troops north of Copenhagen. The Danish government responded 
by declaring war. After encirclement of Copenhagen and three days of 
bombardment of the capital, the Danes requested a cease- fire. When 
the British left they took with them, as their property, the entire Danish 
navy and its equipment.
Without its navy, Denmark felt compelled to accept the French ulti-
matum and join France and its allies in the war. In the treaty alliance, 
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Napoleon promised his support in case of an attack on Denmark and 
guaranteed the territorial integrity of the kingdom, while the Danish 
government undertook to join the Continental System and, together 
with France and Russia, declare war on Sweden to force it to follow suit. 
Thus Denmark, after generations of neutrality, peace and prosperity, 
ended up actively involved in a major European war.
The later years of that war became increasingly foreboding for 
Denmark. In 1810, when marshal Bernadotte was made an heir to the 
Swedish throne under the name of Carl Johan, the old idea of taking 
Norway away from Denmark received new impetus in Stockholm. Over 
the next few years Frederick VI, as the crown prince had become in 
1808, and his advisers were disturbed by news of successive Swedish 
plans for taking possession of Norway, and at one stage also parts of 
Denmark itself, with the support of one or more of the great powers. 
However, they were still inclined to rely on the guarantee of Napoleon, 
who renewed the alliance treaty in 1812. But after the subsequent 
defeats of the French army in Russia the insecurity of Denmark became 
more obvious. The king, still focusing narrowly on the possession of 
Norway, maintained his confidence in the military genius of Napoleon 
and decided to remain his ally. On the other hand, the Danish foreign 
minister and several other advisers, now increasingly apprehensive for 
the very survival of the state, feared the possibility of their country end-
ing up as the ally of a defeated Napoleon and wanted Denmark to seek 
support elsewhere. The immediate anxiety about the loss of Norway and 
the deeper fear of a deprivation of independent statehood became the 
twin preoccupations in Danish circles in the final stages of the war and 
first years of the peace.
Early in 1814 the peace treaty with Sweden was signed in Kiel. 
Denmark had to hand over all of Norway, but – apparently as a result of 
the pressure of time and an oversight by the Swedish negotiator – kept 
Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. As compensation it received 
Swedish Pomerania, which however went to Prussia in the subsequent 
Vienna settlement. Instead Frederick VI was made duke of Lauenburg. 
In the peace settlement with Britain, various colonies were returned to 
Denmark, but not the navy; and the island of Heligoland went to Britain. 
As part of the post- Napoleonic settlement of Germany, Holstein and 
Lauenburg joined the new German Confederation, where their repre-
sentative in the Diet became the Danish sovereign.
Thus, 1814 marked one of the lowest points in modern Danish his-
tory. Only seven years after the seizure of its navy and one year after 
the financial bankruptcy of the kingdom, Denmark lost about two 
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thirds of its territory (Greenland excluded) and one third of its popu-
lation. Domestically, poverty and unemployment added to the burden. 
As the great loser of the Napoleonic Wars, Denmark found itself iso-
lated and exposed when peace returned. For some time, its very sur-
vival as an independent state seemed at stake. A Norwegian rebellion 
against the transition to Sweden, which raised doubts about the role of 
the Danish government and led the great powers to set up a commis-
sion to determine its responsibility for the events in Norway, gave Carl 
Johan another opportunity to pursue his project of securing the Danish 
islands, Zealand in particular, for Sweden. The Russians, too, seemed 
to present a threat. After their peace with Denmark they left an army in 
Holstein, which gradually grew bigger and eventually occupied nearly 
all of the duchy. Thus, on the eve of the Congress of Vienna, which the 
king attended uninvited, there was a real fear in Denmark that the coun-
try might be about to suffer a fate comparable to that of Poland in the 
eighteenth century. For a while, defeatism set in.
Only a few months later, however, the danger began to recede. 
The tsar, satisfied with developments in Norway, ratified the peace 
and started to withdraw his troops. The fear of a military attack from 
Sweden lingered for some time yet. However, once the central issue 
became payment of the Norwegian part of the debt of the Danish king-
dom the tension between the two countries took on a rather different 
character. In the early 1820s relations with Sweden began to improve, 
after the great powers had put pressure on the Swedish king to settle the 
outstanding matter. As a co- signatory of the Final Act of the Congress 
of Vienna, Denmark now enjoyed the protection of what later became 
known as the Concert of Europe. For the following decades Denmark 
had no potential enemy.
From the mid- 1820s Denmark became increasingly inclined to 
turn its back on international politics and to involve itself in domestic 
affairs alone. As in some other parts of Europe in the restoration period, 
those were the Biedermeier years in Danish political and social life. 
To say that Denmark had no foreign policy, a historian of the period 
considered, would be only partly true of the years from 1824 to 1831, 
but entirely true of the following years.3 Denmark simply took care to 
keep its balance among the great powers. That required a little more 
skill in the 1830s, when tension between the two liberal powers in the 
west and the three autocratic powers in the east of Europe compelled 
Denmark to keep the lowest possible profile in diplomacy, than it had 
done in the 1820s. Maintaining such a balance allowed the govern-
ment to concentrate its international efforts on trade and transport. 
 
 
 
tr auma s and trends 11
   11
Official preoccupation with economic matters reflected not only the 
relative calm of European politics in those years but also a change in 
the character and attitudes of the foreign ministers of the country. Niels 
Rosenkrantz, who had advised the king in matters of foreign policy 
during most of the years of the alliance with Napoleonic France and had 
stayed in office until 1824, had been in the aristocratic, cosmopolitan 
tradition of the eighteenth century. His successors, the first of whom was 
Ernst Schimmelmann, identified more with the commercial interests of 
the wealthy circles at a slightly lower level of Danish society.
The age of restoration was the first part of the second long period 
of Danish foreign policy distinguished here, which lasted more than 
a hundred years. If in the eighteenth century the kingdom had been a 
power of the third rank, in the course of this period it became simply a 
small state. The most obvious reason was the succession of losses suf-
fered. However, it was also the result of certain changes in the structure 
and organization of the European states system which made the differ-
ence between great powers and other sovereign states more marked 
than before. The four principal allies of the coalition that had defeated 
Napoleon, together with France itself, were clearly superior in terms of 
power to all other states in Europe. The dominant role assumed at the 
Congress of Vienna also gave them a new status in the society of states. 
Moreover, their subsequent efforts at joint management of European 
politics, initially through the congress system of the post- war decade 
and later through the looser Concert of Europe, lent them some of the 
qualities of a class in international society. Various changes of relative 
power among the great powers themselves, first the decline of Russia in 
the earlier part of the period and, more important, the rise of Germany 
in the later age, further weakened the diplomatic position of Denmark.
As in most of the eighteenth century, Denmark stayed out of the 
wars of the great powers throughout this period. But it now moved one 
step further away from the kind of active participation in European pol-
itics that so often had characterized its foreign policy in the centuries 
before 1720. It no longer entered into military alliances. One reason was 
that the country now had so little to offer others that it was barely wor-
thy of an alliance. However, in the course of the century, particularly 
after 1870, Danish governments made a virtue of necessity by adopting 
a policy of isolation. Prudently staying neutral in the conflicts of others, 
they became increasingly inclined to present this policy in a legal and 
moral framework. Thus Danish neutrality, which in the eighteenth cen-
tury had been more a practice of diplomacy, eventually became also an 
ideology of foreign policy.
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1.2 1864
When Denmark did go to war again in the nineteenth century it was 
not as an ally of a great power in a European war but as principal in a 
local conflict, bent on defending or pursuing vital interests by its south-
ern border. In the course of the quiet years in European politics tension 
had begun to rise again in many parts of the Continent, both within and 
between states. Motivated by the new forces of liberalism and nation-
alism, growing pressures had been directed against the dynastic and 
territorial order imposed by the victorious powers at the Congress of 
Vienna. Both the national politics and the international relations of 
Denmark became affected too. Early in 1848 the new king, Frederick 
VII, responded to political pressure by voluntarily putting an end to 
absolutism and starting a process that eventually led to constitutional 
government. One result was that National Liberal leaders soon secured 
a dominating influence on the foreign policy of the country. Almost 
immediately they became involved in a crisis in the relations between 
Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.
Nationalist stirrings in the two duchies had given rise to a move-
ment which sought to separate Schleswig from Denmark, unite it 
with Holstein under a joint constitution and take it into the German 
Confederation. The policy of the new Danish government, on the other 
hand, was to unite Schleswig with Denmark. After a rebellion in the 
duchies, the government went to war on the programme of ‘Denmark 
to the Ejder’, the river separating Schleswig from Holstein. Shortly it 
found itself engaged in hostilities not only with the recalcitrant duchies 
but also with Prussia and the loose German Confederation. The Danish 
forces fought with patriotic enthusiasm and wide popular support. But, 
as the war progressed, disagreement about its aims developed among 
the Danish government, the armed forces, the diplomatic service and 
even the king, who found it difficult to accept his new constitutional 
role. The disagreement became even more pronounced in the peace 
negotiations. Eventually, after the Conservatives had gained more 
influence in the government at the expense of the National Liberals, the 
Ejder programme was abandoned. Instead the government accepted an 
arrangement which gave the kingdom three separate units: Denmark, 
Schleswig and Holstein. This outcome, agreed in 1852, presented a con-
stitutional problem for the government, the solution of which became 
the principal concern of Danish foreign policy for the next dozen years.
The general idea behind successive Danish attempts to solve the 
problem was to order relations between the three units of the kingdom in 
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a way which could provide a lasting framework for national development 
and the best possible protection against German interference. Reflecting 
a revival in the influence of the National Liberals, the efforts became 
increasingly aimed at tying Schleswig closer to Denmark and giving 
Holstein a separate status. This revival of the Ejder policy was in conflict 
with the agreement of 1852, and acceptable to neither Holstein nor the 
German Confederation, which threatened to occupy Holstein. Prussia 
favoured a solution which involved a division of Schleswig. The Danish 
government, expecting that long- standing rivalry between Austria and 
Prussia would prevent the Confederation from intervening militarily, per-
sisted with its policy, in the hope that a crisis would lead to a great- power 
conference and a satisfactory settlement. Here it had the support of the 
press, the people and most politicians. Following a German invasion of 
Schleswig, war broke out again in 1864. Denmark fought defensively with 
a view to bringing about an international conference. But when a confer-
ence eventually did meet, the Danes again found it difficult to agree on a 
policy. In the course of the conference, the differences between the king, 
the government and the foreign ministry became increasingly marked. In 
the end Prussia and Austria imposed a peace of their own, with the result 
that two years later Schleswig- Holstein became a province of Prussia.
When the king, following the defeat of the Danish forces and the 
poor performance of the diplomats, had to give up the two duchies and 
cede Lauenburg, the kingdom lost about two fifths of its territory and 
approximately one million of its inhabitants. The loss of Schleswig was 
particularly painful to the nation. A despair of the sort that had set in 
50 years earlier returned. Among politicians it was widely feared that 
Denmark might not be able to survive as an independent state. Since so 
much of Danish territory had been lost already, perhaps all of Jutland 
would be taken on some future occasion.4 Such fears reasserted them-
selves half a dozen years later, when some thought that Bismarck, fol-
lowing his defeat of France and the unification of Germany, might go on 
to conquer all of Denmark. Gradually, the darkest forebodings receded. 
Yet, some events in the next few decades, in particular the repeal of para-
graph 5 of the Peace of Prague of 1866, which had allowed for the pos-
sibility of Denmark some time in the future regaining part of Schleswig 
through a plebiscite, and the treatment of the Danish minority south of 
the new border, did little to remove Danish anxiety. In the longer run, of 
course, the sources of lasting Danish insecurity in the half century after 
1864 were not merely the growing strength and self- assertive policies of 
Bismarckian Prussia and imperial Germany but also the rising tension 
among the great powers of Europe.
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Whereas Danish concerns about survival after 1814 could be put 
to rest within a few years thanks to the territorial stability introduced 
by the Vienna treaties and maintained through the relative solidarity of 
the great powers, after 1864 it became much more difficult to rely on the 
great powers for ultimate security. While the development of Bismarck’s 
alliance system tended to divide Europe, his successors’ excursions into 
world politics helped to intensify rivalry among the great powers in 
global as well as European politics. A further source of insecurity for 
Denmark was the relative decline of Russia as a great power. In the ear-
lier part of the century after 1814 the kingdom had sometimes relied 
on the tsar for diplomatic support in critical situations, even as late as 
the difficult years from 1848 to 1852. After the Russian setback in the 
Crimean War this was no longer quite so possible. The Russian defeat in 
the war with Japan in 1904– 05 left Denmark even more isolated diplo-
matically. By then Danish governments could not escape the conclusion 
that their country was firmly within the German sphere of influence, 
in a Europe which seemed to be growing increasingly dangerous for a 
small state.
In the long run, Danish reactions to the trauma of 1864 were of 
several kinds. First, there was a marked introversion of national efforts. 
‘What is lost outwards must be gained inwards’ became the watchword 
of the nation. Through education – of adults as well as children – religion, 
literature and art, the spiritual level of the people was raised. Through 
land reclamation, more efficient agriculture, improved transport, mod-
ernized commerce and industrial initiatives the material resources of 
the country were developed. In the later decades of the century the foun-
dations were laid for the prosperous and egalitarian Denmark that was 
to take shape in the twentieth century.
Second, there was a thorough adjustment to the external situation 
of the country after the Prussian victories and the establishment of the 
German Reich. Bismarck’s defeat of France in the war of 1870– 71 soon 
put an end to Danish dreams of taking revenge for 1864 and recovering 
Schleswig – or a substantial part of it. Instead rules were developed for 
living next to a forceful and assertive great power. As early as 1878 J.B.S. 
Estrup, Conservative president of the council, asserted that Denmark in 
its diplomacy ought to move close enough to Germany to leave no doubt 
that it would be on the side of this power in a major war – ‘in any case 
never against it’.5 In the following decades Denmark, out of respect for 
the preponderance of its neighbour, desisted from pursuing the cause of 
the Danes living south of the border. After 1901 Liberal governments, in 
particular that formed by J.C. Christensen in 1905, found it necessary 
 
 
 
 
tr auma s and trends 15
   15
to steer so close to Germany in their foreign policies that they in effect 
compromised the neutral position of the state. This policy of accepting 
German hegemony came to a head with the outbreak of major war in 
1914.
Third, in the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of 
the twentieth centuries some politicians tried to secure permanently 
peaceful relations with all other states through the introduction of two 
measures available under international law, namely neutralization and 
arbitration. In Danish political thought, the idea that a country might 
save itself from the worst calamities that could befall a member of an 
anarchical society of states by declaring itself perpetually neutral in the 
conflicts of others, and having such status recognized or even guaran-
teed by the great powers, can be traced back to 1864. Amid the despair 
following the defeat, the government instructed its representatives at 
the peace negotiations to seek a permanent neutralization of the coun-
try. The victors rejected the proposal; and the idea played no real part 
in politics again till the 1890s. By then the idea, together with that of 
arbitration, had become part of the programme of the Danish peace 
movement. The Liberal party adopted it, and had it included as a goal 
in the foreign policy and defence programme drawn up for a landmark 
parliamentary agreement reached in 1894. But it was not until after 
1901, when the parliamentary system finally gained acceptance and 
the Liberals formed a government for the first time, that the party was 
able to pursue the status of neutralization actively. The Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899 and certain other developments a few years later 
gave some encouragement to those working for the idea. But by 1905, 
when the government resigned, it was clear that it was not possible to 
obtain adequate great- power support for its realization. Though the goal 
had to be dropped, pursuing it in a critical situation of European poli-
tics had underlined Denmark’s determination to remain neutral in any 
future military conflict of the great powers.
While the quest for neutralization may be seen as inspired by a dis-
position to contract out of international politics, the pursuit of arbitration 
was motivated more by a desire for the reform of international society. 
The idea of reducing the occurrence of violent conflict in international 
society by signing treaties for the settlement of disputes through the 
process of arbitration had been developed and canvassed by the inter-
national peace movement in the later part of the century and had been 
given some impetus from a diplomatic initiative by the United States in 
1890. While the initial aims were to set up a network of arbitration con-
ventions and establish a European or international court of arbitration, 
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the ultimate goal was an international society regulated by law, rather 
than by force. For Denmark, a small state in a precarious geopolitical 
situation, this was a particularly attractive goal. Having previously been 
brought up for public discussion in the 1880s, after 1890 the principle 
of arbitration became a subject of more serious debate between parlia-
ment and government. The principal champions were members of the 
Liberal party, who demanded that the government enter into treaties 
of arbitration with other countries. But the Social Democrats and later 
also the Radical Liberals, who formed a party in 1905, gave their sup-
port too. After the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 Denmark signed a 
considerable number of permanent treaties of arbitration. By then many 
Liberals, Social Democrats and Radical Liberals, representing, respec-
tively, the farmers, the workers and the smallholders of the nation, were 
inclined to see the twin principles of arbitration and neutralization as 
offering an alternative to traditional defence and security policy.
In most of the post- Napoleonic period of European restoration, 
which had been an age of international order, peace and security, the 
concerns of Danish foreign policy had been largely of an economic 
nature, relating to commerce and prosperity more than anything else. 
In the middle part of the century, a period of growing nationalism in 
Europe and moderate rivalry and limited wars among the great powers, 
the goals had been essentially political, concerned with vital interests 
and national security. In the later decades of the nineteenth and first 
part of the twentieth centuries, when tension among the great powers 
was rising and Danish dependence on Germany increasing, the ends 
often pursued most vigorously were of a more ideological kind. They 
were addressed to the quality of external relations and the norms of 
international society. While both of the earlier sets of goals had been 
confined within the current state of the international system – the first 
aimed at drawing advantage from it and the second at providing secu-
rity against it – the later set transcended the international conjuncture. 
It not only proposed legal measures for improving the existing situation 
of the country but also projected ideals for international society in gen-
eral, pre- eminently peace and justice.
Thus, while the governmental response to the external pressure 
presented by German preponderance in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries stayed within the narrow limitations of geopolitical 
considerations, some projections of the goals of Danish foreign policy 
in the same years transcended the usual confines of international pol-
itics and soared into the spheres of international law and international 
morality. A  remarkable optimism in the framing of ideological goals 
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coexisted with a marked pessimism in the formation of security policy. 
In retrospect, both attitudes may be seen as indicating a reluctance, or 
inability, to accept the basic terms of international politics. While the 
more idealistic pursuits of reform in international relations seem to have 
taken too little account of the limitations imposed by the nature of poli-
tics among sovereign states, the ultra- realistic acceptance of the confined 
external situation of the country apparently left little room for exploring 
the diplomatic opportunities presented by an international system of 
rivalling great powers. Danish attitudes to, and thoughts about, foreign 
affairs in the period leading up to the First World War suggest that an 
over- optimistic idealism, apt to encourage futile pursuits, and an over- 
pessimistic realism, conducive to fatalistic passivity, can be alternative, 
and complementary, ways of contracting out of the international politics 
of a given historical situation.
1.3 1914
The real test of Danish neutrality came in 1914. Towards the end of July, 
when a great- power conflict seemed imminent, the Radical Liberal gov-
ernment consulted the leaders of the other parties, and found they all 
agreed that the only possible policy for Denmark would be a strict and 
impartial neutrality. When war broke out, early in August, the govern-
ment issued a series of declarations of neutrality, relating to the several 
great- power conflicts. However, a number of contacts with German 
authorities had already indicated the nature of Danish neutrality. As 
early as 30 July a message from Berlin requested ‘a favourable neutrality’, 
to which the foreign minister Erik Scavenius replied ‘yes of course – to the 
extent that this can be reconciled with the concept of neutrality itself’.6 
On 2 August, before Britain had entered the war, the German minister in 
Copenhagen asked the foreign minister how Denmark would react to a 
possible violation of its territorial waters. After intense discussions with 
the king and representatives of the armed forces, Scavenius presented 
his answer the following day. The government hoped, he said, that such 
a violation would not take place. If, through no fault of Germany’s, it nev-
ertheless did, that would make no difference to the position of neutrality 
assumed by Denmark. ‘In no case,’ he asserted, ‘would Denmark ally itself 
with the enemy of Germany.’7 Thus the government made its position 
quite clear. Whoever might violate its neutrality, Denmark would not go 
to war. It followed not only that the country in no circumstances would 
be the enemy of Germany but also that it could never become its ally.
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On 5 August, after Britain had entered the war, the German 
minister enquired whether Denmark intended immediately and effec-
tively to close the Great Belt, one of the straits providing access to the 
Baltic Sea. As the German navy had already started mining the area 
south of that passage, decision- makers in Copenhagen were inclined to 
regard the enquiry more as a demand. A refusal, they thought, would be 
likely to lead the Germans to complete the mining by themselves, in the 
process perhaps occupying a couple of strategic points in Denmark. All 
of them anxious to avoid any kind of involvement in the war, most were 
inclined to accept the demand. But when the parliamentary opposition 
showed reluctance to support such a decision, the government changed 
its mind. At this stage the king, encouraged by the chief of the navy 
who believed in accommodating the Germans, intervened to make the 
government reverse its decision again. The German minister was given 
an affirmative answer, and the mines were laid. To assuage the British 
government, the king, apparently under the impression that the mines 
would not be charged, sent a message of explanation to his British coun-
terpart. George V was very understanding, as was the British minister 
in Copenhagen. At this stage of the war Britain had no real intention of 
entering the Baltic. But now Danish neutrality, in contrast with earlier 
wars between great powers, rested on closed straits.
The war itself provided further examples of Danish willingness to 
adjust to German needs. In the autumn of 1914 the government, con-
cerned about the possibility of the war moving into the Baltic, which 
might lead Germany to occupy some Danish territory, made an attempt 
to mediate between the various belligerents. When it became clear 
that there was no way of bringing about a general peace, the Germans 
encouraged the Danes to explore the possibility of a separate peace 
between Germany and Russia. Although such a peace could not be in 
the interest of the Western powers, Denmark maintained its mediating 
efforts till the summer of 1915, all the time, however, discreetly keeping 
Britain informed. In 1917, when the intensified naval warfare enhanced 
the strategic importance of southern Norway and Germany feared 
a British action in that area, the prospect of a German occupation of 
Danish territory arose again. To forestall it, the foreign minister offered 
to put certain Danish islands at the disposal of Germany if the need 
arose, and once again assured the Germans of his government’s inten-
tion to resist any British violation of Danish neutrality. However, while 
the political leaders broadly accepted the need to pursue a policy of pro- 
German neutrality, the sympathy of the king (personally quite critical 
of Germany), the army, the press and the people was overwhelmingly 
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on the side of Germany’s enemies. With Britain in particular there were 
many unofficial contacts throughout the war, the flow of military and 
political intelligence to London from highly placed Danish sources being 
especially important.
The bias towards Germany did not stop Denmark from cham-
pioning the rights of neutrals and exploiting the advantages of non- 
belligerents. In its former efforts, Denmark collaborated with the other 
Scandinavian countries, mainly through consultation and coordination 
of attempts. In the first few years of the war the Scandinavian countries, 
and other small European neutrals, repeatedly approached the United 
States with a view to gaining American protection for the rights of neu-
trals. The minimal response of the Americans did not make it any easier 
for weak European neutrals to resist the diplomatic pressure of belliger-
ent great powers and maintain a strict and impartial neutrality.
In drawing on the economic advantages of non- belligerent states, 
Denmark was rather more successful. Though highly dependent for its 
foreign trade on both Britain and Germany, it had considerable bargain-
ing power over each, which it used with remarkable skill. Its negotia-
tors could argue that unless Denmark kept up its exports to Britain, it 
would not be able to receive the raw materials needed to maintain the 
supply of agricultural products to Germany. Thus they convinced the 
Germans that it was not in their interests to continue the embargo on 
Danish exports to Britain that had been imposed at the outset of the war. 
Britain, on the other hand, wanted Danish exports enough to accept that 
an increasing share went to Germany. Within Denmark, the pattern of 
foreign trade that emerged was of particular benefit to the agricultural 
interests. But the shipping section, too, benefited from the war, even 
though a very large part of the merchant navy was requisitioned by the 
allied powers and many ships were lost.
Notwithstanding the various concessions to Germany, Denmark 
remained a neutral state. Whereas the Conservative Estrup in 1878 
and the Liberal I.C. Christensen in 1907 had envisaged an alliance with 
Germany as a possibility in an extreme situation, the Radical Liberal 
leaders of 1914– 18 did not go beyond a fairly passive and guarded 
compliance with German requirements in specific matters and never 
really considered engaging in the war. Though the government carried 
out a partial mobilization at the beginning of the war and repeatedly 
expressed its intention to resist a British violation of Danish neutrality, 
the Radical Liberal lack of faith in military resources qualified its deter-
mination to defend its position with physical means. The anti- militarism 
of the governing party, which was shared by many Social Democrats, 
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pointed to the security and defence policy that would take its final form 
in the following decades.
So did another characteristic of Danish neutrality in the First 
World War, namely a suggestion of intellectual and moral superiority. As 
upheld by the Radical Liberal leaders, the policy reflected an inner con-
fidence that the principle of non- involvement in the violent struggles of 
great powers was in harmony with the intellectual and moral forces that 
they, in common with a growing number of Social Democrats, believed 
would be shaping international relations in the twentieth century.
After the end of the war most Danes regarded the policy of neu-
trality as having been successful. It had kept the country out of war and 
given it substantial economic advantages, and had done the same for 
Sweden and Norway. The Radical Liberal government, which remained 
in office till 1920, now wanted to obtain some lasting protection for 
the international status of neutral states. Following an abortive revival 
of the old ideas of neutralization and arbitration, its representatives, 
together with those of the other Scandinavian nations, concentrated 
their efforts on influencing the drafting of what became known as 
the Covenant of a League of Nations projected by the victorious allies. 
Danish attention focused on the plans for a system of collective security, 
in particular on article 16 of the draft Covenant, which set out the obli-
gations of members of the proposed League in dealing with a state in 
breach of the Covenant. The main concern of the government was that a 
member might find itself automatically obliged to participate in military 
sanctions. However, it received assurances that, while participation in 
economic sanctions would be obligatory, in the application of military 
sanctions the duties of members would not go beyond granting right of 
passage to those engaged in imposing them.
Early in 1920 the parliament unanimously approved Danish 
membership of the League of Nations. Yet the new Liberal government 
continued the endeavours to ease the role of small states in the new 
organization, and did achieve a few concessions regarding the obli-
gations to participate in economic sanctions and to grant right of pas-
sage. Three of the four parts of the programme for maintaining peace 
among nations laid down in the Covenant, namely peaceful settlement 
of disputes, disarmament and peaceful change, were in harmony with 
most Danish thinking about international relations. But the principle of 
solidarity against aggression and war, on which the fourth part, collec-
tive security, rested, remained difficult to accept for large sections of a 
nation which for more than a hundred years had stayed out of alliances 
and escaped involvement in major wars.
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1.4 1940
As early as the Crimean War, a French critic of Danish policy had 
described the country as ‘craintif et optimiste’ at one and the same time.8 
That description would apply equally well to Denmark in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, it was in the decades 
before the First World War, when the concern to reform international 
society was more urgent and the need to adjust to geopolitical condi-
tions most pressing, that the psychological and philosophical dichotomy 
in the Danish approach to foreign affairs became most pronounced. 
The coexistence, in a duality of hope and fear, of a tenacious faith in 
the advance of international law and order and gloomy apprehensions 
of war and invasion marked the pre- 1914 Danish mind.
The attitudes and policies of Denmark in the third historical period 
distinguished here, which started a few years after the First and led up 
to and included most of the Second World War, again contained opposite 
strands. On the one hand, there was a marked tendency to draw inspi-
ration from the goals and principles of internationalism, of both the 
liberal and the socialist kind. On the other hand, there was a compul-
sion to respond to the necessity of geopolitics. In the 1920s, when the 
state of the world in the eyes of most people in many countries seemed 
to present substantial grounds for optimism about the consolidation of 
international society, the former set of ideas was clearly the prevailing 
influence. But in the 1930s, when Denmark again was exposed to pres-
sure from a powerful and aggressive neighbour, the internationalist 
creed was soon cast into the shade by a geopolitical determinism more 
pessimistic than ever before.
In the early 1920s the international situation of Denmark seemed 
safer than it had been for centuries. The collapse of the Russian gov-
ernment in 1917 and the establishment of five states round the eastern 
part of the Baltic had reduced Russian pressure on the region. The defeat 
of Germany in 1918 had removed the pressure from the south. And the 
subsequent signing of the Versailles peace treaty and setting up of the 
League of Nations had restored a formal concert of great powers and 
provided a machinery for maintaining peace among nations. Even later 
in the post- war decade the situation seemed fairly safe. The Soviet Union 
did not yet appear to present a serious danger. The eastern boundaries 
of the two central European powers were protected by the alliance sys-
tem formed by France and the new states in eastern Europe, while the 
western borders of Germany were guaranteed by the Locarno system 
set up in 1925. The following year the pacification and rehabilitation of 
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Germany was sealed when the Weimar Republic joined the League of 
Nations. As late as the beginning of the 1930s the international political 
situation still seemed calm.
A further source of satisfaction for Denmark was the redrawing 
of its southern boundary in 1920, when, following a plebiscite, North 
Schleswig was reunited with the rest of the country. At last Denmark 
could count itself a satiated state. However, the circumstance that the 
reunification had been effected as part of the Versailles settlement, and 
not been explicitly endorsed by Germany, was a matter of some concern 
to the Danish government. When it subsequently attempted to confirm 
the new border by securing a formal recognition, no German signature 
was forthcoming. In the 1930s, when Germany increasingly showed 
signs of its intention to overthrow the Versailles settlement, the status 
of South Jutland, as the province was known to the Danes, became a 
source of considerable nervousness in Denmark.
With no threat looming on the political horizon and no further 
revisionist goal preoccupying the country, it seemed safe for Denmark to 
reduce its post- war military establishment. In 1922 parliament passed a 
new defence act, which reduced the number of battalions from 52 to 35, 
gave up the concentration on the defence of Zealand and confirmed the 
demolition of the fortification of Copenhagen, which had been carried 
out already. The act, which was based on the work of a committee set up 
in 1919, represented a rather one- sided compromise between the Liberal 
party, in government since 1920, and the Conservatives, who had found 
it expedient, in terms of parliamentary politics, to accept most of the 
Liberal proposals. It entailed a sharp reduction in the budgets of both the 
army and the navy. While the spokesmen of the navy had exerted some 
influence on the negotiations, the army chiefs had suffered from internal 
divisions and had played only a minor role in the decision- making. The 
Radical Liberals and the Social Democrats voted against the bill. While 
the former wanted an even severer reduction of defence expenditure, 
the latter advocated disarmament. However, in neither theory nor prac-
tice was there much difference between the positions of the two parties. 
Basically, the leaders of both believed not only that Denmark would be 
quite unable to defend itself against Germany, the only potential enemy, 
but also that maintaining armed forces of any significant size would be 
more likely to provoke than to deter an attack on Denmark. During the 
10 years that followed the 1922 act, the two parties repeatedly put for-
ward proposals for unilateral disarmament.
With security and defence not matters of pressing concern, the 
governments of the 1920s were able to concentrate their efforts in other 
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fields. In diplomacy, they aimed at staying on fairly good terms with the 
great powers, particularly with Germany, and keeping out of any wars 
that might occur. In economic relations, they cultivated the two fore-
most trading partners, namely Britain, which bought nearly two thirds 
of Danish exports, and Germany, which supplied more than a third of 
the imports. In the ideological sphere, they were guided by the values 
and norms which the nation had inherited from the past. On one level, 
they upheld the democratic ideals and practices in a world in which 
rival political ideologies were beginning to establish themselves. On 
another level, they continued the pursuit of the broad internationalist 
goals formulated in the later part of the previous period of Danish for-
eign policy. Here the aim was to develop an international society which 
would be regulated by law rather than by power and characterized by 
peace instead of by recurrent wars. The League of Nations provided new 
machinery for the pursuit of international order. In this forum Denmark 
concerned itself with the rights of small states in particular. Seeking to 
protect and develop the rights of the lesser and more numerous mem-
bers of international society could be seen as an attempt to extend dem-
ocratic principles to international life.
In the early 1930s, however, signs of a rapid deterioration in the 
general situation of Europe began to accumulate. The economic difficul-
ties that had plunged the world into a major crisis in the late 1920s per-
sisted. Fascism, already triumphant in Italy, was fast undermining the 
political structure of the Weimar Republic, Germany’s first experiment 
with democracy. Adolf Hitler’s accession to power in 1933 signalled a 
new aggressiveness in German foreign policy. Within only a few years 
Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, introduced conscrip-
tion and reorganized the army, and invaded the Rhineland. In 1935– 36 
Mussolini’s Italy was conquering Abyssinia, and subsequently interven-
ing in the Spanish civil war together with Germany. By the middle of the 
1930s Denmark once again found itself in an exposed position.
In October 1936, when Hitler and Mussolini formed the Berlin– 
Rome Axis, the multiple system of five European great powers took on 
a triangular shape. In one corner were the two Axis powers, in another 
the two Western League powers and in the third the Soviet Union. The 
ideological struggle between fascism, liberal democracy and commu-
nism reinforced the diplomatic– strategic triangularity. The shape of the 
triangle changed several times. In the original configuration the three 
rival parties were all quite far from each other. But the Anglo– French 
efforts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreements 
of 1938, brought the two League powers and the Axis powers closer to 
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each other. Later the Nazi– Soviet pact, signed in August 1939, and the 
outbreak of the war in the West established a bond between the Soviet 
Union and the Axis powers. Finally, after Germany invaded Russia in 
June 1941, the Soviet Union joined the Western powers in the military 
alliance against Germany and its allies.
For Denmark, one of the most significant events in the chang-
ing diplomatic alignments of the period was the signing of an Anglo– 
German naval agreement in June 1935. That agreement, which could be 
seen as an early move in the British attempt to appease Hitler, in effect 
left the control of the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea to Germany. Thus 
Denmark and Danish waters once again became part of the German 
sphere of influence. Subsequent changes in the alignment of the great 
powers did little to alter that situation.
Throughout this critical period in Danish history the country was 
governed by a coalition of Social Democrats and Radical Liberals. With 
Thorvald Stauning, leader of the Social Democrats, as prime minister 
and Peter Munch, Radical Liberal leader, as foreign minister, the gov-
ernment stayed in office from 1929 till immediately after the German 
invasion of Denmark in April 1940. The traditional anti- militarism of the 
Social Democrats and the pacifist tendencies of many Radical Liberals 
left their mark on the defence, the security and the foreign policy of the 
government.
The reduction of the military forces initiated in 1922 was contin-
ued. In 1932, at a time when the international political situation still 
seemed relatively safe but the economic conditions had become very 
serious for Denmark, a bill for a new defence act was prepared and, 
with a minimum of debate, passed by both houses of parliament in less 
than a week. The number of army battalions was reduced from 35 to 
24 and the size of the navy cut severely. The army now had only two 
divisions, one on Zealand and the other in Jutland. Later the same year 
the minister of defence described the new act as amounting in reality to 
disarmament of the country.9 The bill had been presented on the initia-
tive of the Liberal party, which represented the agricultural interest, the 
section of the economy hardest hit by the international crisis. The two 
governing parties had accepted the proposal as a big step in the right 
direction. They were still advocating unilateral disarmament, but had 
failed to have their successive proposals passed by the upper house of 
parliament. Only the Conservatives voted against the bill.
The third set of inter- war defence laws was enacted in 1937. By 
then the rearmament of Germany and the ambitions of Hitler were pre-
senting a growing threat, to the sovereignty of particular neighbouring 
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states as well as to the peace of Europe. The League of Nations had shown 
itself unable to provide protection against aggression by a great power. 
All the political leaders in Denmark were aware of the risk of major war 
and the potential threat to their country. Yet the changes to the exist-
ing defence structure now proposed by the government were a mixture 
of fairly minimal improvements and some further cuts. While both the 
army and the navy received some additional funds for new matériel, the 
army incurred a reduction in size. The air force was reduced from five 
squadrons to four, and only three batteries were allocated for the aerial 
defence of Copenhagen.
The bill, which was passed with the votes of only the two govern-
ing parties, reflected more the convictions of the Radical Liberals than 
of the Social Democratic leaders. Since 1933 Stauning, encouraged by 
some influential younger members of his party, had developed certain 
doubts about the long- standing anti- militarism of the labour move-
ment and had made a few tentative moves towards a strengthening of 
the defence of the country. But Munch, a dogmatic anti- militarist and 
the dominating intellectual influence on the government, had rejected 
or ignored such attempts to change the policy. He and some of his col-
leagues, and no doubt many supporters not only of his own but also of 
other parties, were still of the opinion that a build- up of defence would 
not reduce the vulnerability of the country, and might even add to it. The 
Conservatives, on the other hand, attacked the bill strongly and voted 
against it. In their view, a reasonable defence, though of course it could 
never be strong enough to meet a German attack in a war with Denmark 
alone, might well help deter an attack in the more likely situation where 
Germany was at war with one or more great powers and had most of 
its forces engaged elsewhere. The Liberals abstained from the vote. The 
service chiefs had had only a minor role in the preparation of the bill, 
mainly because of disagreement between the navy and the army, but 
largely shared the views of the Conservatives.
After the German annexation of a compliant Austria in 1938 the 
government did allocate some funds for the strengthening, as distinct 
from the expansion, of the armed forces. However, the effect on the mil-
itary capability of the nation was of no great significance. In April 1940, 
when Germany was ready to invade Denmark and Norway, the Danish 
army consisted of two divisions, the navy was small and most of its ships 
old, and Copenhagen was practically without any aerial defence. It was 
a force capable only of dealing with incidental violations of Danish ter-
ritory, not of defending the country against a proper attack. While the 
reduction in the defensive forces introduced in the early 1920s had been 
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facilitated by confidence in the stability of post- war international rela-
tions, the restraint exercised in the later 1930s was conditioned more by 
despair about the external situation of Denmark, in a Europe of rapidly 
rising tension and instability.
One reason for despondency was the diplomatic isolation of 
Denmark. As in the nineteenth century, the government made vari-
ous attempts in the 1930s to find allies or protectors. In 1933 it enter-
tained some hope that Britain would offer military help if needed. But 
the British did not commit themselves. Four years later, when Stauning 
spoke to the foreign secretary Anthony Eden in London and voiced his 
concern about the Danish– German border, he received only assurances 
of diplomatic support against a threat from Germany. In February 1940 
Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, confirmed verbally 
that, because of Denmark’s proximity to Germany, Britain would be 
unable to provide help in case of a conflict between the two neighbours.
The other conceivable source of support was the other Nordic 
countries. The events in Germany in 1933 gave impulse to Danish 
efforts to strengthen the bonds with the neighbours in the north. But 
when Stauning began to explore the idea of cooperating in matters of 
defence it became clear that there was no prospect of establishing a 
Scandinavian front against German aggression. The Norwegian and 
the Swedish governments were against it; and the pacifist sections of 
Stauning’s own party as well as the Radical Liberal leaders and support-
ers did not like the idea either. While the Danish objections were largely 
ideologically conditioned, the Norwegian and Swedish reactions rested 
mainly on strategic considerations. The two governments shared the risk 
assessment of the Danes, and found the strategic position of Denmark 
essentially hopeless. Nor did the decline of the League of Nations and 
the abandonment of the system of collective security later in the 1930s, 
or even the outbreak of war in 1939, lead to Scandinavian cooperation, 
whether in matters of defence or in the fields of politics and economics.
The military weakness and diplomatic isolation of Denmark were 
clearly reflected in the foreign policy of its government. From the mid- 
1930s to the retreat of the coalition government in the crisis of August 
1943 Denmark’s foreign policy was dominated by its fear of Germany. 
In the first few years of Hitler’s regime it still seemed just possible that 
the system of collective security introduced in 1920 might offer some 
protection against latent German aggression. But the great powers’ 
handling of the Italo– Abyssinian conflict in 1935– 36 indicated that it 
could be of little help. Instead of enforcing economic sanctions against 
Mussolini’s Italy after its attack on Abyssinia, Britain and France chose 
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to appease Italy at the expense of Abyssinia. For Denmark, as for many 
other small states, that crisis became a turning- point in the attitude 
to the League of Nations. To its foreign minister, whose long- standing 
doubts about the ability of the League of Nations to check expansionistic 
actions by a great power temporarily had given way to a certain amount 
of optimism, the handling of the crisis confirmed that a small state could 
not rely on the League for help against a great power. Only the more tra-
ditional ways of responding to the German threat, it now seemed, were 
open to Denmark.
In the later 1930s Danish foreign policy increasingly followed 
the principle of accommodating Germany. Initially, when Denmark 
was a member of the Council of the League of Nations, that policy was 
pursued largely through the League. Danish representatives devoted 
much effort to attempting to improve relations between the Western 
great powers and Germany, and to securing a more equal position for 
the latter within the Versailles system. Thus, when Hitler’s govern-
ment in 1935 challenged the system by announcing its intention to 
build up the armed forces and reintroduce conscription, the Danish 
foreign minister tried to make the great powers tone down their con-
demnation of the proposed measures and, when he failed, abstained 
from the vote. When, the following year, Germany sent troops into the 
demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, the Danish line in the debate of 
the Council was again conciliatory. After the usual round of consulta-
tions with the other Scandinavian governments, the Danish decision- 
makers found that they could vote for a resolution which simply 
acknowledged that a breach of treaty obligations had taken place, but 
not for one which amounted to a censure of Germany. Guided by a 
wish to see all the great powers concerned take up negotiations with 
each other, the foreign minister recommended, in a secret meeting of 
the Council, that Germany should not only be allowed to participate 
on an equal footing in the deliberations of the Council but also be free 
to make proposals of its own. In the diplomacy of the next few years, 
after the Italo– Abyssinian crisis, Denmark continued on its course of 
conciliation mainly by steering close to Britain, which itself was grad-
ually moving nearer to Germany.
In the last year of peace, after Hitler had invaded and incorpo-
rated Austria and German foreign policy had entered a more aggres-
sive phase, Denmark had to handle relations with Germany on its own. 
Afraid of being drawn into a major war and anxious to have its neutral-
ity respected, it scrupulously avoided offending Hitler’s government 
and did what it could to accommodate German requirements. Earlier 
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in 1938, it had already conceded Germany the right to fly over the 
Danish straits in times of war. In April the following year, when Hitler 
offered Denmark a pact of non- aggression, the government was again 
responsive. Such a pact, the decision- makers thought, might serve as a 
substitute for a more explicit recognition of the Danish– German bor-
der of 1920. At any rate, a rejection of the proposal, they feared, might 
offend the German leadership. While the other Scandinavian countries 
declined similar offers from Hitler, Denmark took up negotiations on its 
own. When the Germans agreed to include in the protocol of the treaty a 
statement which in effect allowed Denmark, in any future war between 
Germany and Britain, to continue trading with the latter according to 
the normal rules of neutrality, the pact was soon ready for signature. 
However, out of concern for the reactions of the Danish public, Munch 
declined an invitation to attend the signing ceremony in Berlin.
On 1 September, when Germany and Poland were at war with 
each other, Denmark issued its first declaration of neutrality. Two days 
later, when the Second World War had broken out, it followed up with 
a declaration of complete neutrality, based on a set of rules drawn up 
by a group of neutrals in March the previous year. On 5 December, a 
few days after the Soviet Union and Finland had gone to war with each 
other, Stauning confirmed in parliament that Denmark had to maintain 
its policy of neutrality.
In the First World War, one of the most important means, and 
ends, of pursuing such a policy had been foreign trade. Now again the 
government’s line was to seek to balance its trade with Germany against 
that with Britain. After an unsuccessful attempt by a group of neutrals 
to cooperate in defence of their rights to trade with the belligerents, 
Denmark took up independent negotiations with each of the two pow-
ers. The German negotiators, adhering to the agreed interpretation 
of the non- aggression pact, accepted the argument that the export of 
Danish goods to Germany was dependent on the import of British raw 
materials for Danish agriculture, and therefore on the Danish export 
of agricultural products to Britain. With the British, who saw Danish 
exports to Germany as an obstacle to their economic warfare and were 
prepared to reduce their dependence on Danish products, it was much 
more difficult to reach an agreement. The negotiations went on for more 
than four months, the parties signing an agreement only a week before 
the Germans invaded Denmark. Yet, in the economic sphere, Denmark 
managed to maintain a balance between the two principal belligerents 
in the first winter of the war.
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In other areas it proved more difficult to sustain such a balance. In 
November the Germans requested a mining of the Danish straits, which 
before the war they had wanted kept clear for passage even in wartime. 
The Danish government decided to meet what was in effect a demand, 
for the same reason as in 1914, namely that if it refused the Germans 
would lay the mines themselves and thereby violate Danish neutrality. 
Thus, from an early stage of the war, Denmark seemed set on a course 
which would render its neutrality as biased in favour of Germany as it 
had been in the First World War. Soon, however, signs began to appear 
that in this war the country might have to face a more radical challenge 
to its neutrality than it had encountered in the earlier one.
By the middle of January several reports indicating that both 
Germany and Britain might be preparing military actions against 
Denmark and Norway had reached the foreign ministry. The information 
had only little effect on the defence posture of the country. In his New 
Year speech the prime minister had already reminded the nation that 
Denmark was armed with a view to defending its neutrality, and that the 
character of the country and the population’s aversion to war excluded 
the possibility of preparing effectively for a real war. Reductions in the 
size of the standing army continued as planned, leaving only 6,263 men 
in early February, though approximately 8,000 men were recruited in 
the course of February and March. On the diplomatic level, the growing 
threat led the foreign minister to initiate a Scandinavian peace appeal, 
his third such appeal since December. It made as little impression on the 
belligerents as the earlier attempts had done.
When German forces invaded Denmark in the early hours of 9 
April, they met only token and sporadic resistance. The government, 
threatened with aerial bombardment of Copenhagen, capitulated the 
same morning. Since the occupation, so to speak, took place in a peace-
ful manner and the Germans presented it as an act of protection against 
an imminent British attack on Denmark and Norway, promising not to 
use Danish territory as a base in the war with its enemies and to respect 
the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the country, the 
government was able to maintain that Denmark had retained its non- 
belligerent status. However, the new situation did affect both the diplo-
matic links and the foreign trade of the country. While Denmark could 
maintain diplomatic relations with the neutrals and with Germany’s 
allies, it had to break them with Britain and France. Similarly, it could 
continue its trade with the neutrals and Germany’s allies but not with 
the Western powers.
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Though neither of the two major opposition parties wanted to share 
the responsibility for the foreign and defence policy pursued in the 1930s 
or to become too closely identified with the decisions made by the king, 
the principal ministers and the service chiefs within hours of the inva-
sion, both the Liberals and the Conservatives agreed to be represented 
in a coalition government. Still with Stauning as prime minister and 
Munch as foreign minister, the new government assumed the responsi-
bility for protecting the population, social structure and political system 
of a country under occupation. The way it went about it became known 
to its supporters as the policy of negotiation, the term cooperation then 
being used to refer to relations among the political parties represented 
in the government. The negotiations with the authorities of the occu-
pying power, usually the minister representing the foreign ministry in 
Berlin, were conducted through the Danish foreign ministry.
Three months later a reconstruction of the government took place. 
In accordance with the wishes of the Conservatives, the unpopular for-
eign minister Munch was removed from the post he had occupied since 
1929. His place was taken by Erik Scavenius, the man who as foreign 
minister in a Radical Liberal government had helped to see Denmark 
through the First World War. Strongly supported by the king and well 
respected by Stauning, he was recognized as an expert in handling the 
Germans. Like so many other observers, in Denmark and elsewhere, he 
had been so impressed with the early victories of Hitler’s armies that 
he had come to believe that Germany would win the war. Consequently 
he thought it prudent, perhaps necessary, step by step to shift the line 
of the government from procrastinating negotiation towards deliberate 
cooperation with the occupying power. However, in no way an admirer 
of the ideology of Nazism or the style of the Hitlerite regime, Scavenius 
never abandoned the basic concerns of protecting Danish interests and 
values and retaining as much of the sovereignty of the state as possible.
After the death of Stauning in May 1942, his place as prime min-
ister and Social Democratic leader was taken by Vilhelm Buhl, who, as 
minister of finance, had been critical of Scavenius’s readiness to accom-
modate the Germans. Buhl’s brief tenure of office was marked by grow-
ing difficulties with the Germans and mounting dissatisfaction in Berlin 
with developments in Denmark. The major problem was the beginning 
of sabotage and other signs of the emergence of organized resistance to 
the occupying power. In November Buhl resigned after strong pressure 
from the German authorities. A  ministerial crisis was resolved when 
Scavenius, at German insistence, agreed to head the government and 
handle foreign relations. Thus it was he who, together with the new 
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representative of the German foreign ministry Werner Best, became 
responsible for managing the difficult process of cooperation in a period 
of emerging organized resistance. Less than 10 months later this phase 
of Danish– German relations came to a dramatic end.
Since the autumn of 1942 Danish workers had become increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the economic consequences of the policy pursued 
by the government and supported by major institutions, including the 
leadership of their trade unions. The Communist party, illegal since 
the summer of 1941, and others intent on rupturing cooperation with 
the occupying power had exploited such dissatisfaction and encouraged 
rebellious tendencies, particularly in key industries. The result had been 
a considerable number of strikes. In the summer of 1943, when Germany 
had suffered major defeats in Russia and Africa and the fortunes of war 
seemed to have shifted decisively in favour of the allied powers, both 
strikes and acts of sabotage multiplied. Disturbances in the form of 
stirring public meetings, hostile demonstrations and street fights with 
German soldiers took place in several provincial towns, notably Odense, 
Esbjerg and Aalborg. Though the industrial strikes and the major public 
disturbances may have appeared at the time as essentially spontaneous, 
they were often initiated by individual members of the Communist party 
and organized in coordination with local resistance groups. However, 
they enjoyed the support of sections of the public which, growing tired 
of the policy of cooperation, were ready to react to reports or rumours of 
German brutality.
When the situation seemed to be heading for breaking- point, with 
one town after another subjected to curfew and other repressive mea-
sures, and paralysed by mass strike, the first reaction of the government 
once more was to appeal to the population to maintain order and not 
allow control to slip out of the hands of the Danish authorities. However, 
in the course of the month of August the role of the government, as a buf-
fer between the Danish population and the German authorities, rapidly 
became far more difficult. At a time when it already was losing author-
ity, the government came up against German demands and pressures so 
extreme as to leave little room for negotiating solutions to the mounting 
difficulties.
The situation was becoming equally difficult for Werner Best. He 
had committed himself to the policy of managing the occupation of 
Denmark through cooperation with its government, and had staked his 
career on its success. The inability of the Danish government to con-
trol the situation and put an end to the disturbances caused him to lose 
ground in a long- standing rivalry with the military authorities in the 
 
 
 
danIsH re aC t Ions to German oCCuPat Ion32
   32
country, who favoured a more heavy- handed way of dealing with rebel-
lious manifestations. Soon he was called to Berlin to face his superior, 
Ribbentrop, and present his account of the developments in Denmark.
On 27 August he returned with an ultimatum, which he presented 
to Scavenius the next morning. The list of German demands included 
the proclamation of a general state of emergency, which prohibited any 
assembly of more than five persons and any kind of strike. It also imposed 
a strict curfew, the introduction of censorship of the press with German 
participation and the establishment of special courts to deal swiftly, 
and most severely, with breaches of regulations to maintain security 
and order. The ultimatum also demanded that capital punishment be 
introduced forthwith for acts of sabotage, attacks on German forces or 
individuals and possession of firearms or explosives. The German gov-
ernment expected an answer the same afternoon.
The cabinet and a standing committee of representatives of the old 
political parties met to discuss the terms of the document, and immedi-
ately agreed that the German demands were unacceptable. An answer 
went off, which stated that, while the government was willing to take 
all necessary measures to secure order, it could not agree to implement 
the arrangements demanded since such a course would destroy all pos-
sibilities of maintaining lasting public order. The Scavenius– Best nego-
tiating duel was coming to an end. While Scavenius, facing a growing 
public dissatisfaction with the policy of the government, was in effect 
losing his popular mandate, Best, through a weakening of his position 
in the power struggle with the military occupation forces, was losing his 
support in Berlin. The base of the intergovernmental form of Danish– 
German cooperation was about to disappear.
The following night German forces carried out surprise attacks on 
army camps throughout the country and, often after intense exchange of 
fire, disarmed and interned officers and men and seized all war matériel. 
When, simultaneously, they attacked naval establishments, most of the 
units managed either to sink their ships or, in a few cases, to take them 
to neutral port in Sweden. The Germans also arrested many prominent 
men and women and interned them, for use as hostages in case of public 
disturbances.
In the early morning of 29 August, general Hermann von 
Hanneken, commander- in- chief of German forces in Denmark, pro-
claimed a state of emergency with severe restrictions, including nation- 
wide curfew and the death penalty for strikers. He also announced that 
he had assumed executive power, and that the king and the government 
had thus ceased to function. Later the same day, the government met for 
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the last time, and decided to tender its resignation to the king. Not till 
after the liberation, on 5 May 1945, did Denmark again have an active 
government.
Despite his difficulties in Berlin and failure in Denmark, Best 
remained Ribbentrop’s man in Copenhagen, and continued his rivalry 
with von Hanneken, and later also with general Günther Pancke, chief of 
the German police forces in the country. Best’s first concern after 29 August 
was to have a new government established. Through Nils Svenningsen, 
head of the foreign ministry, he put his case to members of the deacti-
vated government, stating that the alternative would be direct German 
government of the country. An inner circle of politicians met to discuss 
the proposal, and found that it would not be possible now to form a law-
ful government. The king concurred, and only Scavenius and a few others 
thought that it would be wrong and irresponsible to refuse to comply.
In the course of the debate among the politicians it appeared 
that German rule might not be the only possible alternative. After the 
king and the government had ceased to function, the permanent sec-
retaries had decided, with the approval of former ministers, to stay in 
office. Each of them, acting on his own responsibility, had been taking 
administrative decisions within his department. In the process, they had 
acquired certain necessary additional rights. The rest of the civil service 
had also stayed in place and continued their work. Thus, in September it 
was possible to argue that the public administration of the country could 
be maintained without a government, and that there would be no need 
for German rule. That point was made when the politicians’ refusal to 
form a government was presented to Best.
In the end, a practice developed of maintaining the Danish– 
German diplomatic relationship through meetings and negotiations 
between Best and Svenningsen. In this way, Germany could sustain its 
political pressure on Denmark through its usual channel, the local repre-
sentative of the German foreign ministry. And Denmark could respond 
to such pressure through the head of its foreign ministry, who not only 
enjoyed the support and cooperation of the permanent secretaries of 
all the other administrative departments but also received backing and 
some discreet guidance from members of a committee of politicians 
representing the old parties and the defunct government. Thus, though 
the relationship could no longer be intergovernmental, the practice of 
limited cooperation between unequal partners continued. The arrange-
ment lasted till the end of the occupation. However, from the spring 
of 1944 it was complicated by increasing contact between some of the 
administrative heads and the leadership of the resistance movement.
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Before the August crisis the principal feature of Denmark under 
occupation had been governmental cooperation with the occupying 
power. After that event it soon became active resistance. One reason for 
the shifting picture was simply that the continuation, through admin-
istrative channels, of the practice of cooperation was so discreet that it 
attracted much less attention. The real change, however, was the grow-
ing strength and determination of the resistance movement. Here sev-
eral factors played a part. One was the disappearance of a government 
which regularly had admonished the population to maintain order and 
show moderation and warned against sabotage and other militant acts. 
Another factor was the intensification of German brutality and terror. 
This was marked by the attempt only weeks after the August crisis to 
round up Jews and send them to German camps, by the reactions to the 
mass strike in Copenhagen in the summer of 1944 and by the subse-
quent arrest and deportation of about 2,000 police officers as well as by 
the torture and execution of members of the resistance movement who 
had been arrested by German police.
A contributory cause of decisive importance for the efforts and 
achievements of the resistance movement in the later period of the occupa-
tion was the arrival of organizers, instructors and radio operators as well 
as weapons, explosives and other equipment from Britain under its Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) programme. Last, but not least important, 
was the conditioning influence of the news of German defeats on several 
fronts and the prospect of Hitler probably losing the war. With German 
armies on the retreat in major theatres and its forces stretched, it made 
more sense to move from passive to active resistance in Denmark. For the 
same reasons, such resistance now enjoyed growing public support.
Its first aim, ending governmental cooperation with the enemy 
authorities, having been achieved, the resistance movement was able 
to concentrate on the major task of offering resistance to the occupy-
ing power. The most urgent needs were to organize the movement and 
build up its strength. In September 1943 six men met in Copenhagen 
to seek some coordination of the activities of the many different resis-
tance groups scattered across the country. Representing four major ille-
gal organizations, namely the Communists, the right- of- centre national 
movement Danish Unity, the cross- party organization Frit Danmark and 
the nation- wide cultural and political association the Ring, they decided 
to set up what became known as Denmark’s freedom council. After a 
lengthy struggle to gain acceptance and secure control, the council 
established itself as the body representing the whole movement.
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Though generally distrusted by the leaders of the old political 
parties and the officers of the general staff of the army and other rep-
resentatives of official Denmark, initially inclined to suspect that it was 
a front organization of the Communists, the freedom council eventu-
ally acquired an authority which went far beyond resistance circles. In 
a country without government, army and police, it became a central 
organ with considerable influence. In crises between the public and the 
Germans, it gradually acquired a political role. In the general strike in 
Copenhagen in 1944, its influence proved decisive.
After some suspicion and hesitation, the allied powers, too, came 
to recognize the freedom council as the body to deal with in occu-
pied Denmark, in both military and political matters. SOE’s leader in 
Denmark since March 1943, Flemming B.  Muus, joined it almost at 
the outset, representing the ‘free Danes’ abroad. His successor, Ole 
Lippmann, took part in its meetings as observer and joined its command 
committee. When the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1944, agreed to 
accept a permanent representative of ‘the fighting Denmark’ in Moscow, 
he was appointed by the freedom council.
Throughout its existence, the council issued a number of procla-
mations and guidelines. Aimed at both members of the resistance move-
ment and a wider public, they were marked by moderation and a sense 
of responsibility. The council also set up various committees to manage 
existing activities, including the illegal press and sabotage, and to deal 
with new matters arising. Soon priority had to be given to the setting up 
of an underground army, to support allied forces in case of an invasion 
or of a final battle with German forces on Danish soil.
The plans for such an army, as for similar forces in other occupied 
countries, had been prepared by SOE, partly with a view to keeping the 
Germans in uncertainty as to the location of the Anglo– American inva-
sion, then already under preparation. The instructions reached the lead-
ership of the resistance towards the end of 1943. SOE envisaged a force 
that would be armed by Britain and be under allied command. While 
the former arrangement was most acceptable, the latter was not. The 
freedom council insisted on maintaining command and control, at least 
up to the time when the force might become actively engaged in the 
war. Eventually a compromise was reached. In June 1944 the council 
set up its command committee, in which SOE, the council and the illegal 
general staffs of the professional army and navy were represented. The 
committee would be responsible for recruiting, organizing, equipping 
and, prior to direct combat, commanding the army.
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The organization of the force and the allocation of weapons, most 
of which arrived from Britain in the last winter of the war, presented 
serious difficulties, some of which had not been overcome by the end of 
the occupation. Already from the summer of 1943 small groups of a mil-
itary nature had been set up in various parts of the country, some under 
Communist control and others led by Danish Unity or other middle- class 
nationalist associations. There were signs, and a good deal of suspicion, 
that some such potential task forces might be arming themselves not only 
against the Germans in the existing situation but also against each other 
in an uncertain future. A basic principle of the organization of the new 
army was the integration of both existing and newly established groups. 
This was never quite achieved. While some groups remained under 
Communist control, others for a long time carried the stamp of Danish 
Unity or other such associations. Moreover, certain task forces set up 
by the illegal professional army in the form of six- man groups retained 
a degree of independence, even though they were formally under the 
command of the freedom council. Such divisions led to conflicts about 
the distribution of weapons, the professional officers in particular being 
concerned that arms received from Sweden or elsewhere should not end 
up in Communist hands. However, despite the disagreement about com-
mand and difficulties of allocation of weapons, by the end of the occu-
pation the resistance movement had a force totalling, according to some 
estimates, close to 50,000 men, though far from all of them armed.
The freedom council had to prepare not only for war but also for 
peace. The prospect of the allied powers defeating Germany and liberat-
ing the occupied countries raised important questions about Denmark’s 
status in relation to the allies, about its post- war political programme 
and about the composition of its first government after liberation. 
Dealing with such matters eventually involved some contact and nego-
tiation between the council and leaders of the four old political parties. 
From the outset, the politicians had been nervous about the activities, 
plans and ultimate goals of the council. The news that the Soviet Union 
was prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the council by 
accepting Thomas Døssing, a man of leftist views, as its representative 
in Moscow had added to their insecurity – at a stage when it was far from 
clear which of the allied armies would be liberating Denmark.
Acting on their own, the politicians had taken the initiative in seek-
ing recognition of Denmark as an ally in the coalition against Germany. 
While the British and the Americans had pursued the idea in the spring 
of 1944, the Soviet Union had rejected it. Later in the year, after Døssing’s 
arrival in Moscow, the politicians, still on their own but enjoying British 
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support, tried again to secure Soviet acceptance. When the Russians 
failed to react, it seemed clear that nothing could be achieved in Moscow 
without the support and participation of the freedom council. After 
long and difficult negotiations between the politicians and members of 
the council, which involved the post- war political programme and the 
composition of the liberation government, a joint appeal went off to 
the capitals of the three great powers in January 1945. It was signed by 
the leaders of the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Liberals 
and the Conservatives, and by representatives of the freedom council. 
The initiative led to other lengthy debates, which in Moscow were com-
plicated by Døssing’s hostile attitude to politicians associated with the 
coalition government. When Denmark was liberated, by British forces, 
the matter was still pending. However, in May 1945 Denmark received 
an invitation to send representatives to the San Francisco conference, 
where allied states would meet to set up the United Nations.
Initially, contact between the freedom council and the politicians 
had been more ad hoc. After the establishment of a contact committee 
of the council in August 1944, with two council members and two pol-
iticians, it became more continuous. In the last winter of the war the 
uncertainty about the post- war political situation loomed large in the 
relationship between the two sides. The concerns of the politicians 
were fairly obvious. Since 29 August 1943 they had been disturbed by 
the influence of the Communists in the resistance movement. With the 
establishment, and ever growing authority, of the freedom council they 
had become afraid that it might set itself up after the liberation as some 
kind of government, eventually perhaps under Communist control. 
What they wanted instead was a restoration of parliamentary democ-
racy, with their own parties resuming the management of the political 
process. Thus, when those politicians in the later stages of the occupa-
tion enhanced their influence by changing course and moving closer to 
the resistance movement it was more with a view to securing the future 
position of the parties they were leading than to strengthen the resis-
tance to the occupying power. However, they enjoyed a degree of sup-
port from Britain, which also wanted a stable and reliable government 
in post- war Denmark.
For a long time the members of the freedom council, generally pre-
occupied with resisting the Germans in the immediate situation, gave 
relatively little thought to post- war problems. From the outset, however, 
they had made it clear that the council was not pursuing party- political 
aims but fighting for national goals, primarily the restoration of the 
freedom of the country and the reintroduction of Danish democracy but 
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also the judicial prosecution and punishment of those who had betrayed 
their country by helping the Germans. Later the council expressed its 
views on the national programme of the transitional government and 
the international orientation of post- war Denmark more forcefully. 
Severely critical of the passive and compliant response to the invasion in 
1940 and strongly opposed to the negotiation and cooperation policies 
of the following years, the council renounced the traditions of neutrality, 
isolation and weakness, which it recognized as the sources of such con-
duct. In a document of December 1944, addressed to the political parties 
represented in the committee of party leaders and former ministers, it 
stressed that everything possible should be done to avoid a repetition of 
the disaster and humiliation suffered by the country: ‘Denmark’s future 
defensive forces must be brought up to the necessary dimensions, and 
all notions of Denmark’s isolated neutrality must be abandoned after 
this war.’ In the projected new international organization, the country 
must take on all duties that may be required of it.10
Before the debate about the composition of the liberation govern-
ment had reached its conclusion a disagreement arose within the free-
dom council about the political programme for the post- war period. The 
representatives of the Communists and Danish Unity had drawn up a 
detailed economic and social programme and had secured the support 
of some other members of the council. Given that Danish Unity was 
politically much weaker than the Communists, the initiative could be 
seen as a step by the latter towards securing control of post- war politics. 
In a situation where it was still uncertain whether it would be British or 
Soviet forces that would liberate Denmark, this was a disturbing pros-
pect. Frode Jakobsen, organizer and representative of the Ring and from 
the outset a central figure in the council, argued forcefully against adop-
tion of the programme, stressing in particular the divisive effect it would 
have not only on the council but on the resistance movement as a whole. 
As a result, the matter was dropped, and did not become an issue in the 
negotiations with the politicians.
Only days before the liberation, an agreement was reached about 
the composition of the first government. The politicians, who origi-
nally had angered the council members by secretly preparing a list of 
ministers made up entirely of politicians from the largest parties, had 
to accept the council’s demand for equal representation in the libera-
tion government and exclusion of all ministers who had served in the 
government led by Scavenius. Though the final list of ministers did give 
the resistance movement numerically equal representation, most of the 
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more influential ministries went to politicians of the four parties. And 
Vilhelm Buhl, the Social Democratic leader, became prime minister.
The first free general elections took place in October 1945 and 
resulted in a Liberal minority government. The new prime minister was 
Knud Kristensen, known for a remark he made during the debate about 
representation of the resistance in the liberation government: ‘The resis-
tance movement? Surely it says nothing about that in the Constitution.’ 
The establishment of his government marked the restoration of the pre- 
war parliamentary system, again managed by the four old parties, and 
the end of the formal political role of the resistance movement.
The regression from limited involvement in European politics 
towards disengagement that marked Danish foreign policy in the centu-
ries after 1720 was linked to the democratization of the social structure 
and political system of the country. In the first long period distinguished 
here, foreign policy was largely in the hands of aristocrats who accepted 
war as a fact of international life, and were prepared to play an active 
role in European politics. Though war, if it involved one’s own state, 
might be a dreadful experience which should not be undertaken with-
out good reason, war among other powers could well present not only 
dangers but also opportunities for non- belligerents. Neutrality could be 
a means of defending one’s state from the dangers, but also a way of 
pursuing the opportunities. While in the former instance it might call for 
a league of neutrals, in the latter case neutrality did not preclude some 
form of alliance with one or more of the belligerents. The advantages of 
playing the European balance of power in this restrained manner were 
largely economic.
In the second period, from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the 
conclusion of the First World War, most decision- makers in Danish for-
eign policy were middle- class politicians, typically more wary of war 
and often less able and inclined than their aristocratic predecessors to 
exploit opportunities it might offer third parties. Except when deemed 
essential for the defence or the pursuit of vital interests of one’s own 
nation, war in the region usually appeared as a source of danger, espe-
cially to a former minor power in severely reduced circumstances and 
diplomatically isolated. Now neutrality, used essentially as a protection 
against involvement in the wars of others, came to be perceived more in 
terms of the rights and duties governing relations between neutrals and 
belligerents. While the notion of neutrality in the eighteenth century 
had been basically political, in the course of the nineteenth century it 
became much more legal.
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In most of the inter- war period, the government was in the hands 
of political leaders who represented the broader sections of Danish soci-
ety, where anti- militarist tradition and pacifist tendencies influenced 
attitudes to foreign affairs. In their abhorrence of war, such politicians 
not only found it prudent to steer clear of the power politics of the 
great powers but also pointless to maintain more than the most mini-
mal armed force. In their anxiety about national security in a Europe of 
growing international tension, they tried to reconcile the League prin-
ciple of collective security with the traditional precepts of neutrality. 
In the process, they developed a novel version of neutrality. While the 
neutrality of earlier times had been, at least in principle, impartial as 
between the belligerents and passive in regard to their wars, the new 
neutrality was more partial and active. By all means at their disposal, 
short of going to war themselves, the neutrals should seek to prevent 
or restrict war among others. The theory of such neutrality, developed 
largely by Georg Cohn, legal adviser to the foreign ministry, and the 
international lawyer Philip Jessup, rested on a new evaluation of war. 
On both legal and moral grounds this phenomenon of international pol-
itics was simply disqualified. Whatever the circumstances, nobody had 
the right to go to war. Staying out of war and endeavouring to prevent 
or extinguish wars between other states, it followed, was the morally 
superior policy. Neo- neutrality, as it became known, added a moral 
dimension to the tradition of neutrality – and sometimes lent a touch of 
self- righteousness to its champions.
Generally speaking, the Danes who in the 1940s rebelled against 
the long trend towards disengagement and neutrality by offering active 
resistance to the occupying forces of Nazi Germany did not represent 
a particular class of society. In the first year after the invasion, when 
they numbered perhaps no more than a few hundred, most seem to 
have come from the middle classes, especially from Danish Unity cir-
cles. In the next few years, after the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union and the banishment of the Communist party, a larger number of 
Communists took up resistance, with the result that the emerging move-
ment came to rest on an alliance between the right- of- centre and the left 
sections of the Danish political spectrum. In the final two years of the 
occupation, after the turn in the fortunes of the German armies on the 
fronts, the retreat of the Danish government and the establishment of 
the freedom council, the movement built up its strength rapidly, in the 
process broadening its social base on both the right and the left. Though 
the four old political parties remained under- represented in the move-
ment, many young Conservatives and left- wing Social Democrats joined 
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the resistance at that stage. Throughout the years of resistance, the typ-
ical freedom fighter, as the members became known, was a man in his 
twenties living in a town.
In the later years of occupation, and especially towards the end of 
the war, the resistance movement gained fairly broad support. Shocked 
by the invasion, humiliated by governmental policies, provoked by 
German atrocities and, of course, encouraged by allied victories and 
German retreats in major theatres of war, a large number of people from 
most walks of life eventually came round to accepting the resistance 
and offering at least moral support. The series of events denoted by 9 
April, the date of the invasion of Denmark, had been an experience trau-
matic enough, it seemed, to lead a large and representative section of the 
population to question the wisdom and morality of traditional Danish 
foreign policy. On the eve of liberation there were signs that the nation 
might be moving towards a moral and political turning- point in its inter-
national conduct.
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1940– 45: From cooperation 
to resistance
While Danish reactions to German occupation showed a broad 
development from cooperation to resistance, the more detailed picture 
of political thought and action during those five years presented con-
siderable complexity. Almost from the beginning and to the very end of 
the occupation there were instances of both cooperation and resistance. 
Often the two were mixed, with public bodies, private institutions – as 
well as groups and individuals – each finding their own, often shifting, 
balance between cooperating with and resisting the authorities of the 
occupying power. Moreover, there were different types and degrees of 
the two kinds of reaction.
Rather than attempting a chronological sketch of the whole com-
plex and chequered development, it will be more useful here to con-
struct a spectrum of reactions, ranging from wholehearted support 
of the occupying power to armed resistance. Such a structure may be 
divided into three segments, namely support, cooperation and opposi-
tion, and each of them divided into two parts, allowing for differences 
of nature and degree within each of the three broad kinds of reaction. 
Within each of the six subsections it will be possible to present a num-
ber of significant instances of particular types of reaction, discuss their 
motivations and indicate their influence.
2.1 Support
First a few distinctions between support and cooperation, its contigu-
ous segment in the spectrum, will be to the point. Whereas cooperation 
usually implies a degree of mutuality between the parties, support, as 
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the word will be used here, typically denotes a more subsidiary role for 
the supporting party. While cooperation generally rests on a measure 
of common ground between the parties, support is more likely to spring 
from some kind of identification with the party receiving the support. 
The most active form of support can be described as collaboration, an 
activity which may be defined as requiring a more complete commit-
ment than mere cooperation.
Danish supportive reactions to German occupation will be con-
sidered under two headings, wholehearted support and opportunistic 
service. The former type was largely ideologically motivated, the latter 
much more economically conditioned. The former came from ethnic 
organizations, political parties and uniformed corps of various kinds, 
the latter more from private companies and individuals. Though there 
were instances of both types throughout the period, such support was by 
far the least common of all the Danish reactions to German occupation 
distinguished here.
Wholehearted support
The two foremost institutional sources of the more devoted type of 
support for the occupying forces in Denmark, and the Nazi regime in 
Germany, were the organizations of the German minority in North 
Schleswig and Denmark’s National Socialist Labour Party (DNSAP). 
The Germans in North Schleswig, since 1920 again part of Denmark, 
numbered about 30,000 during the occupation. In the general election 
in April 1939 they had gained about 15,000 votes, which had given them 
just one seat in the Danish parliament. Thoroughly Nazified well before 
the war, they had set up a number of Nazistic organizations and arranged 
various provocative uniformed demonstrations. Their ultimate goal 
had been another shift of the Danish– German border. Their masters in 
Berlin, however, had failed to support them in that enterprise, and had 
made no move to change their line after the invasion.
Always ready to comply with directives issued by the Nazi author-
ities in Germany, the minority organizations concentrated their efforts 
during the occupation on serving German interests in economic and cul-
tural matters. They also responded positively to calls for young people 
to report for military service, with the result that a total of about 2,000 
joined the armed forces of Germany, of whom more than a third were 
killed in action. Moreover, the German minority set up a home guard 
and an anti- sabotage guard of its own. On the grounds of the absence of 
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so many of their men, as soldiers or workers in Germany, the minority 
authorities declared themselves unwilling to let their members vote in 
the general and local elections of 1943. In the general election, how-
ever, the Germans in North Schleswig appear to have cast their votes for 
DNSAP rather than abstain.
DNSAP was established in 1930 but not represented in parliament 
till after the election in 1939, where it received 31,000 votes, i.e. 1.8 per 
cent, and gained three seats. Under its leader Frits Clausen, a physician 
by profession, it became a faithful imitation of the German Nazi party 
in both name and style. Its members wore the swastika and greeted 
each other with raised arm. The programme was taken from Hitler’s 
Germany, including anti- Semitism, and Mussolini’s Italy, especially the 
idea of the corporate state. Its membership rose from approximately 
5,000 at the outbreak of the war to about 21,000 in the spring of 1943. 
Yet, in the general election in March that year it received only 43,000 
votes, i.e. 2.1 per cent, which again gave it three seats. By the end of the 
occupation the party, by then under a new leader, still had about 12,000 
members, most of the new ones having come from the working class.
With substantial financial support from German sources, for the 
party as well as for its chief organ Fædrelandet (The Fatherland), DNSAP 
always steered close to the German authorities. In Copenhagen and 
other towns, it arranged challenging meetings, provocative demonstra-
tions and uniformed marches, which led to violent clashes with anti- 
Nazi spectators and Danish police. With its offensive programme and 
aggressive propaganda, and a leader who struck most Danes as a rather 
comical figure, the party failed to attract public support outside its own 
narrow circles. Indeed the chief effect of its pro- German image and 
bombastic efforts seems to have been to convince the Danish population 
that to be a Nazi was to be a traitor.
Nor did the party command significant forces of its own. Its storm 
troopers, numbering only 1 or 2,000 men, had no weapons other than 
spades. At no stage of the occupation was the party, acting on its own, 
in a position to bring about a coup. However, DNSAP was not always 
alone. In the summer of 1940 it entered into tentative cooperation with 
Landbrugernes Sammenslutning (LS), an extremist agrarian association, 
and its close associate Bondepartiet, the Farmers’ party with four seats 
in parliament. With many members who were attracted by Nazi ideol-
ogy, both of those organizations were against the coalition government 
and campaigned for a non- party caretaker government on good terms 
with Germany. In an apparent attempt to prepare the way for a gov-
ernment headed by Frits Clausen, spokesmen of the two organizations 
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tried unsuccessfully to achieve their anti- parliamentary goal by putting 
pressure on the king.
When DNSAP, despite its unpopularity, weakness and lack of par-
liamentary support, for some years remained a threat to the political 
system and national reputation of Denmark it was because of German 
political support. Already at the earliest stage of the occupation several 
highly- placed German officials supported the idea of pressing the king to 
accept a Nazi government. In October 1940, when plans for a Nazi take- 
over were under debate among German authorities, a delegation from 
the foreign ministry in Berlin visited Copenhagen and had meetings 
with Frits Clausen and other Nazi leaders. In February– March 1942, we 
now know, Hitler stated that he in due course wanted Clausen to replace 
the Danish king, an idea which he brought up again later that year. 
Subsequently, however, German interest in such plans waned. After the 
poor showing of the party in the elections of March 1943 economic sup-
port from German sources ceased. In the spring of 1944 Clausen had to 
retire as leader of the party. A year later, after the liberation, the party 
went into liquidation.
Though DNSAP never achieved its ultimate goal of governmen-
tal power under German protection, it did find some ways of assisting 
the Nazi bid for European domination. It procured political intelligence 
for the occupying power and played a leading role in the recruitment 
of Danes for German military service. In 1940 Heinrich Himmler’s 
Waffen-SS started recruiting in Denmark together with DNSAP and the 
German minority in North Schleswig. The following year the party col-
laborated in the recruitment for a new unit, known as Frikorps Danmark.
Established on Himmler’s initiative in June 1941, after the launch-
ing of the German attack on the Soviet Union, Frikorps Danmark was 
conceived as a purely Danish unit under Danish flag but attached to 
the SS. Volunteers were invited to join the crusade against Bolshevism. 
Initially the unit was under the command of a Danish officer who was 
anti- Communist but not pro- Nazi. After training in Germany and 
Poland, Frikorps Danmark fought on the Eastern Front in 1942– 43, and 
suffered substantial losses. On leave in Denmark in October 1942, its 
soldiers joined civilian Nazis in violent and provocative disturbances.
No doubt some of the Danish volunteers were adventurers, oth-
ers men escaping severe unemployment in Denmark. A  number were 
army officers frustrated by the defence policy of the pre- war govern-
ment and the feeble reaction to the German invasion. But most seem to 
have been ideologically motivated, whether primarily pro- Nazi or more 
anti- Communist. After the Winter War, in which many young Danes 
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volunteered to help Finland against the Soviet Union, some must have 
seen Hitler’s invasion of Russia as an opportunity to again take up the 
battle against Bolshevism. Others, however, were fanatical Nazis.
In Denmark, most people soon came to regard all the volunteers 
simply as traitors. Yet, the establishment and existence of the corps pre-
sented a problem for the government. While avoiding a formal recog-
nition of Frikorps Danmark, it gave in to German pressure by allowing 
Danish officers so inclined to take leave of absence and join the corps. 
The total number of Danish citizens, including minority Germans, serv-
ing with German forces in the war has been estimated as about 7,000.
There were also a few corps of Danes who had volunteered to serve 
in the armed or the police forces of the occupying power on Danish soil. 
The most notorious was the Schalburg Corps, called after a DNSAP 
youth leader who had become the second commandant of Frikorps 
Danmark and had been killed in action, and led by another officer from 
that corps. First established, by Himmler, in April 1943 under the name 
of Germansk Korps, its original purposes were to recruit and train sol-
diers for the Waffen- SS and to prepare the ground in Denmark for the 
Greater Germanic Reich. It had a military and a civilian and political 
section as well as a number of more specialized departments, including 
an intelligence service and terror department. Its foremost functions 
turned out to be to combat the resistance movement and terrorize the 
public. In addition to creating a large number of violent incidents, its 
members informed for the German police. During the mass strike in 
Copenhagen in 1944 one of the demands of the freedom council was 
to have the Schalburg Corps withdrawn from the country. After a good 
deal of reorganization, it was abolished three months before the libera-
tion because of insufficient intake. A number of minor bodies of Danes 
working for the Germans included the Sommer Corps. Called after its 
founder, a former commander of the Schalburg Corps, it took on the 
guarding of German airports and factories working for the Germans. 
After the war about 700 members of the Schalburg Corps were prose-
cuted and given heavy sentences. Ten, including its first commandant, 
were executed.
After the arrest of the police officers in September 1944, an auxil-
iary police unit was set up in Copenhagen under the name of Hipo (an 
abbreviation of Hilfspolizei). Made up of about 550 uniformed Danes, it 
was under German control. Its function was to combat illegal activity. 
Recruited partly from within the Schalburg Corps, it became a branch 
of the civilian intelligence service of that organization. Patrolling the 
streets of Copenhagen, its members, sometimes working together with 
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Danish terrorist gangs, became notorious for shooting people at random 
and carrying out explosions and other acts of terror, and for arresting 
suspects and torturing prisoners. Up to, and including, the days of lib-
eration Hipo men contributed to the horrors and the insecurity of life in 
a city without a proper police force. After the war they received prison 
sentences averaging 11 years.
Finally, a form of collaboration encouraged and organized by 
German or pro- German bodies but performed by Danish individuals 
must be mentioned, namely informing. Infiltration by informers was 
already a problem in the earlier stages of resistance but became more 
serious after August 1943, when the Gestapo operated independently 
and built up its own network of information gathering. For the resistance 
movement, the dangers presented by informing were so great that the 
freedom council decided to permit the liquidation of known informers. 
Approximately 400 people were shot, most towards the end of the occu-
pation and nearly 10 per cent of them women. While it is conceivable 
that some informers, at least in the early years of resistance, were mis-
led by ministerial admonishments against engaging in sabotage or by 
professional officiousness of members of the Danish police force, others 
no doubt informed mainly for monetary reward. Many, however, were 
motivated by ideological convictions, whether pro- German Nazism or 
anti- communism.
The sources of wholehearted support for the occupying power 
and its Nazi programme which have been presented here were of little 
significance in terms of direct effect on public opinion in Denmark. 
Motivated largely by ideological fanaticism, of one kind or another, 
and embodied through small, marginal parties and groups or in 
novel, militant corps and units, they failed to attract the larger pub-
lic or influence the established institutions and organizations of the 
country. Far from helping to build bridges between the authorities and 
political programme of the occupying power and the ministries and 
policy of the Danish government, they rather served to emphasize the 
difference, at least in principle, between resolute collaboration and 
unavoidable cooperation with the Germans. The goals and means, 
character and behaviour of most Nazi activists and many members 
of the various auxiliary military and police units undoubtedly helped 
to develop and shape an enemy image of both the Germans and their 
locally recruited henchmen. Thus, paradoxically, the ultimate effect 
of such pro- German reactions to the occupation may have been to 
help prepare the way for popular acceptance of the resistance move-
ment in the later years of the occupation.
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opportunistic service
If the wholehearted sort of pro- German activity helped to accentu-
ate the distinction between collaboration and cooperation, the type 
of support that was motivated largely by considerations of expedi-
ency rather tended to blur that dividing line. Rarely inspired by pro- 
Nazi sympathies, activity of this kind might be seen as falling within 
a grey area between supposedly patriotic and decidedly unpatriotic 
behaviour. The companies, groups or individuals who, for economic 
advantage or out of need, provided certain services for the occupying 
power stood somewhere in between officials engaged in governmen-
tally approved forms of cooperation with the Germans and the par-
ties involved in blatant collaboration. Occasionally their predicament 
was, in certain respects, similar to that of public bodies which had 
to deal with the German authorities, in the sense that both might be 
acting from a combination of need and advantage. However, while 
the public bodies in principle were motivated by considerations of 
national interest and political necessity, the non- governmental par-
ties were usually moved by more private calculations. Often the latter 
had more choice when deciding whether or not to provide the service 
required, and hence more responsibility for the decisions taken. What 
we are dealing with here are types of parties who, often in politically 
confusing and economically difficult situations, allowed themselves 
to take advantage of a particular constellation of circumstances and 
draw substantial benefits from serving the occupying power in some 
way or other.
The foremost instances of such support were those of the so- called 
værnemagere (a pun on the Danish word for Wehrmacht), companies 
which benefited unduly from carrying out work for the occupying power 
or producing goods for German importers. Almost immediately after 
the invasion the German authorities announced that they intended to 
build new airports in Jutland and were prepared to have the work done 
by their own companies, using either German workers or a conscripted 
Danish labour force. As a lesser evil, the government preferred to pre-
vail upon Danish contractors to carry out the work with Danish workers. 
That solution, which prevented the arrival in Denmark of a large number 
of German workers, gave employment to many Danes without work and 
secured a modest degree of Danish control of the whole enterprise, was 
accepted by the Germans. It also became the model for the construction 
of many of the various German fortifications established on Danish soil 
during the following years.
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In the same period, a growing number of Danish industrial firms 
entered into business relations with Germany, exporting manufactured 
goods, mainly in return for coal and raw materials. While accepting 
such business as not only unavoidable but also essential for the econ-
omy of the country, the Danish authorities endeavoured to control prices 
and profits, maintain the balance between export of goods and import 
of raw materials, prevent a distortion of traditional Danish industry and 
to exclude the supply of goods which constituted a direct contribution to 
German war efforts. However, official attempts to maintain some con-
trol of the companies involved, whether contractors or exporters, were 
not always successful.
For a contractor to respond to Danish ministerial pressure to take 
on major projects for the Germans was from the outset deemed a patri-
otic act by those who knew the circumstances. And for a manufacturer 
to give in to German demands and start exporting to Germany was also 
considered acceptable, provided it was done as far as possible within the 
guidelines indicated by the Danish government. But to charge hugely 
excessive payment for the services rendered or set abnormally high 
prices for the goods exported was not regarded as respectable practice. 
Nor was it in order for a manufacturer himself to institute the relation-
ship with the Germans, or to change his line of manufacture in order to 
suit German needs. All such acts were deemed unpatriotic, particularly 
when seen in retrospect. Since the costs of constructing German fortifi-
cations on Danish soil were charged to a special account with the Danish 
National Bank and the excess of the value of Danish exports over that 
of imports from Germany was charged to a clearing account with the 
same bank, and since both of those accounts were guaranteed by the 
Danish state, any party exploiting the opportunities offered by dealing 
with the Germans was in effect doing so at the expense of the Danish 
nation. Having become increasingly unpopular in the course of the war, 
a substantial number of værnemagere were arrested and tried after the 
liberation. Under laws introduced retrospectively in response to the 
wishes of the freedom council, only relatively few were imprisoned and 
had their profits confiscated. Many were able to plead in their defence 
that the government or the civil servants had prompted them to collab-
orate with the Germans.
Another type of service, again motivated much more by finan-
cial need or advantage than by ideological convictions or sympathies, 
also came about as a result of German pressures. In the spring of 1940, 
when Denmark and Germany were negotiating a trade agreement, 
the Germans decided to make additional supplies of coal, which were 
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essential for Danish industry, dependent on workers from Denmark 
helping to man the mines. Instead, the Danish negotiators agreed to 
provide labour for other kinds of work in Germany. Thus Denmark not 
only avoided conscription of workers for service abroad but also eased 
its unemployment problem, which was particularly severe in that year. 
While nobody may have been downright compelled, some workers were 
pressurized and many encouraged by the Danish employment service to 
take jobs with German employers. The number of people who escaped 
unemployment in this manner, or simply found better- paid work abroad, 
culminated in 1941, when about 36,600 left for Germany and another 
4,000 took jobs for the Germans in Norway. Many of those in Germany 
apparently ended up working in the armaments industry. The people 
who took work in Germany usually transferred part of their wages to 
Denmark over the clearing account, thereby in effect adding to the 
financial burden of their country. After the war, only those who had 
served as uniformed guards were prosecuted.
Finally two other sets of individuals may be mentioned briefly, 
under the heading of opportunistic service to the occupying forces, 
namely those informers who committed their deeds simply or mainly 
for monetary reward and the women who associated with German sol-
diers. While some of the former were retained by the German police, 
others worked on an ad hoc basis, collecting a modest reward for each 
case. Perhaps the women may be divided along similar lines, with some 
involved in a close relationship and others having only casual relations.
As in other countries in north- western Europe deemed co- racialist, 
the German authorities permitted sexual relations between their sol-
diers and willing local women. The number of Danish women who failed 
to follow the unofficial rule of cold- shouldering all Germans must have 
been fairly substantial, because about 5,500 children were registered as 
Danish– German during the occupation. The fraternization caused some 
friction between the Danish and the German authorities charged with 
managing it. It also made the women highly unpopular with the gen-
eral public. Usually referred to as ‘field- mattresses’, some of them were 
hunted down by youthful crowds and publicly humiliated, typically by 
having their hair cut very short and their clothes stripped off. After the 
liberation about 300 women who had had relations with German sol-
diers were convicted of informing.
Though support for the occupying power took many different 
forms, in general it remained insignificant in terms of both the num-
ber of people involved and the degree of political influence exerted. 
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The number engaged in any kind of outright collaboration never 
exceeded a few per cent of the population. In the course of the war, 
many people grew increasingly hostile towards those who had chosen, 
or agreed, to support or serve the Germans, even towards those who 
had been requested or encouraged by Danish authorities to do so. The 
only real threat presented by collaboration was that of a Nazi take- 
over of government with German support. During the first two years 
of the occupation that risk was a decisive consideration for the Danish 
political system.
Above all, the Danish government was not directly involved in any 
of the kinds of collaboration distinguished here. When individual min-
isters or government agencies prevailed upon contractors to undertake 
projects or put pressure on unemployed workers to accept work for the 
Germans, they usually did so in order to avoid more onerous arrange-
ments proposed by the Germans. As they saw it, they were acting out of 
necessity or in the national interest. Thus, it is not under the heading of 
support for, but of cooperation with German authorities that such atti-
tudes and behaviour must be considered.
2.2 Cooperation
As distinct from collaboration, typically driven by ideological com-
mitment or opportunistic calculation, cooperation was in princi-
ple motivated by patriotic considerations. For those in positions of 
responsibility, the overriding concern was to avoid the installation 
of a Nazi government, or direct rule by the occupying power, and to 
maintain a democratic government able to protect the population and 
institutions of the country. In a situation of military occupation by an 
overwhelming power, this might be achieved only through some form 
of political interaction with the authorities of the occupying power. 
From an early stage of the occupation the nature and degree of such 
interaction became a subject of some disagreement among the polit-
ical leaders and other influential people. While some found it neces-
sary or prudent deliberately to enter into limited cooperation with the 
occupying authorities, others thought it possible and wiser not to go 
beyond protracted negotiation and minimal concessions. The former 
searched for common ground between the parties. The latter strove 
for minimal involvement with the adversary.
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Willing cooperation
The foremost exponent of deliberate cooperation with the German 
authorities was Erik Scavenius. Decidedly a man of the realist tradition 
of thought about international politics, he enjoyed the advantages but 
also shared some of the weaknesses of that approach to the theory and 
practice of politics among nations. At an early stage of his diplomatic 
career, before the First World War, when he was serving in Berlin and 
taking an interest in North Schleswig, he had made certain observa-
tions and reached some conclusions about the nature of international 
relations. While people might be moved by national sentiments and 
liberal ideas, policy, he had noticed, was based more on constitutional 
doctrines and legal rights. However, the actual outcome of an interna-
tional conflict, he had found, was determined essentially by military 
power. In the same years, again according to his memoirs, he had given 
some thought to the foreign and security policy of Denmark, and had 
developed certain ideas about its role and place in international politics 
which later were to guide him as foreign minister. To avoid becoming 
embroiled in the wars of other states, he had concluded, Denmark must 
seek to balance between those great powers whose political interaction 
was decisive for its fate. Second, as a result of its geographical location, 
Denmark had to accept its dependence on the power dominating North 
Germany, since 1871 the German Empire, and adjust its foreign policy 
accordingly.1
The same points were made, in a more polemical form, in a book 
based on an account prepared by Scavenius in 1944 in defence of Danish 
policy towards Germany before and during the occupation. In the pref-
ace, the author was sarcastic about the opinion, held by a large section 
of the public, that relations with foreign countries must be governed by 
emotion rather than intellect. The decisive factors in the formulation 
of Danish foreign policy, he maintained, were the European balance of 
power and Denmark’s position in relation to the nearest great powers. 
As a continuation of the North German plain with no significant physi-
cal obstacles and with only limited natural resources and armed forces, 
Denmark was without military options against Germany. Whether one 
liked it or not, that was the power- political basis on which the country 
had to formulate its policy and manage its relations with Germany. As in 
the First World War, Scavenius’s conduct of foreign relations was moti-
vated not only by a deep sense of responsibility and a clear intellectual 
commitment but also by power- political convictions marked by a degree 
of geopolitical determinism.2
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No sooner had he decided, after strong pressure from Munch in 
particular, to accept the post of foreign minister in the Stauning gov-
ernment formed in July 1940 than Scavenius put his stamp on Danish 
conduct of relations with Germany. Critical of the passive and procras-
tinating tactics of his predecessor, which he thought too dangerous in 
a situation where military victories had boosted the self- confidence 
and determination of Hitler’s regime, he believed that it was wiser for 
Denmark to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with Germany in 
various fields. In a declaration approved by Stauning and issued on 8 
July, Scavenius surveyed the foreign policy of Denmark since the First 
World War and pointed out that it had always followed a line favourable 
to the great neighbour to the south. The crucial passage came at the end:
With the great German victories, which have struck the world 
with surprise and admiration, a new time has dawned for Europe 
which will involve a reorganization politically and economically 
under German leadership. Here it will be Denmark’s task to find its 
place in a necessary and mutual active cooperation with Greater 
Germany. The Danish people trusts that it will be able to retain its 
independence in the new European order, and hopes to find under-
standing for its peculiarity and for its traditionally peaceful politi-
cal and social development.3
In its humble style, which many Danes found offensive, that declara-
tion revealed Scavenius’s lack of feeling for, or indifference to, public 
opinion. More important, the expectation that Germany would win the 
war and remain the dominant power in Europe, on which his projec-
tion for Denmark’s future role rested, proved a serious misjudgement. 
It was of course an opinion shared by many people in the first year of 
hostilities, not only in Denmark but in most parts of Continental Europe. 
For Scavenius, of a pessimistic temperament and long in the habit of 
focusing on the military dimension of power, it seemed a safe assump-
tion on which to base his conduct of relations with the occupying power. 
However, though stylistically unfortunate and, ultimately, politically 
unsound, Scavenius’s statement of intent was in no way treacherous. His 
decision to seek cooperation with Germany was motivated by reason-  
of- state considerations. In 1940 he was convinced that the course he was 
proposing was the safest, perhaps the only, way of maintaining the inde-
pendence of his country and protecting the interests of its people in post- 
war Europe. More immediately, he saw it as the best way of warding off 
a Nazi rule of Denmark.
 
 
 
 
danIsH re aC t Ions to German oCCuPat Ion54
   54
When the declaration of 8 July reached Berlin, German officials 
were given to understand that Denmark was prepared to discuss future 
economic cooperation even before a European peace settlement had 
been accomplished. Before the end of the month they proposed a cus-
toms and monetary union between the two countries. Despite the highly 
disturbing implications of such a project, Scavenius thought it advisable 
to enter into negotiations. When the Germans presented a preliminary 
framework agreement which was totally unacceptable to the Danes, 
Scavenius still wanted to continue negotiations and proceeded to draw 
up a counter proposal. Here, however, he met strong opposition from 
most of his fellow ministers, the committee of parliamentary repre-
sentatives and the king as well as from the big trade organizations. 
Fortunately, the German proposal met some resistance from trade inter-
ests within Germany itself, which made it possible eventually to discon-
tinue the negotiations. Thus Denmark avoided becoming a founding 
member of an abortive Neuropa.
Other controversial goodwill measures sponsored or approved 
by Scavenius met with less determined opposition from his colleagues. 
On the initiative of the foreign ministry, a Danish– German Society was 
established in July, with Peter Knutzen, director general of the state 
railways, as chairman. Such a society could be justified on the grounds 
that it would be desirable for German officials and officers serving in 
Denmark to meet Danes other than the Nazi or pro- German set they usu-
ally encountered. The following summer the government tolerated the 
formation of Frikorps Danmark and allowed Danish officers so inclined 
to join and fight among German units on the Eastern front.
More controversial was the accession to the Anti- Comintern Pact, 
which Germany and Japan had concluded on 25 November 1936 and 
revived after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. At 
very short notice, the German minister made it clear that Denmark 
was expected to join a small group of countries, including Finland, 
which would meet in Berlin in November to celebrate the anniversary 
and renew the pact. Scavenius was immediately of the opinion that 
Denmark had to accept the invitation, but met strong opposition from 
most other ministers and the committee of parliamentary representa-
tives. In response to rapidly increasing German pressure, the king, the 
government and the parliamentary representatives soon settled for a 
conditional accession to the pact. Though Scavenius had to struggle to 
uphold the agreed qualifications, he reached Berlin in time dutifully to 
represent Denmark at the ceremony. However, on the day of the cele-
brations a few hundred students demonstrated in Copenhagen against 
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the decision to accede to the pact. They appealed to the king to reject 
outright all attempts to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs and 
attacked Scavenius and his policy towards Germany.
A year later, the so- called telegram crisis was resolved only when 
Scavenius agreed to German demands that he head a new government 
in which he would remain in charge of foreign affairs. The crisis blew 
up when Hitler, already dissatisfied with developments in Denmark 
and upset by reports of widespread anti- German feeling in the coun-
try, became furious on receiving a rather curt acknowledgement of his 
customary message of birthday congratulations to the Danish king. 
The diplomats were recalled, and the fairly accommodating and tactful 
commanding officer of the German forces in Denmark was replaced by 
general von Hanneken, a much more authoritarian type. After a month 
of anxious uncertainty about Hitler’s intentions for Denmark, Scavenius 
was called to Berlin for a long meeting with Ribbentrop. The German 
foreign minister insisted on having the anti- German Buhl government 
replaced by one which included not only representatives of the trade 
unions but also ministers with pro- Nazi sympathies. Scavenius rejected 
the latter condition as well as a suggestion that he should take the part 
of prime minister himself.
Back in Copenhagen, he argued that the only way out of the crisis 
would be to accept Ribbentrop’s proposal for a change of government as 
a basis for negotiation. The so- called political ministers and the party 
leaders insisted on having the German demands reduced substantially. 
In particular, they wanted to retain Buhl as prime minister. After a con-
frontation with Scavenius, they gave way and started looking for a suit-
able person to lead a new government. When they failed to find a willing 
and acceptable candidate Werner Best, newly arrived as Germany’s per-
manent minister in Denmark, decided that the only acceptable solution 
was to have Scavenius in that post. After intense debate among min-
isters and parliamentary representatives, and a helpful contribution 
from the crown prince on behalf of the king, it was agreed to accept 
Scavenius as prime minister, despite the suspicions he had aroused, 
among Conservative and Liberal leaders in particular, and the unpopu-
larity he was likely to incur in the country as the choice of the Germans. 
Round him, as prime minister as well as foreign minister, a new govern-
ment was formed, with many of the old ministers retained. Having had 
Scavenius at the helm for well over two years, the decision- makers did 
not dare disrupt the established relationship with the occupying power.
During the following 10 months, till the rebellion in August 1943, 
Scavenius maintained the policy of willing but limited cooperation with 
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Germany. Engaged in a constant duel of negotiation with Best, who for 
reasons of his own wanted the Danish government to stay in power, he 
dealt with one imminent danger after another as best as he could, while 
all along playing for time. Thus he acted as a shield between the occu-
pying power and the Danish population. Though becoming ever more 
unpopular with a growing section of the public, he enjoyed the explicit or 
tacit support of most ministers and parliamentary representatives, prac-
tically all national and local authorities and the leading trade organiza-
tions as well as of the Danish radio and the bulk of the legitimate press.
The outstanding result of the Danish policy of willing cooperation 
in this period was the parliamentary elections in March 1943. According 
to the country’s constitution, regular elections were due by the begin-
ning of April. The political leaders assumed that the occupying power, 
which in 1941 had ruled out municipal elections in order to avoid civil 
disturbances, would demand a postponement. However, they found 
that the new plenipotentiary, Werner Best, preferred to go ahead and, 
moreover, was able to secure the support of his masters in Berlin. The 
politicians, though well aware of the risks and difficulties involved, on 
balance preferred to have the elections forthwith. Their main reason was 
that a parliament resting on a breach of constitutional law would lack 
formal legitimacy. This would weaken the political system, and could 
even serve as a pretext for the occupying power imposing a government 
that would lack parliamentary cover. Ultimately, the proclaimed Danish 
sovereignty was at stake.
The German authorities gave their consent on three condi-
tions: there would be some restraint on the election campaign; no crit-
icism of the occupying power; and some protection for the German 
minority in the country. The themes of the campaign became democracy 
and national solidarity, instead of disagreements among the governing 
parties. The day of the elections, 23 March, was celebrated as a national 
holiday. The turnout was 89.5 per cent, the highest ever recorded, with 
95 per cent of the votes supporting the parties of the coalition.
Though the party leaders had been careful to distance themselves 
from Scavenius in the conduct of their campaigns, the result of the elec-
tions was seen as a victory for the policy of cooperation. Moreover, it 
spelt the end of DNSAP, which again secured only three seats. With the 
DKP banned, Communists had to be excluded from the elections.
Among Scavenius’s ministerial colleagues, some of his staunch-
est supporters were men without party- political attachments. One was 
Gunnar Larsen, a young and prominent industrialist who joined the 
ministry formed by Stauning in July 1940 and remained minister of 
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public works till the end of the occupation. In matters of foreign affairs, 
he identified with the policy of active cooperation with the occupying 
power. His first task was to lead the delegation that went to Germany 
to negotiate a customs and monetary union. Several later projects ini-
tiated or managed by him included the setting up of a committee in the 
autumn of 1941 to explore the economic possibilities for Danish indus-
try and trade in the Soviet territories then occupied by German forces. 
A few other Danish– German enterprises of his turned out to be equally 
fruitless.
Larsen defended several of his major public- works projects in 
terms of their potential for reducing unemployment, which since the 
early 1930s had been one of the most important political and economic 
problems of the country. Some of his governmental colleagues, how-
ever, suspected that he, a successful businessman with an international 
horizon, was not blind to other potential advantages of such projects, 
perhaps including some affecting his private business interests. His 
relations with the professional politicians were further complicated 
by a general feeling that, like Scavenius, he was less than enthusiastic 
about the parliamentary system and its tedious procedures. In the illegal 
press, he was attacked not only for the nature of his policies but also for a 
tendency to confuse political concerns with private economic interests. 
Though educated at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and person-
ally a man of British and American sympathies and standards, Larsen 
was widely deemed to be pro- German.
His position as Scavenius’s right arm, his close contacts with 
German officials and his numerous efforts to strengthen Danish– 
German bonds made Larsen one of the most unpopular men of the 
occupation years. After the liberation he was imprisoned, charged with 
collaborating with the Germans and giving financial support to Danish 
Nazi circles, but was eventually acquitted. In his defence, he was able to 
state that he had worked for the British Secret Service since April 1940 
and had made a large sum of money available for organized resistance 
in the spring of 1943. The Supreme Court accepted that his payments to 
Nazi groups had been motivated by national considerations. However, 
though legally exonerated, public criticism of his person continued in 
the post- war years and made it impossible for him to remain in Denmark.
Not having been a member or representative of a political party, 
Larsen had no one to share the responsibility for the policies he had pur-
sued and help defend him against the acrimonious and vengeful attacks 
his critics directed against him in the post- liberation period. Another 
non- professional minister found himself in much the same situation 
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in 1945. As commissioner of police since 1938, Eigil Thune Jacobsen 
was, from the outset of the occupation, saddled with the responsibil-
ity for maintaining law and order in the country. It was a task that he 
carried out with conviction and determination, letting the police deal 
firmly with anti- German manifestations as well as Nazi disturbances. 
Identifying with the policy of the government, he accepted the princi-
ple that Danish authorities should punish persons caught challenging 
or resisting the occupation forces. In some cases it might be necessary 
to impose severe sentences, and thus prevent the Germans from inter-
vening and imposing harsher measures on the country. Personally, he 
was particularly opposed to violent and disruptive actions of the type 
usually associated with Communist campaigns. Having established 
and maintained close professional contacts with the police authorities 
in Vienna and Berlin since the early 1930s, Thune Jacobsen was well 
placed to handle relations with the German police in Denmark in the 
first year of the occupation. He was also an obvious choice for member-
ship of the board of the newly established Danish– German Society.
When the Germans, in the summer of 1941, demanded the res-
ignation of the minister of justice the leaders of the Social Democratic 
party pressed Thune Jacobsen to take over the post. The first task of the 
new minister was to prepare a law prohibiting Communist associations 
and activities. In response to a German demand made immediately after 
the invasion of the Soviet Union, internment of leading Communists 
throughout the country had already been set in motion before the change 
of minister. The new law, of 22 August 1941, provided for the arrest and 
punishment of persons guilty of Communist activity or agitation, and 
for the detention of persons whose conduct indicated that they might 
engage in such activity and become a threat to the security of the state 
or its relations with foreign powers. The law was administered jointly 
by the ministry and a parliamentary committee. Thune Jacobsen was 
also responsible for the preparation of a law, passed in December 1942, 
to provide protection against industrial sabotage. As minister, his basic 
concern was to retain the administration of justice in Danish hands. To 
achieve this, he thought, it was necessary to calm relations between the 
population and the occupying power and to continue the policy of coop-
eration. Even as late as 28 August 1943 he hoped to avoid a final rupture 
of the intergovernmental relationship with Germany.
The orders he gave to the police in the initial period, and the laws 
he introduced and influence he exercised on the judiciary as minister, 
made Thune Jacobsen a hated figure in resistance circles. Soon after 
the liberation he was arrested, but immediately released as a result of 
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an intervention by Frode Jakobsen. He hoped to clear his name through 
a process of impeachment but was not given the opportunity. Thus, he 
never provided a formal proof of certain claims he made in his defence, 
namely that he had worked for the British Secret Service and had 
been passing information to London about the police and sabotage in 
Denmark, which had been one of the reasons why he had had to escape 
to Sweden in October 1944.
Among the professional politicians, Scavenius found his most loyal 
supporters in the Social Democratic party. Foremost among them was 
Thorvald Stauning, who as prime minister till his death in May 1942 
totally identified with the policy of negotiating with the Germans, mak-
ing concessions when necessary and cooperating as required. It was a pol-
icy which followed naturally from the course he and Munch, as leaders 
of the Social Democratic and Radical Liberal coalition government, had 
pursued towards Germany in the 1930s and which, in his view, became 
imperative in the circumstances of the first years of the occupation. Like 
Scavenius, he apparently expected Germany to win the war and found 
it necessary for Denmark to prepare itself for German domination of 
Europe in the post- war world. His most important contribution to the 
political process was to maintain a degree of parliamentary backing for 
Scavenius’s dealings with the Germans. Time and again he defended the 
policy and measures of his foreign minister in the committee of leading 
politicians set up in the summer of 1940, to represent the old political par-
ties and provide vicarious parliamentary control, and secured its backing 
for the government’s handling of relations with the occupying power.
Other Social Democratic leaders in support of the policy of coop-
eration included Alsing Andersen, Hans Hedtoft- Hansen and H.C. 
Hansen. Andersen was minister of defence in the pre- war government 
and remained in office till July 1940, and thus shared the responsibil-
ity for the extremely weak military preparedness of the country in 1940 
and the early decision to cease fighting on 9 April. In the later part of 
1942 he served as minister of finance. His most notorious act, however, 
was to put his name to a circular which, as acting chairman of the Social 
Democratic party, he issued to its representatives throughout the coun-
try on 2 September 1943. It was not only an aggrieved defence of the 
government’s occupation policy, which had saved the country from the 
disasters of war and could well have continued doing so till the end of 
hostilities, but also a bitter attack on the resistance movement, that ‘coa-
lition of chauvinists and Communists which irresponsibly and secretly 
has sought to throw suspicion on the ends and means of cooperation and 
bring about a different mentality in sections of the public.’
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That circular, which correctly expressed the party’s attitude to the 
events of August 1943, and may have been drafted by Hedtoft- Hansen, 
became a lasting embarrassment for Andersen.4 Carrying the formal 
responsibility for its appearance, he was strongly criticized in some of 
the illegal press. In subsequent years, when the attitude of the public 
to cooperation and resistance had changed markedly, the leaders of the 
party failed to acknowledge their responsibility for the circular, pre-
ferring instead to treat it rather as a mistake committed by Andersen. 
When Hedtoft- Hansen, in 1947, appointed him minister of finance he 
lasted only two days, his past once again catching up with him.
Hedtoft- Hansen and H.C. Hansen, both younger than Andersen, 
had no ministerial responsibilities during the occupation but, as mem-
bers of parliament, held high posts in the leadership of the Social 
Democratic party. Since the 1930s they had been known for their invet-
erate anti- Nazi and anti- Communist attitudes. Though, early in 1941, 
the Germans forced them to resign their honorary posts in the party, 
both remained part of its informal leadership throughout the war. At all 
stages they were convinced that the policy of cooperation was both justi-
fied and necessary. Like Vilhelm Buhl, leader of the party after the death 
of Stauning, they were highly sceptical about the resistance movement 
and its leadership, the self- appointed nature of which they found diffi-
cult to reconcile with their democratic convictions. They also suspected 
that the Communists dominated its activities. In an apparent attempt to 
secure some control of its efforts, each established contact with mem-
bers of the movement and, eventually, with the freedom council. Both 
became ministers in the liberation government and each of them even-
tually became prime minister, Hedtoft in 1947 and H.C. Hansen in 1955.
The state organs and public bodies of the country largely sup-
ported the policy of willing cooperation, especially in the first three or 
four years of the occupation. Since the most obvious alternatives to the 
existing order were government by the Nazi party and its sympathiz-
ers and military rule by the occupying power, official Denmark found 
it necessary to accommodate the Germans and avoid provocations. 
King Christian X set the tone from the very beginning. In the morning 
of 9 April, after the order to cease fighting had reached the units of the 
armed forces, the government prepared a proclamation which called 
for calm and restraint by the public and maintenance of law and order 
throughout the country. The king added his personal appeal for correct 
and dignified behaviour, explaining that any rash act or remark could 
have the most serious consequences. As it did for members of the public, 
caution became the first principle of official dealings with the Germans.
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Though the king was cast in several roles in the course of the occu-
pation, in his constitutional acts and public utterances he managed 
to back his government and support its policies. In the initial period 
he quickly became the focus of a public swell of patriotic feelings and 
expressions. His daily, unaccompanied ride on horseback through the 
streets of Copenhagen strengthened his bond with the people and 
helped make him the foremost symbol of national unity in trying circum-
stances. Soon, however, he also became a bold example of how to deal 
with the Germans on personal levels. Numerous stories about the king – 
some true, others apocryphal  – went round, most of them involving 
some kind of snub to representatives of the occupying power.5 In British 
propaganda directed against Danish politicians involved in cooperation 
with the Germans, the king was sometimes presented as an alternative 
rallying point for patriotic efforts. However, though the king may have 
been attracted to some such roles, he usually made sure to consult the 
political leaders and secure their support for his interventions.
In the first summer of the occupation there was some uncertainty 
among politicians about the king’s commitment to the parliamentary sys-
tem of government. Their fears culminated when the so- called Højgaard 
circle, a group of prominent men with rightist views, in November 1940 
put pressure on the king to dismiss the Stauning government and, with 
or without parliamentary approval, appoint a ministry of politically 
independent people, drawn mainly from trade and industry and led 
by prince Axel, a cousin of the king. Such a government, it was argued, 
would not only protect the country against a Nazi take- over but could 
also secure some advantages from the Germans which were beyond the 
reach of the existing government. The king rejected the proposal, and 
let Stauning assure the parliament that he had no intention of acting 
without its approval.
After the telegram crisis and the riding accident in October 1942 
and subsequent prolonged illness of the king, he gave loyal, if not always 
enthusiastic, support to Scavenius in the critical period of 1943. In May 
he marked his return to official duties with a broadcast address in which 
he spoke against sabotage. Aware that such an admonition now ran 
counter to the trend of public opinion, he had long resisted it, but even-
tually agreed because both Scavenius and Best wanted it. During the 
rebellion some months later he was again reluctant to associate himself 
with an appeal for law and order, which went out on 21 August, and gave 
in only after a long argument. Yet, despite his qualms, the king did not 
disown the policy of cooperation. Indeed, when the rupture of formal 
relations with the Germans finally came, on 29 August, he remarked 
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that it had happened too soon. After the August crisis the king, like the 
government, was constitutionally out of action without having abdi-
cated. Regarding himself as a prisoner, Christian X remained in this 
state of suspension till the end of the occupation but kept in touch with 
Scavenius indirectly.
In the state administration, the department responsible for for-
mulating and carrying out the policy of cooperation, before as well as 
after the August rebellion, was the foreign ministry. Immediately after 
the invasion it was agreed that relations with the German authorities 
in the country should be conducted mainly through that ministry. Such 
an arrangement made it possible to maintain the fiction that occupied 
Demark remained a sovereign state, able to handle relations with its bel-
ligerent neighbour through normal diplomatic channels. Thus the policy 
and practice of cooperating with the occupying power acquired a for-
mal, albeit legalistic, base which was convenient or acceptable to each of 
the parties. It survived the deactivation of the Danish government and 
lingered on, in its make- believe existence, till the collapse of the occupy-
ing power. Its function was to help the government and the ministry in 
their efforts to protect the independence of Denmark in domestic affairs.
The central figure in the ministry was Nils Svenningsen. At the 
time of the invasion head of the department handling political and legal 
matters, he had identified with Munch’s policy towards Germany in the 
late 1930s and accepted the geopolitical dependence of Denmark on a 
powerful Germany. In the spring of 1941 he was appointed head of the 
ministry. As such, he became Scavenius’s most loyal and reliable helper 
in the conduct of relations with the German authorities in Copenhagen 
and Berlin. He entirely accepted the policy of willing but limited coop-
eration. Drafting most of Scavenius’s statements, he helped to formulate 
the policy and took responsibility for putting it into practice. In diplo-
matic crises with the Germans, as well as in recurrent issues between 
Scavenius and the politicians, he invariably gave his minister full sup-
port. After August 1943, when he became chief negotiator in relations 
with the German authorities, he faithfully continued the policy of pro-
tecting the remains of Danish sovereignty by engaging in restrained 
cooperation with the Germans. This meant close and continual negotia-
tions with Best under discreet supervision by the political leaders.
Never having any doubts himself about the necessity for such coop-
eration and its moral and political righteousness, Svenningsen resented 
anything that stood in his way. He could not accept any breaches of loy-
alty to the ministry by diplomats and diplomatic staff serving abroad 
during the occupation. Thus, he never forgave Henrik Kauffmann, the 
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Danish envoy in Washington, who immediately after the invasion and 
occupation, declared his legation independent of the government in 
Copenhagen and a year later, in the name of the king, signed an import-
ant agreement with the United States for the defence of Greenland. 
Nor did Svenningsen ever accept, or even understand, the motivations 
behind sabotage and other militant efforts of the resistance movement. 
Seeking solutions through established diplomatic channels was for him 
the only way. Through steadfast negotiation and expedient compromises 
he kept the dialogue with Best going till the end of the war, thus helping 
to ward off German intervention by military means. After the liberation 
Svenningsen was attacked for collaboration and sent into exile, as envoy 
to Sweden. In 1951, however, he was recalled to Copenhagen, where he 
again ended up as head of the foreign ministry, under the government 
of H.C. Hansen.
Military matters were not managed by the foreign ministry but 
dealt with through direct contact between the Danish and the German 
armed forces. For occupied Denmark it was important to maintain its 
army and navy, not only because they were visible symbols of its claimed 
sovereignty but also because they might be needed to quell internal dis-
turbances, whether by Danish Nazis or, after June 1941, by Communists. 
Within a few weeks of the invasion agreements were reached with the 
Germans about the conditions on which the army could be retained in 
the new situation. Many barracks and installations had to be vacated to 
make room for the German troops; narrow rules for exercise and train-
ing were laid down for the army; and all weapons and explosives were 
put under German control. Later other agreements were negotiated 
to limit the manpower of the army, and frequent demands were made 
for the handing over of substantial parts of its war materials. For von 
Hanneken, who assumed command of the German troops in the autumn 
of 1942, the goal soon became the elimination of the Danish army and 
navy. This, however, did not come to pass till 29 August 1943.
The pivotal figure in the conduct of the army’s relations with the 
occupying power was Ebbe Gørtz. As chief of the general staff and senior 
liaison officer to the German military authorities, he managed the nego-
tiations of the conditions imposed on 9 April. Promoted to lieutenant 
general and commander- in- chief in the autumn of 1941, he saw the 
army through the crises of the next few years. After the internment of 
officers and men in the autumn of 1943, he set up the so- called small 
general staff, which under the auspices of the leading politicians took 
charge of the army’s illegal activities and preparations during the rest 
of the occupation. His concerns throughout were to protect the army 
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and ensure that its officers and men did not upset the orderly relations 
with the German authorities that had been developed by the politicians 
responsible. Within the given limitations, he sought to train as many sol-
diers as possible and to maintain discipline throughout the army. When, 
on 29 August German troops attacked army barracks and other places 
of duty throughout the country and many units did not resist, or fought 
only briefly, and did not destroy their stock of weapons, they were fol-
lowing orders issued by him. Firmly believing the role of the army to be 
that of a loyal and obedient tool of the responsible government, Gørtz 
accepted the policy of cooperation and the many compromises and con-
cessions it entailed.
Gørtz was against officers independently engaging in illegal activ-
ities, on the grounds that their professional loyalty to the government 
should always have priority. This was also his position after the setting- 
up of the small general staff, which he, in the absence of an acting gov-
ernment, saw as subordinate to the political leaders, Buhl in particular. 
That attitude made him unpopular with the resistance movement, and 
led to frictions with those who looked to the freedom council, rather 
than the politicians, for leadership. However, Gørtz retained the con-
fidence of the Social Democratic leaders, with some of whom he had 
developed close relations in the earlier stages of the occupation. In 
October 1944 the allied powers appointed him leader designate of the 
Danish resistance forces in case of an allied invasion of Denmark. Thus 
he ended up as commander- in- chief of the forces of the resistance move-
ment mobilized on 5 May 1945. In the post- war years he managed the 
reconstruction of the army and its reorganization for NATO member-
ship. However, still under attack for his inflexible attitude during the 
occupation, he decided to decline when he, in 1950, was invited to apply 
for the new post of chief of defence.
The major organizations of the economic life of the country, which 
in its foreign trade had become highly dependent on Germany, fully 
supported the policy of cooperating with the occupying power. Since 
both the Association of Trade Unions (DsF) and the Danish Organization 
of Employers (DA) needed to keep the production flowing, they shared 
an interest in accommodating various German requirements and avoid-
ing any disturbing rupture of the Danish– German diplomatic rela-
tionship. For the former organization, the most pressing problem was 
the high and rising rate of unemployment, which in the first winter of 
the occupation reached 36 per cent with unskilled labour particularly 
hard hit. This was the basic reason why the Association accepted the 
German demand for manpower, and encouraged, eventually pressed, 
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unemployed members to take work in Germany and thereby reduce the 
demands on its unemployment fund. Axel Olsen, chairman of the Union 
of Unskilled Labourers (DAF), was particularly willing to supply Danish 
manpower to Germany, on the principle that to look after his men was 
more important than anything else. Nor did he have great difficulty 
accepting the idea of a customs and monetary union with Germany pro-
posed in the summer of 1940.
Another concern of the Danish labour movement was the challenge 
of the Communists, who competed for the loyalty of its members. Before 
their party became illegal, they continually attacked and criticized the 
Social Democratic party and the trade union leaders. After June 1941, 
the DsF took measures to suppress the influence of Communists within 
its organization. From late 1942, however, the problem was exacerbated 
by the growing number of strikes and acts of sabotage which appeared 
to be organized mainly by Communists. In the summer of 1943 rampant 
demonstrations and sporadic rebellions added to the fear of a Communist 
challenge to the leadership of the labour movement. Spokesmen of the 
Social Democratic party and the trade unions responded by defending 
the national policy of cooperating with the occupying power, warning 
against the dangers for the labour movement of a rupture in relations 
with the Germans and stressing the need to keep their organizations 
intact. Danish democracy itself, the DsF chairman Eiler Jensen warned, 
could be at stake.
In the summer of 1944 the DsF joined the DA and a number of lead-
ing politicians in an appeal to call off the mass strike in Copenhagen. Later 
the same year, when most of the departmental heads of the state admin-
istration were considering resigning in protest against the German arrest 
of the Danish police, the two organizations again joined forces, and put 
pressure on the civil servants to stay in office and continue the negotia-
tion and cooperation with the occupying power. The trade union move-
ment maintained that line till the end of the occupation. Throughout the 
war the overriding concern of the Social Democratic labour movement 
was to keep its political and economic organizations intact.
The DA, from May 1941 under the chairmanship of T.K. Thomsen, 
played a complementary part in supporting the policy and promoting 
the practice of cooperating with the German authorities. As chairman 
of the Organization of Contractors and director of one of the country’s 
largest such companies, Thomsen was from the outset of the occupa-
tion deeply involved in several major German projects carried out on 
Danish soil by Danish companies and workers, and with the approval 
of the government. Later he took the lead in condemning sabotage and 
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opposing strikes, as a result of which he and his organization attracted 
much criticism in the illegal press. At the same time, however, the DA 
donated large sums of money to a relief fund set up in 1943 to support 
various activities of the resistance movement.
By and large, the policy of cooperation, as developed by the politi-
cal and promoted by the economic establishment of the country, enjoyed 
the support of the press. Immediately after the invasion, the occupying 
power banned news detrimental to its military interests as well anti- 
German propaganda, but left it to the Danish government to carry out 
the censorship. This became the responsibility of the press bureau of 
the foreign ministry. Since that office also maintained the contact to the 
German press attaché, it became the link between the occupying power 
and the Danish press. In practice, the system that emerged was one of 
self- censorship, though with frequent German complaints, requests and 
warnings.
That this procedure worked well enough to survive the first few 
years of the occupation was not only a consequence of German threats 
and interventions, which in a number of cases took the form of removal 
of anti- German journalists or editors. It was also because nearly all legal 
Danish newspapers were organs of one or other of the old political par-
ties, and as such were disinclined to publish material detrimental to 
the established relationship between the coalition government and the 
occupying power. Thus, as late as the autumn of 1942 the press loyally 
backed the government in its condemnation of the growing anti- German 
sabotage. Later that year and in 1943, when Germany suffered setbacks 
in several theatres of war and the Danish population grew more critical 
of the policy of always accommodating the Germans, it became more 
difficult for the press to toe the line. Presumably motivated not least by 
a concern not to lose their readers, most newspapers now found ways 
of keeping their more discerning readership informed of developments 
both at home and abroad.
The period of self- censorship came to an end after 29 August, 
when the Germans took over the censoring themselves. Now both mil-
itary, political and economic copy had to be passed to German censors, 
through the press bureau. Moreover, the Germans regularly supplied 
propaganda material which had to be published in full. If in the first cou-
ple of years the press on the whole had supported the governmental line 
towards the Germans and in the period leading up to 29 August to some 
extent had followed the rapidly changing political feelings and public 
attitudes of its readers, after that date it lost what remained of the tradi-
tional freedom of the press.
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To the extent that the press in the summer of 1943 managed to 
minister to sections of a public growing tired of governmental policy 
and turning towards some form of opposition to the Germans and, at the 
same time, made sure to continue its support of the official line of coop-
eration, the press could be said to have been playing a double game. Of 
the various persons and organizations presented here as practitioners, 
advocates or supporters of willing cooperation, perhaps the one who 
came closest to such double- dealing was Christian X, who at several cru-
cial stages seemed to be torn between demonstrating his sympathy with 
popular anti- German feelings and backing his government. When the 
DA donated substantial sums to a relief fund set up for various illegal 
ends it might be seen more as a case of hedging one’s bets. When Gunnar 
Larsen and Thune Jacobsen after the liberation claimed to have assisted 
British intelligence- gathering it had the taste more of an attempt at ret-
rospective self- justification than of a revelation of a purposeful double 
game. And when Hedtoft- Hansen and H.C. Hansen established contact 
with the resistance movement as well as when general Gørtz set up the 
small general staff of the army and later took command of the military 
forces of the resistance movement, the basic concern appears to have 
been to secure some control of the activities of that movement and to 
make sure that the political leaders, the Social Democrats in particu-
lar, had as firm a hand as possible on political developments and mil-
itary actions during the rest of the occupation and immediately after 
liberation.
For the men responsible for developing the policy of cooperation 
and conducting the relations with the occupying power there could be 
no double- dealing. Guided by a political realism which tended to take 
the form of geopolitical determinism, and in the cases of Stauning and 
Scavenius misled by the expectation that Germany would win the war 
and dominate post- war Europe, they felt compelled to accommodate the 
Germans, and emboldened to do it in a proactive way. Recognizing that 
the success of their policy depended on German confidence in Danish 
integrity, both Scavenius and Svenningsen negotiated in good faith and 
endeavoured to honour the agreements reached.
While the basic concern of ministers, political leaders and dip-
lomats who identified with the policy of cooperation was to maintain 
what remained of the legal sovereignty and political independence 
of Denmark, the guiding principle of the leaders of the Association of 
Trade Unions was to look after the economic and social interests of their 
members and protect the organizations of the Danish labour move-
ment. While the former set, concerned with present and future needs 
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of the state and nation, took a broader view of the interests at stake, the 
latter focused more narrowly on the welfare of a large section of the pop-
ulation. Neither group acted under the influence of Nazi sympathies or 
pro- German feelings; both were acting in a self- protective mode when 
they willingly engaged in limited cooperation and carefully steered 
clear of anti- German activities.
reluctant negotiation
Those who recognized that some interaction between the Danish and 
the German authorities was unavoidable but preferred to keep it to a 
minimum were moved by much the same fears and concerns. As aware 
as those who felt compelled to engage in deliberate cooperation of the 
risk of a Nazi take- over or a German military rule and of the need to 
protect Danish institutions and political traditions, they tried to follow 
the principle of least contact and negotiation with the occupying power. 
In practice, that usually meant handling only particular matters which 
required attention or simply dealing with disputes in Danish– German 
relations as they arose.
However, though the approach was reluctant and procrastinating, 
it inevitably led to one concession after another, and thus threatened 
to take the Danish negotiators on to a slippery slope. While often pre-
sented as an alternative policy, this line of conduct turned out to be more 
a way of exercising some restraint on those who found it necessary or 
expedient to engage the country in various forms of willing cooperation. 
Ultimately, the course of reluctant negotiation and minimal concessions 
survived because it was shielded by the established policy of continuous 
contact and active cooperation. Yet it allowed many politicians and pub-
lic servants to maintain some dignity in trying circumstances, especially 
in the first years of the occupation when there was little active resistance 
to the occupying power.
The first minister to attempt a pragmatic policy of limited contact 
and minimal concessions was P.  Munch, who remained foreign min-
ister for the first three months of the occupation. The German inva-
sion and occupation meant the failure of Danish foreign and defence 
policy, the purpose of which had been to keep the country out of war. 
However, since the fighting by Danish forces in the morning of 9 April 
had been only brief and minimal and since the Germans immediately 
had described their occupation as a peaceful and protective measure, 
and had undertaken to respect the territorial integrity and political 
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independence of the occupied country, it was possible for the Danish 
government to describe the situation that had arisen as a case of peace 
occupation (occupatio pacifica). Munch, in his answer to a German note 
of 9 April, presented a formal protest against the violation of Danish 
neutrality, but also expressed his government’s willingness to manage 
relations within the country with due regard to the existing situation.
Having arranged for most official contact with the Germans to 
be through the foreign ministry, Munch stuck to his pragmatic pol-
icy of dealing with matters case by case as they arose. In this manner 
he helped to establish the principle that matters at issue were settled 
through negotiation, rather than through naked imposition by the occu-
pying power. At a time when the Danish government was highly ner-
vous about German intentions, and far from sure that its democratic 
form could be maintained, this seemed an important point. However, a 
series of concessions made in response to German pressure underlined 
the inequality between the occupier and the occupied and undermined 
the notion of Danish sovereignty. The latter effect of his policy and diplo-
matic style was reinforced by developments on the international scene, 
where the rapid victories of the German armies in the summer of 1940 
made Hitler’s Germany seem almost invincible.
In the governmental crisis in early July, Munch gave way to 
Scavenius in the foreign ministry. By now a tired and disillusioned man, 
he was still unpopular with the old opposition parties – especially the 
Conservatives, who held him responsible for the policies that had led 
to invasion and capitulation – and well aware that the German minis-
ter found him too uncooperative. After retiring, he took one of the two 
Radical Liberal seats in the committee of parliamentary representatives 
of the old political parties, where he became a useful mediator in a series 
of disagreements between Scavenius and the party leaders.
Vilhelm Buhl, minister of finance for the first two years of the occu-
pation and, after Stauning’s death in May 1942, prime minister for six 
months and leader of the Social Democrats, was critical of Scavenius’s 
policy towards the Germans. He could not support the ‘active negoti-
ation policy’, according to which Denmark quickly offered concessions 
deemed likely in due course to be demanded anyway, and believed that 
the negotiators should give way only when compelled to do so. Thus, in 
the earlier years he tended to act as a brake on Scavenius’s endeavours. 
In particular, he opposed the proposed customs and monetary union, 
the setting up of a committee to explore possibilities of Danish partic-
ipation in the development of areas of the Soviet Union occupied by 
German forces and the accession to the Anti- Comintern Pact.
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As prime minister, Buhl’s situation became more difficult, marked 
as it was by the beginning of sabotage and growing tension with the 
German authorities. In September 1942 he broadcast a notorious speech 
in which he made a heartfelt appeal to the public to support the fight 
against those engaged in sabotage. His political concerns were to avoid 
a rupture of relations with the German representative and to maintain 
public support for his government’s policy of reluctant cooperation. An 
unchecked growth of sabotage and other anti- German acts, he feared, 
would jeopardize the continuance of Danish jurisdiction and conse-
quently endanger public support for governmental policy. The Germans 
had already threatened court- martial jurisdiction and the death penalty 
for acts of sabotage.
The so- called telegram crisis, which broke out later the same 
month, saw the end of Buhl’s ministry. In Berlin, where his record 
both as minister of finance and as prime minister was well known, 
he was regarded as the main stumbling block to the development of a 
satisfactory relationship with the Danish state. When Best arrived in 
Copenhagen he was determined to have him replaced. While the politi-
cal leaders, initially inclined to reject the German demand, were looking 
for a suitable person to replace him, Buhl decided to step down. Like 
Munch, he joined the committee of parliamentary representatives of the 
coalition parties, of which he soon became the unofficial leader. Though 
he tended to keep a distance from Scavenius’s government, at a crucial 
stage of the August crisis of 1943 he supported his party’s endeavours 
to uphold the policy of cooperation and sponsored the broadcast call for 
law and order. However, a week later, after the receipt of the German 
ultimatum of 28 August, he was the first politician to speak up and deci-
sively reject it. In the debate that followed in September he also rejected 
as impossible all ideas of forming a new parliamentary government. In 
contrast with Scavenius, he always kept an eye on public opinion and 
displayed a keen sense of what was possible and prudent in any given 
domestic political situation.
It was inevitable that Buhl, as the country’s most influential politi-
cian, should establish contact with the freedom council in the last year of 
the occupation. But, like other Social Democratic leaders, he did it more 
to secure some control of the resistance movement than to support its 
efforts. Highly suspicious of the self- appointed leaders of the resistance 
and afraid that the movement might present a threat to the political sys-
tem of the country, he relied on the illegal general staff of the army and 
the officers and on the Danish brigade, set up in Sweden largely under 
Social Democratic auspices, to protect the traditional order. From the 
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last winter of the war he became increasingly preoccupied with the risk 
that the resistance movement, through its growing popularity and its 
allied support, should emerge as the only body that had played a part 
in the defeat of the Germans and the liberation of Denmark, and thus 
obscure the standing and role of the official organs of the country.
However, Buhl enjoyed the support of the politicians, who saw 
him as the most suitable candidate for the post of prime minister in the 
liberation government. After a good deal of misgiving, the freedom 
council accepted him too. His post- war career, first as prime minister 
of the liberation government for six months and from 1947 as minister 
in Hedtoft’s government, marked the restoration of the pre- war Danish 
political system and the reinstatement of ‘the old politicians’.
Throughout the occupation, Buhl’s performance was a balancing 
act between too much and too little cooperation with the Germans. His 
political calculations and deft manoeuvring were motivated not so much 
by a patriotic urge to oppose the occupying power or a will to support 
the allied cause in the struggle against Nazism as by essentially domes-
tic considerations. His concerns were to protect the traditional political 
system and established social order against the German onslaught and, 
once the disturbance of major war in Europe was over, return to the 
old ways of party politics in a democratic country gifted with powerful 
Social Democratic organizations.
Buhl and Munch, who had both been ministers in the Social 
Democratic and Radical Liberal coalition government of the pre- 
 invasion years, found it relatively easy to accept a degree of cooperation 
with the occupying power. For the leaders of the two major opposition 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, it was more difficult. Knud 
Kristensen, prominent in the Liberal party and minister of the interior 
from July 1940 to November 1942, had been very reluctant to join the 
broader coalition government formed in the summer of 1940, initially 
insisting on merely observer status for his party’s representatives. He 
had accepted the establishment of a committee of parliamentary repre-
sentatives only on certain conditions, namely a revision of social services 
and a tightening of the rules for unemployment benefits, both parts of 
the economic programme of the Liberal party.
As minister, he often infuriated Scavenius by opposing his policy 
of cooperation with Germany and criticizing his diplomatic conduct. In 
particular, he rejected the proposed customs and monetary union. While 
acknowledging that such a union could lead to higher German prices 
for Danish exports, which he suspected might tempt many, he stressed 
that the decisive consideration must be national independence. In the 
 
 
 
 
danIsH re aC t Ions to German oCCuPat Ion72
   72
summer of 1941 he took the leading part in an unsuccessful attempt 
to replace Scavenius, attacking him for never wanting to say no to the 
Germans and calling for a different policy. In the telegram crisis the 
following year Kristensen, now chairman of his party, maintained till 
a late stage his opposition to Scavenius becoming prime minister. When 
Scavenius did form a new government he refused to serve under him, but 
did not object to his party keeping its representation in the government.
Like Munch and Buhl before him, Kristensen joined the committee 
of parliamentary representatives after his resignation, and thus helped 
to maintain parliamentary backing for, and control of, Scavenius’s gov-
ernment. In the later period of the occupation he did not go out of his 
way to establish contact with the resistance movement, whose efforts 
he dismissed as attempts to engage in ‘private foreign policy’. When he, 
towards the end of the war, heard about the plans to have members of 
the freedom council represent the resistance movement in the liberation 
government he was not enthusiastic. However, in that government he 
again took the post of minister of the interior. In October 1945, follow-
ing the first post- war parliamentary election, he became prime minister 
in a Liberal minority government.
John Christmas Møller, chairman of the Conservative party in 
the 1930s, minister without portfolio immediately after the invasion 
and minister of trade, shipping and industry for three months from 8 
July 1940, had a much more positive attitude to the resistance move-
ment. Resenting the practically immediate capitulation on 9 April, he 
reacted by delivering outspoken anti- German speeches at political 
meetings, which soon attracted the attention of the German author-
ities and led to his resignation as minister. Nor would the Germans 
accept him as member of the committee of parliamentary repre-
sentatives. After further public statements of anti- German charac-
ter, including remarks about ‘the enemy’ being in this country, the 
Germans demanded, in January 1941, that he give up all his posts, 
including membership of parliament. Politically isolated, he soon 
found himself in contact with prominent individuals who were dis-
posed to engage in illegal activities against the occupying power. 
One was Frode Jakobsen, Social Democratic maverick and founder 
of the resistance organization the Ring. Another was Aksel Larsen, 
the Communist leader, with whom he started an illegal paper, Frit 
Danmark. This period came to an end in the spring of 1942, when 
Christmas Møller, after receipt of an invitation from London, illegally 
left the country for Sweden and, together with his wife and son, flew 
to Scotland.
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When Christmas Møller, despite his opposition to the foreign and 
defence policy of the Stauning- Munch government in the 1930s and his 
indignation at the capitulation on 9 April, accepted a ministerial post in 
Stauning’s government he did it in the compatriotic spirit that marked 
Danish political life in the period after the invasion. He saw the need for 
some negotiation with the occupying power, especially in regard to eco-
nomic matters, but believed it should be conducted on the basis of the 
Danish– German exchange of notes immediately after the invasion, in 
which Danish sovereignty in domestic affairs had been acknowledged. 
In principle, he was sceptical about the pragmatic approach of dealing 
with matters as they cropped up because he thought it might lead the 
government on to a slippery slope. In practice, however, he accepted 
as unavoidable a number of cases where the government yielded to 
German demands which showed little respect for Danish sovereignty, 
but were backed by superior power. What he could not accept were vol-
untary concessions. In particular, he rejected the proposed customs and 
monetary union, seeing it as a deliberate signing away of national inde-
pendence in a number of fundamental areas, which would be effective 
not only during but also after the war. Here he took a strong stand, stak-
ing his ministerial post on the outcome of the negotiations.
In contrast with Buhl, for whom the occupation was a Danish– 
German matter to be managed largely in the context of domestic political 
considerations, Christmas Møller was very aware of the wider interna-
tional dimensions of the situation and conduct of his country. Given the 
minimal fighting and immediate capitulation on 9 April, he was con-
cerned about the impression that the free world, and the allied powers 
in particular, might gain of the attitude and policy of the Danish govern-
ment towards the occupying power. Anxious that Denmark should not 
be seen as collaborating with Germany, he wanted it understood that the 
country had retained a degree of independence, and was prepared to do 
its utmost to resist German diplomatic pressure. Hence, he was angry 
with Kauffmann in Washington for having declared himself indepen-
dent of the government he was representing on the grounds that it was 
no longer free but controlled by the German occupier. While the govern-
ment should give in to German pressure only when palpably forced to 
do so, the diplomats serving it abroad, he insisted, should remain loyal.
Christmas Møller’s experience as minister demonstrated the dif-
ficulty of reconciling the principle of limited contact and minimal con-
cessions with the practice of dealing with a forceful occupying power. 
In London, where he was most of the time till the end of the occupa-
tion, he was able to devote his efforts to encouraging the activities of the 
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resistance movement in his BBC talks to Denmark and to rallying Danes 
in Britain and other allied countries. Towards the end of the war he 
engaged in some delicate and complex political manoeuvring, which led 
him to the post of foreign minister in the liberation government, where 
he represented the free Danes abroad.
The secondary ranks of the leadership of the four major political 
parties as well as most ordinary members of parliament, none of them 
personally involved in dealings with the Germans, on the whole pre-
ferred protracted negotiation and reluctant concessions to willing coop-
eration with the occupying power. After August 1943, when relations 
with the German authorities were managed by the permanent heads 
of the state administration, there was again a tendency for dissatisfac-
tion with the policy of cooperation to be more marked among those less 
directly exposed to German pressure. Thus, it was Nils Svenningsen, the 
chief negotiator, and Eivind Larsen, a departmental head in the justice 
ministry responsible for matters relating to the police and jurisdiction, 
who negotiated the details of cooperation, and other departmental 
heads who occasionally opposed particular proposals put forward in 
response to German demands.
A major question from the autumn of 1943 related to the role of the 
Danish police in the fight against sabotage. The Germans wanted their 
assistance in return for an undertaking that any saboteur caught would 
be dealt with under Danish jurisdiction. A proposal prepared by the jus-
tice ministry met strong opposition when presented to a meeting of the 
departmental heads in January 1944. The arguments advanced against 
it were that the Germans could not be trusted to honour their undertak-
ing, that an arrangement possibly requiring Danish police to open fire 
against saboteurs could lead to civil war, and that the proposed form of 
cooperation might compromise Denmark’s reputation among the allied 
powers. However, Svenningsen and Larsen got their way, and the justice 
ministry prepared a proposal for the Germans, who failed to respond.
Four months later the matter came up again. An expansion of 
sabotage against railways and several attacks on armament factories 
led Best to demand that the Danish police take over the guarding of 
a large number of industrial concerns. Svenningsen again wanted to 
comply; but the majority of civil servants, this time including Larsen, 
were against it, as were the professional organizations of the police. 
The result was a refusal of the German demand. But the mass strike in 
Copenhagen later the same month, which was accompanied by some 
spectacular acts of sabotage, brought the issue to the fore once more. 
This time the departmental heads, supported by the politicians, agreed 
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on a compromise proposal for the solution of the problem. Best found it 
acceptable, and a system of limited cooperation went into force.
Only two months later, however, general Pancke, head of the 
SS and German police in Denmark, attacked the police stations and 
rounded up nearly 2,000 policemen and sent them to concentration 
camps in Germany. That meant the end of Danish jurisdiction, and 
was a fundamental blow to the system of administrative management 
of relations with the occupying power. Buhl, and some other politi-
cians, thought that the departmental heads should retire and break off 
relations with the Germans. Most of the heads as well as the freedom 
council took the same line. However, both the trade union movement 
and the employers’ association, with the support of some politicians, 
appealed to the heads to remain at their posts. Svenningsen, deter-
mined to continue the existing system, succeeded in preventing a 
break with the German authorities. Thus, the policy and practice of 
negotiation and cooperation, whether willing or reluctant, stayed in 
force till the end of the occupation. When the large organizations in 
a major crisis took the side of Svenningsen and colleagues against 
other colleagues and a number of politicians on the opposite side, the 
pattern emerging had much in common with that typical of earlier 
years, when Scavenius, together with his most faithful colleagues, 
usually could rely on the support of the central administration and 
various major organizations against the political leaders. What had 
changed was public opinion. In the first years after the invasion the 
nation, rallying in support of the king and the coalition government, 
could accept the policy of accommodating the occupying power and 
the practice of making concessions of the sort which either could be 
deemed necessary or could be seen as practical, perhaps even advan-
tageous for Danish interests. In the last year of the occupation, a con-
siderable section of the population had long since come round to the 
view that it was not always necessary to give way to German demands, 
and usually not in the Danish interest to do so. An increasing number 
of people had also decided that it was both politically justified and 
morally right to resist the occupying power, even with arms.
2.3 Opposition
The third section of the spectrum of Danish reactions to German occu-
pation presented here is characterized by opposition to the occupying 
power and its local representatives and servants. Here the most obvious 
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distinction is between passive and active opposition. While the more 
passive forms predominated in the first period of the occupation, the 
decidedly active, and more obvious, manifestations came to the fore 
in the later years, with the rise and organization of the resistance 
movement.
Most of those engaged in some form of passive opposition sup-
ported, or at least implicitly accepted, the policy of limited cooperation 
with the Germans pursued by official Denmark. Others, however, were 
less satisfied with that policy, and more inclined to regard passive oppo-
sition as a preparation for increasingly active resistance to the occupy-
ing power. While the reactions of the former, generally to be found at the 
broader levels of society, typically were spontaneous and emotional, the 
efforts of the latter, often involving particular categories of people, were 
usually more organized and purposive. To some extent, it was also a 
difference between those who were plainly pro- national and some who 
were more anti- German.
Passive opposition
The state of shock and perplexity of the Danish people immediately 
after the invasion on 9 April was soon followed by a wave of national-
ism stronger than anything experienced in the inter- war period. The 
nationalism of 1940 had a negative as well as a positive side, but in 
both of its aspects found only a rather feeble expression in terms of 
public behaviour and practical politics. The negative side, taking the 
form of fairly mild anti- German feelings, led to the popular practice of 
cold- shouldering the Germans in Denmark. Resolved to ignore them, 
people would look the other way when meeting one of the soldiers in 
the street. At the same time a large number of heartening stories about 
Danish– German personal exchanges, for example relating a snub by 
the king or a bold answer by a delivery boy, went round, many no doubt 
invented.
The positive side of the new nationalism took the form mainly of 
an intense cultivation of national identity. The focus of the movement 
was the king, who became the symbol of the Danish nation. Despite his 
rather reserved nature and less than democratic style, he soon gained 
enormous popularity, which reached a peak with his seventieth birth-
day in September 1940. To mark the occasion, silver and gold badges, 
designed with the Danish flag and crown, the king’s monogram and the 
year 1870 and 1940, were produced for sale, and worn by very many 
people throughout the occupation.
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Some other demonstrations of national unity in the first summer of 
the occupation took more unusual forms. One was what became known 
as alsang, community singing of patriotic songs in the open air. It started 
in Aalborg with 1,500 participants, and quickly spread to other parts of 
the country. Within two months it was possible to arrange simultane-
ous and coordinated rallies throughout the country with one sixth of the 
total population singing along. The meetings that day finished off with 
telegraphic greetings to the king. Attempts the following year at algang, 
brisk community hikes in the country, were physically more demanding 
and did not rouse quite the same degree of patriotic passion.
The nationalist feelings also found more intellectual expressions 
at this early stage of the occupation. Throughout the country well- 
attended meetings with lectures and talks, typically about Danish his-
tory or Danish identity, were arranged. Here the foremost sources of 
inspiration were the writings of N.F.S. Grundtvig, the nineteenth- cen-
tury clergyman who devoted his life to awaken the people of Denmark 
to an awareness of its identity and, through a monumental religious 
and historical quest of Danishness, became a formative influence on the 
Danish mind in modern times. At Copenhagen University Hal Koch, pro-
fessor of ecclesiastic history, delivered a series of lectures on Grundtvig 
which attracted large audiences. About the same time the Royal Theatre 
showed a play about Grundtvig’s youth written by Kaj Munk, a clergy-
man and dramatist who since 9 April was moved by uncompromisingly 
anti- German feelings. In their different ways, both Koch and Munk 
became vehicles of the new nationalism.
A more organic manifestation of the gush of national feelings in 
1940 was the establishment of Dansk Ungdomssamvirke (DU), an orga-
nization set up to facilitate cooperation among the various youth asso-
ciations of the country. Conceived as a national and cultural body, it 
acquired also a political programme when Hal Koch became chairman 
of its council. In a Europe where the democratic form of politics was 
challenged by contending political systems, by Nazism from the right 
and communism from the left, he thought it vitally important to pro-
tect Danish traditions and values by guiding and educating the youth 
of the country. The result was a large number of meetings and events 
for young people in many parts of the country which were intended 
to go beyond emotional appeals on the theme of the thousand- year- 
old Denmark and also address the challenges and risks of the existing 
political situation of the country. The ultimate concern of the leadership 
of the organization at that stage of the war was to protect the nation 
against future attempts by a victorious Germany to Nazify Denmark. 
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In the following years, when the danger of a Nazi take- over of the gov-
ernment became increasingly unlikely, DU acquired the additional 
function of serving as a channel for disseminating news about Danish– 
German governmental and administrative relations. In its earlier as 
well as in its later phase the organization, which in its composition itself 
reflected the parliamentary and governmental cooperation of the four 
old political parties, supported the established policy of accommodating 
the occupying power.
The forms of passive opposition considered so far could be 
described as politically self- protective and nationally introspective. 
Though essentially reactions to invasion and occupation, their opposi-
tion to German forces and Nazi ideas stopped short of antagonism. For 
some people, however, a commitment to king, government and parlia-
ment, with its implied acceptance of the policy of cooperation with the 
occupying power, was not enough. Though the immediate political sit-
uation might preclude more active forms of opposition, sections of the 
population found it possible to combine passive opposition with prepar-
ing for active resistance at a later stage. Here three initiatives proved 
important, namely the setting up of clubs for cross- country sports in 
most major towns, the creation of a nearly nation- wide ring of politi-
cal study circles and the preparation of the Communist party for illegal 
activities.
The idea of a civilian movement for cross- country sports, which 
were already part of the training of army officers, arose among officers 
and found support among people with a positive attitude to national 
defence. It could be a way of training young men in cross- country rac-
ing and map- reading as well as in close combat and perhaps shooting. 
A council, composed mainly of officers, was set up in the summer of 
1940, and contact was established with circles which might be willing 
to start such clubs. In the autumn of 1941 the Danish Cross- Country 
Sports Union was established, later to be attached to the Danish Rifle, 
Gymnastics and Sports Association. Moved by the idea of laying the 
foundations of a better Denmark, the leadership of the Union attached 
importance to inculcating members with patriotism and willingness to 
defend their country and native soil. Soon the movement built up 30 
branches, starting with major cities and the garrison towns. For many 
members, involvement in cross- country activities led directly to active 
resistance. Indeed, some branches of the movement were set up as cover 
for the training of illegal groups.
In November 1941 a group of academics and intellectuals formed 
the Danish Study Ring, which after August 1943 became known simply 
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as the Ring (Ringen). The original purpose was to build a defence for 
Danishness and democracy by setting up cross- party study circles round 
the country. Largely through the efforts of its manager Frode Jakobsen, 
several dozen such circles and individual contacts were organized. In 
Copenhagen, a further dozen groups, each made up of members of a par-
ticular profession, as well as some groups for Social Democrats only were 
set up. In the first year or two the leadership of the organization limited its 
activities to providing confidential information about governmental policy 
and the occupying power and publishing relevant pamphlets, eventually 
also producing a regular publication with political news and comments.
For Jakobsen, who before the occupation had majored in German 
at Copenhagen University, travelled in Germany and there established 
contact with anti- Nazi circles, that programme was not enough. As a 
maverick Social Democrat belonging to the left wing of the party, he 
was in conflict with its leaders about the policy of accommodating the 
Germans, and more minded than any of them to engage in active resis-
tance. From an early stage he clearly saw the organization he had built up 
as a potentially illegal body, eventually engaged in anti- German activi-
ties. In the course of 1942 a disagreement developed between him and 
the chairman, the historian Erik Møller, who wanted the organization to 
stick to its educational programme. When Møller retired, early in 1943, 
the Ring rapidly moved towards illegal activity with Jakobsen as its 
most influential leader. In the later period of the occupation it expanded 
immensely, establishing itself as a corner- stone of the resistance, with 
Jakobsen as its powerful representative in the freedom council.
Denmark’s Communist Party, which at the outbreak of the war 
had less than 8,000 members and only three seats in parliament, found 
itself in a complicated position when Germany invaded and occupied 
Denmark. Since 1933 Nazi Germany had demonstrated, in words as 
well as in action, its hostility to communism. Yet, as recently as August 
1939 the Soviet Union, for a while allowing strategic and diplomatic 
considerations to override the ideological and political conflict dividing 
Europe, had signed a pact with its potential enemy. The situation that 
resulted was one which called for particular circumspection on the part 
of a Communist party in a small country contiguous to Germany. On the 
day of the occupation, when two of its leaders, including the chairman 
Aksel Larsen, happened to be in Moscow for consultation with the exec-
utive committee of the Comintern, the political committee of the Danish 
party met to discuss the situation. The issue was whether to provoke the 
occupying power to ban the party and drive it into illegal existence or, as 
the majority urged, to endeavour to maintain its legality. The following 
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day telegraphic directives arrived from Moscow, instructing the party 
to seek to retain legal status as long as possible, while at the same time 
preparing for eventual illegality. This was the course the party took.
Deeming the war to be a struggle among imperialist powers for 
the resources of the world, the party could not support any of the sides 
but only strive for peace. The first few months it directed its critical com-
ments mainly at the Western powers, especially Britain, but later pre-
sented a more balanced view in its reporting on the progress of the war. 
In domestic politics, where the long- term aim of the Communists was the 
overthrow of the capitalist system, the party opposed the formation of 
a coalition government of the old political parties and cautiously disso-
ciated itself from the policy of accommodating the occupying power. In 
parliament it failed to support various measures introduced in response 
to German pressure, and devoted most of its efforts to attacking the 
social and economic legislation of the government for being detrimen-
tal to the standard of living of the workers and the many unemployed. 
In defending the interests of those groups, the spokesmen of the party 
concentrated their attack, in parliament as well as in the Communist 
press, on the Social Democratic party and the leadership of the trade 
unions. As a result, the party strengthened its position among the work-
ing classes and attracted some new members.
In its attempt to prepare for illegal existence and activity, the 
Communist party took some steps to decentralize its structure and set 
up an alternative organization, with unknown leaders, cover addresses 
and secret lodgings. It also began to make arrangements for the printing 
of illegal publications. However, it was not till well after the German 
attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, and the subsequent arrest and 
internment of about 150 leading Communists and the banning of the 
party, that the reorganization was completed. After an initial period of 
collapse and chaos, a leadership was set up, consisting of Aksel Larsen, 
the deputy chairman Alfred Jensen, the party secretary Thorkild Holst 
and Børge Houmann who was responsible for the finances of the party 
and for its publishing activities. In the provinces, too, efforts were made 
to decentralize the organization of the party. A leadership of three per-
sons was established in most towns and secret cells were set up at lower 
levels, on the principle of no horizontal links and only minimal vertical 
contact. Printing and distribution of publications were also reorganized, 
so as to facilitate the printing of local papers and thus avoid the hazard 
of bulk posting of illegal materials.
With the Soviet Union now an ally of the Western powers in the 
war against the Nazi and fascist powers and the Communist party 
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banned by both the German and the Danish authorities, its members 
were both freer and more motivated to engage in active opposition to 
the occupying power. Guided by Moscow, the party adopted the revived 
tactical principle of popular front, which required Communists to join 
non- Communists in the struggle against the Nazi enemy. That meant 
giving priority to the goal of national liberation and letting the ulti-
mate aim of social revolution recede into the background. Thus, for 
a while, the national fight was allowed to eclipse the class struggle. 
Soon Communists established themselves as among the leaders of anti- 
German resistance, in practically all its forms. Sometimes, as in various 
strikes and demonstrations in August 1943, ordinary party members, 
perhaps led by a shop steward, acted more or less independently of 
their leaders, possibly initiating events which turned out to be of some 
importance. The influence of the party and its members in the emerging 
resistance movement was manifested in the composition of the freedom 
council set up in September 1943. Two of the six founding members 
were Communists, namely Børge Houmann and Mogens Fog, the latter 
representing the cross- party illegal paper Frit Danmark, which started 
on Communist initiative as an exercise in popular front.
In so far as the more self- protective and introspective forms of 
passive opposition mentioned here were at all meant as anti- German 
demonstrations, they were on the mild side. As largely emotional 
expressions of attachment to Danish qualities, values and institu-
tions, they carried only little risks of provoking the Germans in the 
country. They could be seen as merely innocuous reactions of placid 
people to a precarious situation. People who were more resistance- 
minded than those who went to alsang and similar events tended 
to dismiss such manifestations of the national awakening as mostly 
cases of sentimental stir, or even to discredit them as ignoble substi-
tutes for more practical and courageous activities. Yet it seems possi-
ble that the exploration and cultivation of Danishness in those early 
years may have led some individuals towards more active opposition 
to the German menace, at a later stage. Perhaps more important, the 
collective engrossment in the study and enjoyment of Danish history 
and identity in the first summer of the occupation may have helped 
prepare the way for the growing public support for armed resistance 
three or four years later. If so, it might be seen as a preparatory stage 
in the political education of a people conditioned by generations of 
neutrality to steer clear of international power politics and schooled 
for decades in Radical Liberal pacifism and Social Democratic 
anti- militarism.
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The three organizations introduced here as representing those 
who wanted to go beyond pro- Danish sentiment and start preparing for 
anti- German action showed that there were groups of individuals and 
sections of the population who did not need to go through such a learn-
ing process. Each organization attracted particular groups and types 
of people and developed its own programme of preparations for future 
activities. As the war in Europe took its course and the political situa-
tion in Denmark developed, with international as well as national con-
ditions becoming more conducive to active resistance, all of them, or at 
least many of their members, became ready to join groups or individuals 
already engaged in anti- German activities.
active opposition
The last of the six subsections of the broad spectrum of Danish reactions 
to German occupation, too, presented so many different forms that some 
distinction will be required. The most obvious one is between unarmed 
and armed, or at least militant, types of active opposition. The former 
were in force from the very beginning, or from a relatively early stage, 
of the occupation and lasted till the liberation of the country. Among 
them were the most direct and substantial of Danish contributions to 
the allied efforts to defeat Hitler’s forces and conquer Nazi Germany. The 
more warlike kinds of opposition, however, depended much more on the 
fortunes of the allied powers in the war and on the development of pub-
lic opinion in Denmark. Thus, armed opposition only rarely established 
itself as a significant influence in Danish– German relations till the last 
few years of the occupation.
In the first years, before a resistance movement emerged and 
became organized, and throughout the rest of the occupation Denmark 
contributed to the allied cause in three ways: by shipping, with intelli-
gence and through propaganda. The most important contribution was 
that of the merchant navy. It became involved in the hostilities between 
the great powers soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939, and 
in the following seven months, when Denmark was still neutral and 
unoccupied, lost 29 ships and 362 sailors, nearly all victims of attacks by 
German torpedo- boats in the North Sea.
The invasion caught the shipping companies, as the rest of the 
country, by surprise. Two thirds of their tonnage and more than half of 
their crews were on the high seas or in foreign ports. Two of the larg-
est companies, J. Lauritzen’s and A.P. Møller’s, ordered their captains to 
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seek neutral port and follow the instructions of their authorized rep-
resentatives in New York. A few months later A.P. Møller’s son, Mærsk 
McKinney Møller, moved to New York to take control of the Mærsk fleet. 
East Asiatic Company, operating through its subsidiary in London, man-
aged to arrange for the transfer to British service of the right of disposal 
for 12 of its large ships. Some ships on the high seas belonging to other 
companies received conflicting instructions from various authorities, 
which left the decision- making to the captains, most of whom consulted 
their officers and crew. Of 60 or 70 ships on which the crews were free to 
decide, about one half chose a British and the other half a neutral port. 
Most of the approximately 230 Danish ships in allied (mostly British) or 
neutral ports in the summer of 1940 ended up in allied service.
Danish ships which had reached Britain, or some part of the British 
Empire, were formally treated as prizes and put under British flag, and 
their crews encouraged to stay aboard and continue their service. About 
90 per cent of the sailors agreed to do so. Like the officers, they eventu-
ally formed a trade union. Their leader became Børge Møller, an able 
seaman who had been trade union representative in Antwerp and had 
escaped to London after the German invasion of Belgium. Their base 
was Newcastle- on- Tyne, where they signed on and enjoyed various facil-
ities. In the course of the war, about 3,000 Danish sailors attended their 
centre there. Many of them also joined the association of ‘free Danes’ in 
Great Britain.
In the summer of 1941 the United States, responding to British 
pressure, seized 40 Danish ships which had been laid up in American 
ports, and later put them back in service with Danish captains. Since 
most of the original crew had left and signed on Norwegian, American 
or British ships, many of the officers and men of those ships were for-
eigners. Many of the ships, now flying the flag of Panama and bearing 
new names, crossed the Atlantic with supplies for British forces in the 
Middle East. Within only a few months seven of them were torpedoed. 
Once the United States had joined the war, in December 1941, the 
demand for experienced officers and men to man the many new ships 
being launched increased rapidly. In the end, there were as many Danes 
sailing for America as for Britain.
Danish ships and sailors played a part in most kinds of war trans-
port on the oceans of the world. While large ships sailed in convoys along 
the English and Scottish coasts during the crucial 1940– 41 stage of the 
war, small steamers carried goods to various ports of the British Isles. 
There were Danish contingents in the transatlantic convoys at the time 
when German submarines still had the upper hand in naval warfare. 
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About 25 Danish ships, now again carrying their own flag, took part in 
operation Overlord, the allied invasion of Normandy in 1944. In the war 
in the Pacific region, A.P. Møller’s large ships were useful in carrying 
American troops to the Far East, each taking a few thousand soldiers at 
a time.
The deployment of the home fleet of the merchant navy was regu-
lated by a Danish– German agreement reached within weeks of the inva-
sion. In addition to carrying goods to and from Denmark and between 
harbours within the country, Danish ships should provide transport 
and carry cargoes, such as iron ore, for the Germans at their expense. 
However, since they frequently called at German and Swedish ports, 
such ships were occasionally able illegally to take individual Jewish 
refugees, allied airmen and resistance fighters with them to neutral 
Sweden. Some ships also played an important role in ferrying illegal 
post and other materials between the resistance movement in Denmark 
and its representatives and contacts in Sweden. Total losses incurred by 
Danish shipping in the course of the Second World War have been esti-
mated as 192 ships and approximately 2,000 sailors.
However, the most memorable episode in Danish shipping during 
the Second World War did not involve large ships of the merchant navy 
sailing on distant oceans but small boats of all kinds navigating in home 
waters. Within two weeks in October 1943 a large number of boats, 
ranging in size from rowing to fishing boats, set out from more than two 
dozen Danish harbours and moorings to ferry persecuted Jews across 
the Sound to safety in neutral Sweden. Arriving at more than a dozen 
diverse points on the Swedish coast, the skippers managed to save about 
95 per cent of all Jews in Denmark. This achievement, as we now know, 
was not merely a manifestation of Danish solidarity and individual brav-
ery but also a result of German hesitation and personal discretion.
During the first few years of the occupation the so- called Jewish 
question had not become an issue in relations with the occupying 
power. The Danish government had categorically denied its existence 
and resisted all pressures for discriminating legislation. The German 
minister Cecil von Renthe- Fink had taken much the same line, for the 
reason that anti- Semitic initiatives might spoil the good relations with 
Denmark and thus stand in the way of what mattered most, namely 
upholding the image of Denmark as a model protectorate and main-
taining its export of foodstuff to Germany. The relatively small num-
ber of Jews in Denmark may well have made it easier for his superiors 
to accept such arguments and postpone the pursuit of racial policies 
in that country.
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Werner Best, the high- ranking SS officer who succeeded Renthe- 
Fink in November 1942, initially followed the moderate line laid down 
by his predecessor. However, following the dramatic events of August 
1943, when demonstrations, strikes and sabotage led to martial law, 
diplomatic crisis and the retreat of the Danish government, it very soon 
became more difficult for him to maintain such a course. In a weakened 
position in relation to both the top leadership in Berlin and the new head 
of the armed forces in Denmark, Best seems to have started a double 
game of his own. On 8 September he sent a telegram to the foreign min-
istry in Berlin, which passed it on to Hitler. Formally the message called 
for action against the Jews in Denmark, but also listed quite a few reser-
vations and objections to such an initiative. Whether Best had received 
confidential information about an impending order, as he insisted after 
the war, or simply expected it and wanted to turn the situation to his own 
advantage is not clear. But Hitler’s order for action in Denmark followed 
on 17 September, with allocation of extra police forces for the task.
For handling the situation in Denmark after despatch of his tele-
gram, Best relied heavily on Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, a fellow dip-
lomat responsible for shipping, who previously had spent some years in 
Denmark, learnt the language and established contact with many peo-
ple in business and political circles. He, and a few other Germans, went 
to Berlin in an attempt to avert the action under preparation. Duckwitz 
even travelled to Stockholm in order to persuade the Swedes to accept 
the Danish Jews. In the meantime Best denied rumours of an impending 
action and, in his meetings with the permanent head of the ministry of 
foreign affairs, asserted that a recent day- time robbery in the office of 
the Jewish community and a subsequent seizure by the German police of 
the membership archives had nothing to do with any such action.
However, on 28 September Duckwitz turned up at a meeting in 
Copenhagen of Social Democratic politicians and confirmed to friends 
among the younger leaders of the party that a raid was imminent and 
urged that all Jews be warned and offered shelter. There are indica-
tions that this decisive warning was given in tacit understanding with 
Best, who, though a man of anti- Semitic convictions, did not partic-
ularly want a manhunt across the country. Duckwitz’s message was 
passed on to C.B. Henriques, head of the Jewish community, the same 
night and was read out at the morning service in the synagogue the 
next day.
The Jewish community was far from ready to deal with the sit-
uation. It was dominated by long- established, fully integrated and 
socially distinguished families of conservative views, confident that the 
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governmental policy and administrative practice of cooperating with 
the occupying power would protect them against the imposition of anti- 
Semitic measures. There were no emergency plans for safeguarding the 
less influential and poorer members, including more recent arrivals on 
Danish soil. Ideas of mass escape or underground existence had been 
rejected on the grounds that such solutions would require too much help 
from non- Jewish members of the population. In a situation of alarm-
ing rumours and urgent warnings, the representatives of the commu-
nity focused instead on a few desperate and rather unwise alternatives 
broached by the departmental heads and themselves.
In the evening of 1 October, a Friday, trucks with German police 
soldiers, accompanied by members of the Danish Schalburg Corps, 
drove round Copenhagen and arrested Jews. Though the soldiers, 
according to reports, were brutal and rough in their treatment of peo-
ple, they followed orders not to break into locked houses and flats. In 
the course of three hours they made only 202 arrests, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the Jewish population in the capital having already left 
their homes. Another 82 Jews were arrested in Jutland and on Funen. 
Later a further 197 Jews were arrested while trying to escape. All 481 
Danish Jews were immediately sent to Theresienstadt, initially a ghetto 
for Czech Jews established 60 kilometres north of Prague. In a message 
of 5 October to his masters in Berlin, Best could declare Denmark ‘jud-
enrein’. Himmler and other superiors were less than enthusiastic about 
the meagre result of the action.
Though for propaganda purposes presented as a model town, 
Theresienstadt had become a transit camp where Jews stayed for some 
months until moved to Auschwitz or some other extermination camp 
further east. However, according to agreement reached on 2 November 
between Best and Adolf Eichmann, who was in charge of the administra-
tive side of the final solution of the Jews of Europe, those from Denmark 
were allowed to remain in Theresienstadt. It was also agreed that they 
could have a visit by representatives of Danish authorities and receive 
food parcels and clothes from Denmark.
Moreover, they were in good company. Theresienstadt had also 
become a camp for privileged Jews from the Altreich, many of them 
prominent scientists or artists. A  rich cultural life, organized by the 
Jewish ghetto administration, helped the inmates to cope with the 
material deprivations and uncertain future in the later period of the 
war. Shortly before the final collapse of Nazi Germany the Jews from 
Denmark were evacuated and brought back to Denmark on the ‘white 
buses’, sent to rescue surviving concentration camp inmates under a 
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joint Swedish– Norwegian– Danish initiative. By then 52 of them had 
died, mainly from old age and illness.
The Jews not arrested in October 1943 also underwent a harrow-
ing experience. Immediately after the start of the German police raid 
in Denmark the Swedish government lodged a protest in Berlin and 
broadcast a message offering to accept escaping Jews. With the help of 
non- Jewish Danish citizens, 7,056 Jews and 686 non- Jewish relatives 
reached the Swedish coast unharmed. This mass escape in the earlier 
weeks of October was not an operation organized by the emerging resis-
tance movement, though groups and members here and there no doubt 
played a part. Rather, the help provided was a case of improvised reac-
tions of a very large number of local individuals, backed by a united pub-
lic opinion outraged by the Nazi provocation. The reactions were also 
encouraged by the stand taken by national authorities. On 2 October 
most of official Denmark, including the king, the politicians, the trade 
organizations and unions and various other institutions, lodged protests 
against the Nazi initiative. The following day, a Sunday, a pastoral let-
ter from bishop Fuglsang- Damgaard, sharply criticizing the action and 
calling on people to help the victims, was read out in the churches of the 
country.
Most of the escaping Jews made for the east or north coasts of 
Zealand, primarily Gilleleje, and other major islands, where they hoped 
to secure passage to Sweden. At all stages, they were able to rely not 
only on neighbours, friends and acquaintances but also on strangers for 
secret help with transport, shelter and a place on a boat. Many owners 
of the larger boats, risking boat, livelihood and perhaps their freedom 
if caught by German police, charged for their services. But all involved, 
whether on land or sea, accepted the risks incurred.
Few of the helpers could have known that those risks were not quite 
so great as generally assumed. At this stage, too, there was a degree of 
tacit and passive coordination of German measures. While pursuit of 
Jews not yet arrested was left to a modest number of Gestapo soldiers, 
surveillance of the Sound by German police units was suspended during 
the month of October. Thus, the greatest threat to the escaping Jews 
may have been Danish Nazis and informers. Yet, only a very small num-
ber were caught.
Apart from a few who drowned or committed suicide, the rest, 
including some European Jews who had escaped to Denmark in the 
1930s, settled down in Sweden for the duration of the war. There they 
established themselves as an influential section of the community of 
nearly 20,000 Danish refugees living in Sweden by the end of the war. 
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Some of the Jewish men and youths joined the Danish Brigade set up 
there in November 1943 with a view to deployment in Denmark at the 
end of the occupation.
For the Nazi masters of the occupying power, the relocation of 
nearly all Jews in Denmark to safety in Sweden represented a com-
promise. It served their purpose of preparing Denmark for a future 
Nazification, but excluded well over 7,000 Jews from their projected 
final solution of the racial problem. For the Danes, the successful exo-
dus turned out to be the most laudable result of the dual interaction 
marking relations with the German authorities, limited cooperation 
and restrained resistance. Achieved at a time when the emphasis in 
Danish reactions to the German presence was shifting from coopera-
tion towards resistance, it was also of political significance. The story 
of the events in October, which took place only weeks after the drama 
in the last days of August, helped to enhance the reputation of Denmark 
abroad, not least in the United States, and prepare the way for accep-
tance as an ally in the war.
The second major Danish contribution to the allied cause, the 
gathering and transmitting of intelligence, started at an early stage of 
the occupation and continued till the German forces in north- western 
Europe capitulated and Denmark was liberated. The work was initiated 
and, till the autumn of 1943, carried out by a small group of army and 
navy officers, assisted by a few well- placed civilians. In the course of 
the war, approximately 18,000 pages of information were passed to the 
allied powers, mostly to London via Stockholm. The material supplied 
dealt mainly with the troops and authorities of the occupying power but 
included also occasional information about political and social develop-
ments within Denmark deemed of interest to Britain and its allies.
In 1940 the Danish intelligence services were run by half a dozen 
officers of the army and the navy, supported by two fairly basic networks 
of military and civilian informants stretched across the country. After 
the invasion the flow of intelligence to the general staff of the two ser-
vices continued, but was of little use to the Danish authorities after the 
government’s decision to capitulate. It was not till later in the year that 
the intelligence officers, at heart anglophile, managed to establish con-
tact with Britain. It went through Ebbe Munck, a journalist with good 
contacts in both Denmark and England who in the autumn managed to 
be appointed Stockholm correspondent of Berlingske Tidende, a leading 
Danish daily. Among his acquaintances in Copenhagen was major Volmer 
Gyth, one of the intelligence officers in the general staff of the army. 
Before Munck’s departure it was arranged for the intelligence reports 
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to be smuggled out by couriers and delivered to him in Stockholm, and 
there passed on to the British legation.
In Stockholm, Munck was soon approached by Charles Hambro, 
who represented the newly- established sabotage organization Special 
Operations Executive (SOE). The connection was strengthened when 
that organization set up an advanced headquarters for the Nordic coun-
tries in the Swedish capital. The result was that most Danish intelligence 
reports ended up in SOE’s headquarters in London. There they were 
passed on to Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), SOE’s potential rival, 
on the condition that British activities in Denmark were left to SOE. 
However, the Danish officers, for a long time apparently unaware of the 
existence of SOE, were under the impression that their connection to 
London through Munck was with SIS directly.
Confident that the supply of military and political intelligence 
was the most important contribution Denmark could make to the allied 
cause in the existing situation, the officers were opposed to any form of 
anti- German activities in Denmark likely to stand in the way of their 
collecting and transmitting information for London. Thus, they turned 
against the growing sabotage in 1942 as well as the later anti- German 
demonstrations, all of which they recognized as destabilizing threats 
to the coalition government and its policy of cooperation, which pro-
vided the cover for their secret, illegal and dangerous activities. 
Unaware of the rivalries and disagreements among organizations and 
ministries in London and not conversant with changes in British policy 
towards Denmark and other occupied countries, the officers tended to 
assume that their own priorities were in harmony with those of London. 
Since this was not always the case, their reactions to sabotage and other 
disturbing activities not only led them into conflict with the emerging 
resistance movement but also seriously complicated their interaction 
with SOE.
In the autumn of 1942, after the priorities of SOE had shifted from 
building up secret armies in the occupied countries to organizing sab-
otage against the occupying power, the Danish intelligence officers’ 
relations with that organization reached crisis point. Some of the senior 
SOE officers, general Colin Gubbins in particular, having developed sus-
picions about the commitment and reliability of the Danish officers, the 
organization decided to test their loyalty to the allied cause and willing-
ness to engage in active resistance by calling for some spectacular acts 
of sabotage to be carried out by the Danish army. The reactions of the 
Danes revealed that their concern was not merely to secure optimal con-
ditions for the continuation of their intelligence work but also to keep 
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the Danish army intact – ready, as they liked to think, for deployment 
some great day in the distant future. Here their position was in accor-
dance with the programme of the army’s general staff and in harmony 
with the policy of their government.
The confrontation lasted more than six months and was never 
quite resolved. It soured relations between the parties and affected their 
cooperation. While the Danish officers, perhaps inclined to overestimate 
the importance for the British of the intelligence provided, felt unap-
preciated and distrusted, the more activist among the SOE officers, for 
long sceptical about the need for complete peace and quiet in Denmark, 
reached a low opinion of the military morality and professional judge-
ment of the Danish officers.
The events of 29 August 1943 broke up the League, as the senior 
intelligence officers called themselves. One was arrested and sent to 
Germany for the rest of the war and another temporarily interned in 
Denmark. Three went underground and ended up in Sweden, from 
where two of them, with the help of others and some support from the 
Swedish intelligence service, set out to restore the Danish service. This 
involved re- establishing a network of contacts across the country. The 
man entrusted with that task was lieutenant Svend Truelsen, a reservist 
of the Royal Life Guards who had been attached to the general staff and 
trained in intelligence work, and was now employed by the Agricultural 
Council. In a short time he managed to reorganize and develop a highly 
efficient network across the country, for both the army and the navy. 
While the network of informants in Copenhagen was expanded, the 
organization in the provinces was decentralized. Moreover, a direct 
telegraphic connection with London was set up.
In the course of this work, Truelsen established and maintained 
contact with members of Denmark’s freedom council, but declined a 
request to set up an independent intelligence service for the council. 
However, his connection with the resistance movement led him into 
conflict with the so- called small general staff, set up by younger offi-
cers of the army’s general staff during their internment in the aftermath 
of the events of August 1943. That body owed its existence not least to 
a prevailing nervousness within the Danish establishment, especially 
among the Social Democratic leaders, about Communist influence in the 
resistance movement and plans for the post- liberation situation. Hence 
it was determined to keep contact with the resistance movement to a 
minimum, and eager to secure control of the reorganized intelligence 
service. To this end, one of its members, major Svend Schjødt- Eriksen, 
assumed formal responsibility for the domestic part of the service, 
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which in principle included information about Communist activities in 
the country.
Schjødt- Eriksen belonged to a small group of younger officers who, 
out of frustration with the events of April 1940 and the defence policy 
of the country, had decided to join DNSAP in the summer of 1940. Only 
a passive member, he had left the party after some months, and later 
developed close relations with the Social Democratic leaders. The result 
of the struggle that ensued between him and Truelsen for control of the 
intelligence organization was that the latter in May 1944, by then hotly 
pursued by the Germans, had to escape to Sweden. As Gyth had done 
before him, he soon moved on to London, where he spent the rest of the 
war. However, while Gyth was largely ignored by SOE, Truelsen was 
appointed major and attached to its head office with responsibility for 
intelligence work. Subsequently he joined the Danish section, where he 
managed and organized intelligence work and participated in the plan-
ning of SOE actions in Denmark, notably the bombing by the Royal Air 
Force of three Gestapo headquarters.
After the departure of Truelsen, major F.B. Larsen took over the 
management of the intelligence service in Denmark. Like his predeces-
sor, he guarded its independence of the small general staff. After Larsen’s 
arrest, in September 1944, by the Germans – who never realized whom 
they had caught – Schjødt- Eriksen assumed overall management of the 
service. By then, however, it was so decentralized that each region or 
section functioned more or less independently. The collection, trans-
mission and presentation of intelligence were carried on efficiently till 
the end of the war. If the information produced turned out to be of rel-
atively minor importance to the allied powers, it was because Denmark 
belonged to an area of low priority in the conduct of the war. However, 
towards the end of hostilities in western Europe, when at one stage it 
looked as if Denmark might become a theatre of war, the up- to- date and 
comprehensive information supplied by the Danish intelligence service 
was appreciated in the headquarters of the armies commanded by gen-
eral Montgomery.
The third major unarmed form of active opposition was the propa-
ganda that the illegal press directed against the Danish authorities and 
the occupying power. To the extent that the allied powers disapproved 
of the coalition government and its accommodating policy towards the 
occupying power and wanted the Danes to make a stand and resist the 
Germans, an illegal press that campaigned against the government and 
called for resistance was in effect supporting the allied cause. That such 
a press did not emerge till well into the second year of the occupation 
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was partly because the allied powers themselves for a long time were 
not willing or ready to encourage the Danes to turn against their gov-
ernment and start resisting, but mainly for the reason that the political 
situation within Denmark itself was only then becoming conducive to 
the emergence of an illegal press.
In Britain, Denmark did not enjoy much respect in the period after 
9 April 1940. At war with Germany since September, and now involved 
with the Norwegians in their fight against the invading forces of the 
German army, the British tended to overlook that Danish reactions to 
Nazi Germany before, during and after the invasion, were in harmony 
with the policy pursued by Britain itself practically up to the German 
invasion of Poland. Nor did they perhaps appreciate that the Danish pol-
icy of appeasement had been sealed in 1937, when the Foreign Office 
had indicated to the Danes that they could not expect British military 
support in case of German aggression against their country. If the British 
now censured the Danes for nonchalant conduct on 9 April and the fol-
lowing months it may have been mainly out of fear that the country 
might end up as vassal of Hitler’s Reich.
The policy that Britain later that year developed towards Denmark 
was to encourage the government to stand firm against German demands 
and pressures. In its propaganda, it made a distinction between the 
king and the government, building up the former while criticizing 
the latter. The criticism, however, was directed more at Scavenius and 
the other ministers without party- political attachments than at the 
party leaders in the government. In 1942, after the beginning of sabo-
tage in Denmark, the propaganda switched aim, focusing the attack on 
collaborators among the public while leaving the government in peace. 
The immediate reason was still to protect the flow of information from 
the Danish intelligence officers. A more long- term consideration for the 
Foreign Office was to keep the Danish political structure intact in order 
to smooth a future transition from occupation to liberation and secure 
goodwill and cooperation from post- war governments. Thus Britain 
tried to balance between the existing government and the emerging 
resistance movement.
It was not till the spring and summer of 1943 that British propa-
ganda towards Denmark again hardened. The entire government and 
its accommodating policy now came under attack, while those engaged 
in active resistance received some encouragement. However, while 
calling for a stepping up of sabotage and other forms of resistance, the 
British still did not want the government to collapse and the German 
authorities to assume complete control of the country. Their aim was to 
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encourage passive resistance by the public and militant efforts by the 
growing resistance movement, all within the existing political structure 
of the country. Thus, British propaganda was still conditioned by the 
political considerations of the Foreign Office on the one hand and moti-
vated by the military ambitions of SOE on the other.
American policy, diplomacy and propaganda towards Denmark in 
the earlier years of the occupation, too, went through several stages. The 
first one lasted from April 1940 to April the following year, when 
the  United States signed its agreement with Henrik Kauffmann about 
the defence of Greenland. The second stage came to an end with Japan’s 
attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States’ entry into the war in 
December 1941, which led to the closing of the American legation in 
Copenhagen the following month. The third stage concluded with the 
public rebellion in August 1943 and the retreat of the Danish govern-
ment. Though the relationship between the two states was continuously 
complicated by Kauffmann’s declaration of independence of his govern-
ment at the outset of the occupation and the partial acceptance by the 
United States of his unprecedented diplomatic status, the Washington 
administration endeavoured to stay on reasonably good terms with the 
government in Copenhagen throughout the whole period. Its reasons 
for pursuing that policy towards Denmark, however, varied from stage 
to stage.
The first year, when the outcome of the war in Europe was uncer-
tain, the United States had good reasons to stay on cordial terms with 
Denmark. Any peace settlement which established Germany in a dom-
inant position on the Continent and left a formally independent and 
neutral Denmark within a German sphere of influence would present a 
situation in which it might be in American, as well as in Danish, inter-
est to maintain friendly relations between the two neutrals. Though the 
US administration was disturbed by a series of apparently voluntary 
concessions by the Danish government to the occupying power, it was 
sufficiently well informed to know that such acts were not motivated 
by Nazi sympathies or pro- German inclinations and to appreciate the 
reasons and calculations governing Danish conduct. Kauffmann’s cam-
paign, which presented Denmark to the American public as a hostage 
to German power and its policy as forced upon the government, also 
helped the administration to tolerate Danish management of relations 
with the occupying power.
The second stage in US– Danish relations, up to December 1941, 
was marked by the agreement for the defence of Greenland. Signed 
by Kauffmann on behalf of a ‘free Denmark’, it inevitably burdened 
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American relations with the legitimate government of the country. Since 
the administration already then recognized the importance of also being 
able to maintain its military presence on Greenland after the end of the 
war, it was eager to limit any damage done by the independent envoy and 
by its open implicit acceptance of his diplomatic status in Washington. 
To mend relations with Copenhagen, president Roosevelt wrote a letter 
to the king, assuring him that the United States still recognized Danish 
sovereignty over Greenland and had merely taken charge of its defence.
After Pearl Harbor and the entry into the war, it became in some 
respects easier for the American administration to distance itself from 
the Danish government and start reconsidering Danish conduct of rela-
tions with the occupying power. Kauffmann’s personal accession, again 
on behalf of the ‘free Denmark’, to the Declaration of the United Nations 
on 2 January 1942 and other activist initiatives encouraged such a devel-
opment. A certain amount of discreet competition with Britain in the 
sponsorship of a Danish resistance movement, and even in the projection 
of post- war spheres of influence on the European Continent, was a fur-
ther incentive to begin to think of Denmark as a potential ally in the war. 
Yet, the policy and diplomacy of the administration remained ambigu-
ous. Continuously well informed, mainly by its legation in Stockholm, 
about conditions and developments in Denmark, it understood and, in 
the period leading up to the events of August 1943, even came to respect 
Scavenius and his policy. Thus, at no stage of the first several years of the 
occupation did the American political authorities initiate or encourage a 
propaganda campaign directed against the Danish government and its 
policy of limited cooperation with the occupying power.
Till well into the occupation, the Soviet Union had reasons of its 
own not to engage in or encourage anti- German propaganda against the 
Danish government. Having signed a non- aggression pact with Germany 
in August 1939, with a secret additional protocol which divided eastern 
and central Europe into a Soviet and a German sphere of interest, the 
Soviet government was inclined to regard Denmark as belonging to the 
German sphere. When Germany invaded Denmark the Soviet envoy 
in Copenhagen referred to the event as the ‘arrival’ of German forces, 
and enjoined the Danish Communists to avoid critical comments on the 
occupation. Instead they should blame the British and French imperial-
ists for the war, and the Social Democrats for letting Denmark become 
involved. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Denmark 
continued, with the Danish side seeking to expand trade between them 
and the Soviet representatives focusing their concern more on the strate-
gic importance of Denmark, at the entrance to, and exit from, the Baltic.
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The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 immediately 
led to a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Copenhagen and 
Moscow. In the following period till the dissolution of Comintern in May 
1943, the only significant political relations between the two countries 
were between the headquarters of that organization and the Danish 
Communist party. Here contact seems periodically to have been via the 
Swedish Communist party and intermittently by radio. After August 
1943 the party had its own representative in Stockholm, Alvilda Larsen, 
and through her presumably regular contact with the Russians. On a 
broader and more public level, there was continuous contact during the 
war through Radio Moscow, which broadcast news and propaganda and 
issued orders and directives to the Communist parties of the occupied 
countries. During the last year of the occupation the resistance move-
ment had its own representative in Moscow, Thomas Døssing who acted 
as envoy of the freedom council.
As an ally of the Western powers, the Soviet Union presented a 
new interpretation of the war. No longer a war of imperialist powers, 
it was a joint struggle for liberation from Nazi and fascist domination. 
In a speech broadcast on 3 July 1941 Stalin appealed for a united front 
of peoples in defence of freedom, thus reviving the tactical dogma of 
popular front enunciated by the Comintern congress in 1935. Shortly 
after, Moscow called upon the Communist parties in occupied countries 
to organize resistance through strikes, rebellions and guerrilla warfare.
Denmark, however, seems to have been of only marginal impor-
tance to the Russians, even in the later years of the war. Though still 
concerned about the future strategic importance of the Danish straits, 
they do not appear to have included this country in their plans for an 
expanded sphere of Soviet influence in the post- war world. Nor do they 
seem to have developed an active interest in the political life of the 
country. Though critical of the close cooperation of the government 
and administration with the occupying power and resentful of the anti- 
Soviet policy of the parliament and political leaders in 1941, the Russians 
did not go out of their way to encourage and support the Danish resis-
tance movement, as a whole. Not too impressed with some of the people 
who represented it abroad, they thought it lacked efficient leadership 
and a political programme, and was far from being a mass movement. 
Thus, for a long time the Russian attitude to Danish resistance remained 
uncertain and hesitant. When the Soviet authorities eventually accepted 
a representative in Moscow of the ‘fighting Denmark’, they used him 
as a willing tool for their own purposes but did little to facilitate his 
ordinary work.
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Yet, despite the late arrival of the Soviet Union as an allied power, 
its limited interest in Denmark, sceptical attitude to Danish resistance 
and minimal support for the movement, this power became a greater 
ideological inspiration and political influence than the Western allies for 
some more resistance- minded sections of the Danish public in the two 
years leading up to the events of August 1943. This was so particularly in 
the sphere of illegal publications and anti- government and anti- German 
propaganda. Here it was those who looked to Moscow, rather than to 
London, for inspiration and guidance who seized the initiative. At both 
local and national levels, it was Communists, whether party mem-
bers or sympathizers, who took the lead in setting up an illegal press. 
Spearheading the counter- offensive against the German propaganda 
machine, this press played an important part in shattering the image of 
occupied Denmark as a model protectorate of governmental coopera-
tion and social order promoted by Nazi Germany.
Whatever the attitudes of Britain, the United States and the Soviet 
Union to Danish politics, it was largely because of the situation within 
Denmark itself that a year or two went by before propaganda against the 
coalition government and the German authorities got under way. Till 
the autumn of 1941 the general public saw little need for an illegal press 
which could publish uncensored news and influence public opinion. 
Conditioned by generations of neutrality in foreign policy and affected 
by anti- militarist attitudes and pacifist ideas, it was at that early stage 
quite willing to accept the policy of cooperation forced upon the govern-
ment by the prime minister and the king. Once they had adapted to the 
situation of an occupied country, most people were able to put up with 
a radio and press which, though restricted by governmental guidelines 
and German control, did provide daily information about Danish rela-
tions with the German authorities and the progress of the war. Those 
who wanted uncensored facts and opinions could read the Swedish 
newspapers, provided they understood the language, or tune in to the 
BBC, which broadcast in Danish from the beginning of the occupation. 
Listening to the BBC was not expressly forbidden, though many Danes 
thought it was.
The turning- point was the banning of the Communist party after 
the German attack on the Soviet Union. With its leading members 
arrested and interned or living underground, the party needed an illegal 
press to present its views and further its cause. Its first such publication, 
the pamphlet Danske Toner, came in September 1941. It contained the 
speech against the bill to ban the party that Aksel Larsen, its leader, had 
been unable to make in parliament. The following month the first issue 
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of the monthly Politiske Maanedsbreve appeared in duplicated form. 
Renamed Land og Folk in March 1942, and eventually properly printed, 
it became the foremost illegal paper of the country, appearing in numer-
ous local editions and maintaining a print run of 120– 130,000 in the 
last few years of the occupation. From May 1943 to the end of the occu-
pation the party also published Nyt fra Sovjetunionen. Moreover, a large 
number of illegal papers, of various sizes and varying regularity, were 
published by local Communist groups during the later years of the war. 
Always attaching great importance to propaganda, the Communists 
dominated the illegal press up to August 1943 and went on to play a 
major part in this form of resistance till the end of the war.
From the autumn of 1941 a few non- Communist groups, too, 
were formed for the purpose of publishing illegal papers. One of the 
first was a small group in Copenhagen which started De frie Danske. 
Its first number, appearing in December, was a protest against the 
Anti- Comintern Pact and a plea for the government to refuse future 
demands by the enemy. From January 1942 Frode Jakobsen’s Ring 
published Det politiske. In August the same year the first number of 
Studenternes Efterretningstjeneste appeared. It was published by a group 
of Conservative students in Copenhagen, who the previous November 
had set up a group under the same name in connection with the demon-
stration against the Anti- Comintern Pact. It became a fortnightly, which 
by the spring of 1944 reached a print run in excess of 100,000.
The most important development in the illegal press of 1942, how-
ever, was the emergence of Frit Danmark. That paper, as well as the orga-
nization by the same name, owed their origins to plans, developed by the 
Communist party the previous autumn, for a broad, cross- party illegal 
forum. The project took concrete form when Christmas Møller, leader of 
the Conservatives, joined forces with Aksel Larsen with a view to creat-
ing an organ which could serve as a mouthpiece for a national rally of 
those ready to oppose the policy of the government and resist the occu-
pying power. A cross- party editorial committee was set up, and the first 
issue published in April. From an early stage, the driving force behind 
the paper was Børge Houmann, who also edited Land og Folk and other 
Communist publications. Moreover, for its printing and distribution Frit 
Danmark had to rely on the facilities and networks already organized 
by the Communist party. Thus, Frit Danmark, the paper together with 
the organization, may be seen as a cover organization of the Communist 
party, set up in accordance with the tactical slogan of national front 
against the enemy. However, the paper had a non- Communist co- editor 
throughout its existence, in the earlier period Ole Kiilerich and later 
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Kate Fleron, both Conservatives. Thus, from another point of view, Frit 
Danmark may be deemed a successful exercise in cross- party coopera-
tion, with both sides of the political spectrum represented, each in rough 
proportion to the degree of its ideological commitment to the anti- Nazi 
cause and the level of its organizational preparedness for active resis-
tance in 1942.
In a deliberate attempt to create a counterweight to the dominat-
ing influence of the Communists in the illegal press, several new papers 
were launched in the earlier part of 1943. One was Danske Tidende, 
which came out in January with Conservative and Social Democratic 
sponsorship. Another was Hjemmefronten, set up by Kiilerich and other 
Conservative Youth (KU) members and launched the following month. 
Despite raids, arrests and imprisonment, all the illegal papers men-
tioned here managed to maintain publication up to May 1945. Moreover, 
a large number of new publications appeared after August 1943, with 
the result that more than 250 different papers were in circulation in 
1944– 45.
In the same period a few illegal news services were set up to pro-
vide reliable information to editors, of both illegal and legal sections of 
the press, as well as to the world press. One was Information, a service 
instituted and, till his arrest in October 1944, run by Børge Outze, then 
a journalist working for the national newspaper Nationaltidende. This 
service prepared daily reports on the sort of news and information that 
could not be published legally and distributed them to a small circle of 
interested parties. The list of subscribers eventually included also edi-
tors of Communist papers, who since January 1943 had had their own 
news service, Ugens Nyt edited by Houmann. Via Sweden, Information 
also managed to keep other countries informed about developments 
within Denmark.
After the events on 29 August 1943 a number of Danish journalists 
stationed in Stockholm, finding themselves cut off from the legal papers 
they represented, decided to set up a central news service of their own, 
which they named Dansk Pressetjeneste. Its aim was to collect news from 
Denmark and pass it on to the world press, and thus help popularize 
the Danish resistance movement. Led by Erik Seidenfaden, the service 
eventually had a staff of about 50, with its own correspondents in the 
major Danish ports of shipment. News for the BBC’s Danish section was 
sent telegraphically, and used selectively in broadcasts to Denmark. 
During the mass strike in Copenhagen in the summer of 1944 the ser-
vice succeeded in keeping the attention of the press of the free world for 
several days.
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The establishment of the freedom council affected the illegal press 
in several ways. First, the council became a source of illegal publications 
of its own. Within a month of its formation it published the pamphlet 
Naar Danmark atter er frit (Once Denmark again is free), its programme 
for the immediate post- war situation. Representing a compromise 
between the different views of influential members of the council, the 
pamphlet served to allay the widespread fear among the public of the 
Communist section of the resistance and to moderate the revenge-
fulness of parts of the illegal press. Written mainly by Mogens Fog, it 
became an important historical document. Later followed a long line of 
directives which, striking the public as wise and responsible, enhanced 
the authority of the freedom council. Statements and instructions were 
usually published in Information, which thus became the mouthpiece 
of the freedom council. Several members of the council, Houmann and 
Fog in particular, wrote frequently for Frit Danmark, the political line of 
which was to the left of the council’s.
Another way in which the freedom council exerted influence on 
the illegal press was through the setting up of a press committee. It 
started as an attempt to pacify certain right- of- centre illegal organiza-
tions and papers, including Studenternes Efterretningstjeneste, Danske 
Tidende and Hjemmefronten, which initially were inclined to disown the 
freedom council as a self- appointed body dominated by the Communist 
party and Danish Unity at the expense of less extremist sections of the 
resistance. In the winter of 1943– 44 Arne Sørensen, leader of Danish 
Unity and member of the freedom council, took up negotiations with 
its opponents in the illegal press, with a view to forming a link between 
them and the council. In February the press committee was established, 
with representatives from both sides. Soon Outze from Information 
joined too. Though the freedom council failed to dominate the views 
and positions espoused by the illegal press and the press failed to con-
trol the decisions and statements made by the council, the weekly meet-
ings of the committee did help to coordinate the efforts of the parties 
involved, especially in some crucial situations.
A retrospective study of the political contents of the bulk of the 
illegal press, from the autumn of 1941 to the spring of 1945, revealed 
some common features as well as a broad development. The minimal 
shared programme of the press in the first year, up to the autumn of 
1942, was to expose breaches of faith by the occupying power and to 
oppose acts of deliberate cooperation by the government. In the fol-
lowing period, up to August 1943, there was broad agreement about 
supporting and encouraging sabotage and criticizing and opposing the 
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government, which was maintaining its policy of cooperation and car-
rying on a campaign against sabotage. There was also solid support for a 
hate campaign against collaborators, Nazis, informers and women hav-
ing relations with German soldiers. In the last year of the occupation, 
well after the emergence of the freedom council and the establishment 
of its press committee, the illegal press reached a broad consensus in 
support of intensified sabotage, recurrent anti- German demonstrations 
and resolute liquidation of informers. When the freedom council, in the 
summer of 1944, found itself in disagreement with the politicians about 
the phasing out of the mass strike in Copenhagen, it enjoyed the solid 
backing of the illegal press. One reason why this press eventually could 
identify with the freedom council was that SOE had accepted the council 
as representing the leadership of Danish resistance and British propa-
ganda had promoted it accordingly.
The overall trends in the illegal press were a hardening of oppo-
sition to the policy of cooperation pursued by the coalition government 
and the central administration and an intensification of propaganda 
against the occupying power and its collaborators. Seen from one point 
of view, this pattern simply reflected political developments within 
the country, in relations between the public and the government and 
administration as well as in interaction with the authorities of the occu-
pying power, both of which ultimately were conditioned by the course 
of the war among the great powers. Yet, the illegal press itself obvi-
ously had some influence on those political developments in occupied 
Denmark.
In a situation in which the legal media of the country were pre-
vented from carrying negative information about the occupying power 
and encouraged to support the accommodating policy of the govern-
ment, even an emergent and sectarian illegal press which exposed the 
conduct of the Germans and criticized the policy of the government must 
have played some part in strengthening anti- German sentiments and 
weakening support for governmental policy at least in some sections of 
society. In a later situation, in which a broader and more representative 
illegal press promoted sabotage and opposed the government, such a 
press seems likely to have had a significant role in helping to educate a 
wider public and preparing the ground for various forms of resistance. In 
the final situation, which arose after the retreat of the government and 
the establishment of the freedom council, a fully-fledged illegal press 
soon became an integral part of the resistance movement, serving as an 
essential means of communication at critical stages and a useful forum 
for debate about long- term aims. From an international perspective, 
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the contribution of the Danish illegal press can be seen as a local sup-
plement to the diverse and intermittent propaganda drives of the allied 
powers.
militant resistance
The last part of the spectrum of Danish reactions to German occupa-
tion presented here comprises various sorts of militant activity, each 
apt to lead to violent confrontations, namely sabotage and liquidations, 
demonstrations and strikes, organizing a resistance army, and serving 
with the forces of an allied power. Engaging in sabotage and executing 
informers was generally the closest members of the resistance move-
ment came to actually fighting the Germans in the country. Participating 
in anti- German demonstrations and strikes was often the defiant reac-
tions of sections of a public provoked by German reprisals following a 
wave of sabotage. Setting up a secret army ready to support allied forces 
in battles on Danish soil was part of the resistance movement’s prepara-
tions for a situation which, as it turned out, never arose. Enrolling in the 
armed forces of an allied power, whether in a regular unit or in the spe-
cial forces of SOE, was the choice of Danes eager to join the fight against 
Nazi Germany and its allies.
In the first few years of the occupation there was not much sabo-
tage. Nearly everybody was against it. Official Denmark, from the gov-
ernment to the police and the law courts, condemned it and punished 
perpetrators severely. The press and public opinion denounced it as 
irresponsible and dangerous, liable to provoke the Germans and upset 
the precarious relations with the occupying power. The allied powers 
refrained from encouraging it. Even SOE, cautioned by the Foreign 
Office and besieged by the Danish intelligence officers, for a long time 
held back. Above all, there was no organized movement in the country 
to plan and carry out sabotage. Thus, the acts that did take place during 
the first year or two were, on the whole, not only few but also casual, 
minor and insignificant.
The first real sabotage group to come to the attention of the public 
was the Churchill Club in Aalborg. Formed early in 1942, it was made 
up mainly of high- school students in the 15– 17 age group, all from 
respectable middle- class homes. In April and May they carried out about 
25 relatively minor acts of sabotage directed against the Germans, 
including arson and vandalism as well as some thefts of weapons. After 
arrest and imprisonment, a few of them, using the blade of a hacksaw, 
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managed to leave and return to their cell at night- time and thus for 
many weeks continue their sabotage in the town. Two of the older ones 
were sentenced by a German court martial to 10 and 15 years and sent 
to gaol in Germany. The others ended up in a Danish prison, where they 
were allowed to continue their high- school studies. While the name of 
the group indicated the pro- British orientation of its members, their 
actions, together with their conduct in court, constituted a challenge to 
their parents’ cautious and timid generation.
It was not till well into 1942 that the first signs of more organized 
forms of sabotage appeared. Here, too, it was Communists who took the 
lead. After a straw poll round major places of work, the party decided to 
organize sabotage against industrial production of military importance 
for Germany. The first result was a series of fires across the country in 
the summer months. The Germans reacted by demanding greater efforts 
by Danish authorities to prevent such incidents and threatening to resort 
to German courts martial. The government’s response was a broadcast 
address on 2 September, in which prime minister Buhl deemed sabotage 
an act against the national interest, appealed to the public to assist the 
police in its investigations and warned about the risk of loss of Danish 
jurisdiction in such matters. Only a few days later, Christmas Møller 
made his speech over the BBC in which he, ignoring the British censors, 
strongly urged the nation to engage in sabotage against the enemy. At 
that stage, the Danish population, still rightly suspecting sabotage to be 
largely the work of Communists and gangs of youths, was overwhelm-
ingly opposed to it.
During the following winter the Communists continued their 
offensive, now also using explosives. The first successful railway sab-
otage, again carried out by a Communist group, took place north of 
Copenhagen in November. However, it was not till January 1943 that 
sabotage became a regular illegal activity. For a long time it remained 
largely the work of Communist groups. Yet, by the spring SOE, now with 
a new leader in Denmark and more men in the field, was beginning to 
establish some management and control of those actions. As instruc-
tors and organizers, the SOE men helped to strengthen existing groups 
and set up new ones, mainly in the larger provincial towns. They also 
introduced new materials, especially plastic explosives. About the same 
time non- socialist sabotage groups and organizations were formed, 
mostly in Copenhagen. Usually having better connections with the 
established authorities, not least with the police in parts of Copenhagen, 
such groups provided a counterpart to the Communist organizations, 
thus helping to make sabotage more acceptable to the public. The result 
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of those developments was marked intensification of sabotage in the 
summer of 1943, which provoked the German authorities and helped 
to touch off the interaction between German threats and reprisals and 
Danish demonstrations and strikes, a process which culminated in the 
events of August.
After the retreat of the government and the introduction of German 
police in Denmark acts of sabotage grew, in size as well as in number. 
The major targets were large concerns linked with the armaments 
industry, such as Riffelsyndikatet and Globus, and shipyards building 
ships for German use. But many smaller factories or repair shops which, 
directly or indirectly, worked for German bodies as well as numer-
ous retail shops were also destroyed. And railway sabotage, mainly in 
Jutland, grew steadily. However, the earlier months of 1944 showed a 
decline in both industrial and railway sabotage, mainly as a result of 
an SOE call for a pause in such activities. The subsequent retreat of the 
German armies across Europe and the approach of the allied forces, giv-
ing rise to the expectation that the war would soon be finished, greatly 
encouraged selective forms of sabotage. In common with other activities 
of the resistance movement, sabotage now attracted ever broader sup-
port from the public.
Sabotage, at the level of intensity reached during the last two 
years of the occupation, required efficient organization, not only of the 
planning and carrying out of the various acts but also of communica-
tion with England and reception of instructors, explosives and weap-
ons from abroad. The first large sabotage organization had its roots 
in the efforts of a score of Communists in Copenhagen in the summer 
of 1942. The Danish police eventually arrested so many of them that 
the Communist party in the course of the winter decided to broaden 
the membership of the organization and, in the name of popular front, 
include also non- Communists. As a private joke, the new groups, made 
up mainly of students, were referred to as bourgeois partisans or BOPA, 
which later became the name of the whole organization. Over its less 
than three years of existence, BOPA had nearly 400 members, of whom 
175 remained at the end of the occupation. About 40 had been killed and 
most of the rest either arrested or driven to escape to Sweden. Despite 
the many arrests and casualties, the organization retained its dual com-
position, most of its members being either mechanics or students, and 
stayed largely under Communist control.
The leader of BOPA in 1944– 45 was Børge Thing, code- named 
Brandt. Under his leadership, the organization carried out many minor 
and some large and well- planned actions, all in the Copenhagen area. 
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A  few amounted to regular partisan attacks, carried out in daylight 
against well- guarded industrial concerns and involving exchange of 
fire and throwing of bombs. The organization also performed about 
30 liquidations of informers. In the last weeks before the German capit-
ulation BOPA was attached directly to the freedom council as an elite 
group, ready to engage in military action if required. After a final parade 
in the summer of 1945 the organization was disbanded.
The other large sabotage organization operating in the 
Copenhagen  area was Holger Danske, called after the mythical Ogier 
the Dane. With the cross- country sports movement and the illegal paper 
De frie Danske among its sources of origin and with later links to Danish 
Unity and the Ring, it established itself as a non- socialist counterpart of 
BOPA. But Holger Danske was larger, looser, more democratic and less 
disciplined. Repeatedly plagued by casualties and arrests, it had to be 
rebuilt or reorganized several times during its two years of existence. 
First set up in April 1943 with Josef Søndergaard, code- named Tom, 
as the central figure, the group relied initially on BOPA for instruction 
and explosives but within a few months established contact with SOE. 
During the summer of that year it carried out, partly with British mate-
rials, a number of actions. One of them, namely the blowing up of the 
central public building Forum, was so spectacular that most of the mem-
bers of the group, including the seriously injured Søndergaard, had to 
escape to Sweden.
The organization was rebuilt by Jens Lillelund, who through a con-
nection in Danish Unity was able to establish contact with SOE agents in 
the country as well as with the freedom council. From October five sab-
otage groups were in existence, one made up of cornets and another of 
naval cadets and students. The latter group, led by a teacher Svend Otto 
Nielsen known as John, carried out a number of acts of industrial sab-
otage, relying on teams which combined bombing experts and marks-
men. In the course of the winter, however, practically all the groups 
were uncovered, many of its leaders and members being arrested or 
forced to escape. Lillelund and Nielsen were denounced by a female 
informer. While the former got away, the latter was seriously wounded 
and arrested by German police, and later executed. Lillelund’s succes-
sor, and briefly Danish Unity’s representative in the freedom council, 
Jørgen Staffeldt died in a German concentration camp.
The rebuilding of the organization started in the spring of 1944, 
after a dissatisfied BOPA member had broken away and taken two 
groups with him, and subsequently attached himself and his men to 
Holger Danske. New groups were recruited, and Lillelund was recalled 
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from Sweden. He soon arranged for Holger Danske to be linked to Frode 
Jakobsen’s Ring, instead of to Danish Unity, which strengthened the 
organization’s representation in the freedom council. Sabotage activi-
ties, which the groups had started again in the early part of the summer, 
were resumed late in the autumn, after a lengthy lull following the gen-
eral strike in Copenhagen.
However, in its revived form, Holger Danske was more than a sab-
otage organization. From the summer of 1944 it saw itself also as a mil-
itary unit preparing to play a part in a final encounter with the forces of 
the occupying power and its uniformed collaborators. In the meantime 
members of the organization carried out a large number of liquidations 
in the Copenhagen area, perhaps nearly 200, mainly of known inform-
ers but in some cases also of persons whose behaviour or company made 
them obvious security risks. Some groups organized ruthless attacks on 
armed units of Danish guards and others serving the German authori-
ties, such as the hated Sommer Corps. Not all such executions and attacks 
had the approval of the leadership of the organization, or the sanction 
of the freedom council. Like some acts of sabotage, they were occasion-
ally carried out by local groups, or even individual members, without 
authorizations from above. Throughout its existence Holger Danske lost 
64 men, some killed in action and other executed by the Germans, but it 
still had about 350 members by the end of the occupation.
The major activities of the two largest sabotage organizations were 
usually directed against industrial concerns and shipyards in or near the 
capital which, in one way or another, served the interests of the occupy-
ing power. In the provinces, sabotage was much more against railways. 
Since the aim of such sabotage was to delay and harass German trans-
ports, most of it by far took place in Jutland. It was usually there that the 
occupying power moved men and equipment to and from Germany and, 
especially in the last year of the war, from Norway to Germany. Troops 
and armaments moving southwards might be needed on one of the 
fronts. The selection of targets and timing of actions depended largely 
on reports about planned German movements received from contacts 
within the Danish State Railways (DSB).
Till late in the summer of 1943 railway sabotage, in Jutland and 
elsewhere in the country, was essentially the work of Communist groups. 
By the autumn of that year, however, groups operating within the ambit 
of SOE were making their presence felt. The most remarkable action 
took place in November, when the railway bridges over the Gudenaa, 
a small river in North Jutland, were blasted and the line disrupted for 
12 days. After the pause in the first half of 1944 railway sabotage grew 
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significantly. In response to orders issued by allied headquarters after 
the invasion of Normandy in June, the resistance movement stepped 
up its efforts to sabotage the transport of German troops to and from 
Denmark. The effect, however, was not particularly impressive. Six 
months later, after the launch of the German Ardennes offensive, London 
demanded faster and more powerful sabotage. Lieutenant colonel Vagn 
Bennike, then leader of the resistance in Jutland, responded by intro-
ducing a system of coded signals, transmitted by the BBC in its Danish 
broadcasts, for ordering collective discharge of sabotage at several 
points of the railway system. This soon led to a marked improvement in 
the effectiveness of Danish efforts. Though a retrospective analysis has 
shown that the delays caused by railway sabotage were on the whole 
fairly minimal, this form of resistance did cause the occupying power 
considerable inconvenience. In the last winter of the war it had to allo-
cate many thousands of troops to guarding the railway tracks.
Historians have calculated the total number of proper acts of 
industrial and other non- railway sabotage to be in the region of 2,800 
and that of railway sabotage to exceed 1,500. Though obviously a hos-
tile activity directed, instantly or ultimately, at the occupying power, 
such sabotage, like most isolated efforts in a great war, may well have 
been less effective in military terms than most of those closely involved 
with it at the time believed it to be. However, sabotage should also be 
seen in terms of its psychological and political, and even its diplomatic, 
impact in the later years of the occupation. For people humiliated by the 
capitulation in 1940 and frustrated by the accommodating attitude to 
the Germans of Danish authorities in subsequent years sabotage served 
as a release, not only for freedom fighters actively involved but also for 
more passive members of the public. As a forthright act of defiance of 
the enemy in the country, it was an explicit indication of anti- German 
attitudes and anti- Nazi convictions.
Politically, sabotage – together with its two concomitants, demon-
strations and strikes – constituted a challenge to both the German and 
the Danish authorities. It rocked the rationale behind the German 
notion of peace occupation and the policy of negotiating agreements 
with the occupied country; and it undermined the Danish fiction of 
sovereignty and the policy of maintaining law and order in the coun-
try while cooperating with the occupying power. Diplomatically, sab-
otage was a friendly greeting to the Soviet Union from the fighting 
Denmark, and an explicit demonstration to the British and American 
allies of Danish will to play an active part in the struggle against 
Nazi Germany. Thus sabotage, together with the industrial strikes 
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and public protests of 1943 and 1944, helped prepare the way for the 
Danish bid for allied status in the later period of the occupation.
From the spring and summer of 1943, when the sabotage groups 
were growing increasingly dependent on SOE for guidance about tar-
gets and timing and for supply of instructors and material, rapid and 
efficient contact with London was becoming essential. Already the first 
parachute drops of agents – of lieutenant Thomas Sneum in September 
1941, representing SIS, and of the ill- fated SOE captain C.J. Bruhn in 
December the same year – had included a radio telegraphist with rel-
evant equipment. Others followed with later drops. But there were 
problems, to do with the equipment as well as with the telegraphists 
themselves. The senders, large and heavy, were often lost or damaged 
in the drop. For the telegraphists, not all of them sufficiently trained by 
their British instructors, the efficient German detector vans were fre-
quently more than a match.
Most of those problems were solved when L.A. Duus Hansen, 
Bang & Olufsen’s chief engineer, became involved. Several of the early 
agents had turned to him for technical advice and spare parts, as a 
result of which he had become familiar with the English equipment 
and the code system. Himself a trained telegraphist, he offered to take 
over some of the sending. From the spring of 1943 the Danish intelli-
gence officers, whose contact with London so far had been essentially 
by letter, used him for urgent military messages. A few months later, 
after several unsuccessful attempts by SOE to send more telegraphists 
and equipment to Denmark, Duus Hansen suggested that Danish- 
trained telegraphists and Danish- built senders be used henceforth. 
Though not in accordance with established SOE rules of security, his 
proposal was eventually accepted by London. From the autumn of 
1943 Duus Hansen was the leader of all Danish radio communication 
with the free world.
Duus Hansen’s main contributions were technical and organiza-
tional. He constructed new and more practical types of senders, some of 
which were as light as 1.5 kg (only one tenth of the weight of the British 
type) and small enough to fit into a briefcase (instead of a suitcase). They 
could also be used as receivers. Suitable for both AC and DC, they could 
even be run from the battery of a car, which made it possible to outwit 
the German detector vans by frequent and rapid changes of location. 
The advantages of the new transmitters were so obvious that the British 
introduced them in other countries where SOE was active.
Duus Hansen also found a number of proficient and reliable teleg-
raphists who were able to learn the British codes and ready to start 
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serving areas of the country which had been without adequate contact 
with London. His brother H.K. Duus Hansen, who as a veterinary sur-
geon had a suitably ambulant profession, started sending from Funen in 
March 1944. After some serious initial misfortunes, other telegraphists 
managed to establish continual sending from parts of Jutland from July 
the same year. On Zealand, which had had permanent radio contact 
with London since September 1943, automatic high- speed transmitters 
able to send eight to ten times faster than by hand were introduced in 
the summer of 1944. While Copenhagen acquired five such instruments, 
Jutland got only two. The organization also ran a workshop for the man-
ufacture of transmitters.
Under Duus Hansen’s leadership the security system was greatly 
improved. As a rule, each telegraphist had more than one transmitter at 
his disposal and many places to send from. He also had a team of trained 
and armed guards to transport transmitters from place to place and 
to warn him when the Germans approached. Yet the struggle with the 
German detection system, constantly being refined, continued till the 
end of the occupation, sometimes with tragic results. To avoid strain-
ing the direct radio link to London more than necessary, Duus Hansen 
established a wireless telephone connection with Sweden across the 
Sound, and later a high- speed (UHF) connection which allowed him to 
transmit to London using Malmø as relay. The Germans failed to dis-
cover those means of communication. Thus, after a slow and difficult 
start, Denmark ended up with a highly efficient system of wireless com-
munication, which both technically and organizationally became recog-
nized as exemplary.
The reception on the ground of agents, equipment, explosives 
and arms, too, was marked by first dedicated and heroic performances 
by outstanding individuals and then by growing organization, at both 
local and national levels. The first proper reception, with a team on 
the ground, took place in the night of 12 March 1943 near Mariager in 
Jutland. Here a Royal Air Force aircraft, having already dropped the 
new SOE leader Flemming B. Muus and three other agents elsewhere 
in the country, delivered six containers. The team was led by Flemming 
Juncker, a landed proprietor with links to Danish Unity who since 1941 
had been involved in active resistance and had become leader of the 
emerging movement in Jutland, and by Ole Geisler, captain in SOE who 
only the previous month had been parachuted into Denmark as leader of 
a team of four agents.
The containers received were transported on a horse- drawn car-
riage by Marius Fiil, owner of the Hvidsten Inn. Round him and his inn 
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a group was formed for the reception of future drops on a local site. In 
the course of the spring and summer five drops were received there. 
Since they included not only weapons and explosives but also seven SOE 
agents, the Hvidsten group played a significant part in the subsequent 
expansion of this organization’s work in Denmark. Within a year, how-
ever, almost the entire group was arrested by the Gestapo. Eight of its 
members, including Marius Fiil and two close family members, were 
executed and others imprisoned, several in Germany.
In the course of the summer of 1943 a further half dozen drops took 
place in Jutland and on Funen and Zealand, with the new SOE agents 
now helping local groups to arrange reception of the containers and 
packages and distribution of their contents. From August of that year 
till the following summer only a few drops took place, mainly because 
the British and the Americans, fighting the Germans in Italy and busy 
preparing the invasion of Normandy, had higher priorities than arming 
the Danes, but also because the resistance movement was undergoing 
nation- wide organization. In accordance with SOE directives received 
by Muus, the country was to be divided into six regions, each to have 
its own organizer with direct radio link to England and its own military 
groups for future action. Those plans affected also the arrangements for 
receiving and distributing weapons.
Jutland was nominally divided into three regions. For a long time, 
however, Juncker maintained a degree of overall authority in that part 
of the country. In March 1944, after a wave of arrests of members of his 
organization, he made Anton Toldstrup leader of reception. Toldstrup, an 
active member of the cross- country sports movement who had links to 
Danish Unity, immediately organized reception groups in north and mid 
Jutland (regions 1 and 2). His energy and efficiency soon secured him a 
place in the unofficial leadership of resistance in Jutland. When Juncker 
the following month had to escape to Sweden – from where he continued 
to London, to become SOE’s organizer of despatches to Denmark – he left 
the movement in Jutland in the hands of Vagn Bennike and Toldstrup. 
When drops started in August, and rapidly reached substantial propor-
tions, the latter was still in charge of receptions. Subsequently, however, 
he took over the leadership of region 1 at the request of Bennike. This 
arrangement led to a bitter feud between the army officer and the civil-
ian resistance leader, in which the latter enjoyed the support of London. 
In the last months of the occupation Toldstrup again concentrated on the 
organization of reception.
On Funen (region 4) the leader of reception and distribution became 
Erik Frandsen, an engineer and instructor in the local cross- country 
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association who, as member of the leadership of resistance in Odense, 
had been responsible for sabotage. During the last seven months of the 
occupation the organization he built up managed to take delivery of 
about 30 drops, with approximately 700 containers, practically without 
losses. On Zealand and Lolland- Falster (region 5) Stig Jensen, editor and 
former lieutenant with friends in Danish Unity, became reception chief 
in the autumn of 1944. A veteran of Danish resistance and one of SOE’s 
first contacts in the country, he built up an organization which reflected 
his concern with security. Insisting on using only people not involved 
in other forms of resistance, he separated reception from transport and 
distribution and kept contact between groups to a bare minimum. The 
efficiency of his organization was decisive for meeting the needs for 
weapons and ammunition of the large resistance organizations in the 
Copenhagen area (region 6), in the months before German capitulation.
Altogether about 620 tons of weapons, explosives and other British 
or American materials were delivered to Denmark by air, most of it small 
arms. The great majority of the missions were carried out by the RAF on 
behalf of SOE, some of the flights crewed by Poles. At the later stage of 
hostilities, when SOE cooperated with the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), its American counterpart, under the joint name of Special Forces, 
American aircraft, too, carried out missions to Denmark. A further few 
hundred tons were transferred to Danish fishing boats on the high seas 
or smuggled in via Sweden. While the Danish side of the former traf-
fic was handled by Toldstrup’s organization, the latter operation was 
initiated by Ebbe Munck and carried out with the tacit consent of the 
Swedish authorities. In the later period of the occupation the supply of 
weapons was meant not so much for current operations of the resistance 
movement as for use by the illegal army then being set up to be available 
in case of an allied invasion of Denmark.
Hand in hand with sabotage, as concurrent militant activities 
directed against both Danish and German authorities, went demon-
strations and strikes. In the first few years of the occupation, when the 
public largely supported the policy of cooperation and put up with the 
German presence in the country and many workers feared having to join 
the legion of the unemployed, there were very few industrial strikes and 
public demonstrations. Any such manifestations of dissatisfaction that 
did appear were usually minor and economically motivated, reflecting 
the severe effects of the war on the daily lives of wage earners in par-
ticular. It was not till early 1943 that illegal strikes and demonstrations 
became more numerous and serious, and began to take on a decidedly 
anti- government and anti- German character.
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One reason for this development was the efforts of Communists, 
more of the men on the shop floor than of the party leaders, to exploit 
growing feelings of discontent and restlessness among workers in key 
industries and turn them against Social Democratic and trade union 
leaders, who generally were staunch supporters of the coalition govern-
ment and its policy of cooperation with the German authorities. Another 
reason was a more general change in public attitudes to that policy and 
to the German presence in the country, a change which no doubt was 
conditioned by spectacular defeats of German armies in Russia and Italy 
and optimistic rumours of an early collapse of the Axis. A third factor in 
that development was the wave of sabotage that was building up in the 
earlier part of 1943. While significant acts of such nature might spur on 
the workers to challenge the Danish authorities and spite the occupy-
ing power, German reprisals to the sabotage could provoke industrial 
strikes and public demonstrations.
Odense presented the first notable case of sabotage leading 
to strike. One of the last days in July an SOE group carried out sabo-
tage against a mine vessel at the local shipyard. When the Germans 
responded by placing armed guards on board the ship the workers 
immediately went on a sit- down strike, arguing tongue- in- cheek that 
‘the rifles could go off’. The strike quickly spread to other places of work 
within the town’s iron industry, with about 3,000 men walking out, and 
lasted more than a week. By then, however, the unrest had spread to 
Esbjerg on the west coast of Jutland, where a Communist group had set 
fire to the fish warehouses and scuffles between German soldiers and 
local people had broken out during the fire- fighting. When the German 
commandant imposed a curfew the street disturbances spread, and a 
strike, organized by Communist shop stewards, closed down the engi-
neering industry of the town. After some inconclusive negotiations 
between Social Democratic representatives of the trade union, who 
were against the strike, and the Communist strike leaders, a large meet-
ing of workers called for a general strike until the Germans lifted the 
state of emergency. On 11 August the entire town closed down, which 
remained the situation till the Germans agreed to end the curfew.
After the victory of the protest movement in Esbjerg the distur-
bances spread to Funen, where Odense again became the focus of con-
frontation with the Germans and their collaborators. It started with 
Danes, including some soldiers, going on the attack in the streets. After a 
few days of restraint, the German commandant sent out patrols to quell 
the disturbances. This led to bloody street fights with more than a dozen 
Danish casualties. The next morning, on 18 August, a call for a general 
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strike went out. Within a few hours the town was in open revolt. The 
following days were marked by demonstrations in the street, rallies of 
workers, assaults on the properties of collaborators and punishment of 
women associating with Germans as well as by continual clashes with 
members of the Schalburg Corps and German patrols. In one incident 
a German officer who happened to be passing through the country was 
handled so roughly that it nearly became a case of mob lynching.
In response to intense German pressure, the local police force was 
rapidly reinforced from other parts of the country to help deal with the 
situation in the streets. With a view to stopping the strike and putting 
an end to the Communist agitation, the trade union leaders and the 
Social Democratic mayor negotiated an agreement with the Germans, 
but failed to secure the acceptance of the workers. The strike, organized 
and directed by Communists and goaded on by a series of acts of sabo-
tage carried out by local groups, continued. At this point the situation 
seemed critical enough for Paul Kanstein, SS officer responsible for 
the internal administration of the country, Nils Svenningsen from the 
foreign ministry and Johannes Kjærbøl, minister of labour, to travel to 
Funen and help bring about a solution. The local negotiators, helped by 
the support from Copenhagen but opposed by a strike committee dom-
inated by Communists, reached another deal with the Germans, who 
again agreed to keep their soldiers off the streets for the next few days. 
The strike was called off on 23 August and work resumed the following 
day. Since the occupying power had accepted a compromise, the strike 
was regarded as a victory for the protest movement.
In the meantime the movement had spread to the smaller towns on 
Funen and a few on Zealand and to Jutland, mainly to towns in its east-
ern and northern parts. There the development in Aalborg, Denmark’s 
fourth largest town, became particularly dramatic. The occasion that 
touched off demonstrations and strike was the death of a young saboteur 
killed in a shoot- out between a resistance group and German soldiers. 
When the funeral on 23 August was advanced by some hours in order 
to avoid violent demonstrations and German military intervention, the 
town went on a strike immediately. Demonstrations in the town centre 
led to violent clashes, in which German soldiers used tanks and carbines 
to suppress the activists and killed several people. After more casual-
ties the following day, the strike was intensified, and now specifically 
linked to a demand for the withdrawal of troops from the streets. When 
the Social Democratic trade union leaders negotiated a deal with the 
German commandant, a meeting of shop stewards in which unskilled 
workers and Communists were strongly represented rejected it. A mass 
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meeting led to more violent clashes, in which the Germans, on the orders 
of general von Hanneken, deployed armed patrols and imposed a state 
of emergency. The situation remained deadlocked till 29 August, when 
the national emergency eclipsed the resistance in Aalborg.
The events of the month leading up to 29 August gave rise to sev-
eral myths. One was that the occupying power deliberately provoked the 
rebellion to prepare the way for a more forceful policy in Denmark. On 
the contrary, in town after town the German commandant exercised a 
degree of restraint to avoid exacerbating the conflict, or gave way to help 
bringing it to an end. Preoccupied with the possibility of an allied inva-
sion, the German authorities had little interest in upsetting the estab-
lished political and diplomatic balance in the country. Nor can London 
be held responsible for bringing about or abetting the rebellion. Neither 
the Foreign Office nor the masters of SOE wanted a popular revolt at that 
stage of the war, especially not one instigated or led by Communists. 
Nor can the events of August be attributed to the strategies or tactics 
of the Communist party as such. The leaderships in Copenhagen and 
the major provincial towns could hardly be enthusiastic about unpre-
dictable events which disclosed the identities of local leaders and, by 
challenging the Social Democrats, compromised the Communist tactics 
of united front. Not even the idea, so popular with Danish authorities at 
the time, of itinerant Communist trouble- makers travelling from town 
to town and touching off disturbances seems well founded.
After thorough research at grass- roots level, Danish historians 
have shown that the August rebellions, in the 17 provincial capitals and 
market towns in which they occurred, were primarily the work of local 
industrial workers. Often instigated by Communist shop stewards, who 
seem largely to have been acting on their own initiative, and sometimes 
coordinated with local resistance groups, calls for strikes and demon-
strations drew a quick response from workers whose dissatisfaction and 
anger had reached flash- point. Occasionally well- timed acts of sabotage 
followed by German or pro- German measures of retaliation helped to 
consolidate their support. However, it was not only workers who were 
ready for actions of protest. At that stage of the war and the occupa-
tion many other people, too, were becoming increasingly frustrated by 
the political and social situation, and more inclined to challenge the 
authority of the occupier. Thus, in town after town salaried employ-
ees, employers, shopkeepers and professionals responded to the call 
for strike, quickly turning it into a general strike, or town strike as it 
was also described. This sudden and simultaneous emergence in many 
provincial towns of a fairly broad- based protest movement weakened 
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the authority of the Danish government and undermined its policy of 
cooperation.
The combination of strikes and demonstrations that erupted in 
Copenhagen the following summer was even more dramatic. By then 
not only the international but also the national political situation had 
changed markedly. The elated optimism which already in the summer 
of 1943 had superseded the general pessimism which had prostrated 
the nation in the first years after the invasion had now been reinforced 
through the allied invasion of Normandy in June. One effect was a wide-
spread conviction that the war in Europe was reaching its end, which 
was matched by a growing desire to show some defiance of the Germans 
still in the country.
An important difference in the domestic situation from the sum-
mer of 1943 was that there was no longer a working government, with 
responsible ministers ready to call for law and order when tension with 
the occupying power threatened to reach crisis point. The pressure 
on the population of the German military and police forces was now 
more direct. The wave of sabotage in June which, as mentioned above, 
included some spectacular and successful attacks in Copenhagen, led to 
a sharp increase in that pressure. The retaliatory measures included the 
execution of eight members of the resistance, the introduction of mili-
tary courts on Zealand and a number of devastating acts by members of 
the Schalburg Corps, including the blowing up of the Tivoli concert hall. 
Provoked by such measures, the workers in Copenhagen, still dissatisfied 
with their economic deal but, in a situation close to full employment, now 
no longer so cowed by the spectre of unemployment, were ready to react 
to any further acts of punishment meted out by the occupying power.
On 26 June the German authorities proclaimed a curfew for 
Copenhagen, from eight o’clock in the evening to five in the morning, 
partly to punish its inhabitants and partly to facilitate the fight against 
sabotage. The blacksmiths at Burmeister & Wain (B&W), which was the 
biggest workplace and had a notoriously red labour force, reacted imme-
diately by leaving work at 12 noon, on the pretext that they had to get 
some fresh air and look after their allotments before the curfew set in. 
The next few days the ‘go- home- early strikes’ spread to other parts of the 
machine industry, largely through the Communist network, as well as to 
other industries and workplaces. By the 28th more than half the work-
force left work early. At that stage the Germans gave way and postponed 
the curfew by three hours. Many, perhaps half, of the striking workers 
responded by resuming work full time.
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Hand in hand with those strikes went a street rebellion, taking the 
form of demonstrations, erection of barricades and lighting of fires, ini-
tially in the working- class areas but later also in other parts of the town. 
In the course of the four days it lasted 15 Danes were killed and about 
100 wounded in fights with the German patrols. While the Danes saw 
the demonstrations rather as defensive measures, directed against the 
Schalburg Corps and German terror, the Germans, seeking to enforce 
their curfew and quell the demonstrations, were engaged in a battle to 
regain control of a rebellious city apparently bent on challenging the 
occupying power.
A few days later events in Copenhagen took a more serious turn. It 
started with rumours of a fatality incurred in connection with the over-
turning of some tram cars, which led the tramway employers to refuse 
to take out their cars the next morning. With people reduced to walk-
ing or cycling, the streets emptied and an air of suspense set in. The 
more decisive event was the announcement in the morning papers that 
eight members of the Hvidsten resistance group had been executed. The 
factories, metropolitan train services, telephone exchanges and depart-
ment stores closed down immediately, with salaried employees and 
shopkeepers following soon after. By the afternoon only dairies, hospi-
tals, fire services and power stations remained open. In the evening the 
Germans turned off the gas, water and electricity supplies of the capital 
in an attempt to force its inhabitants to give in.
The next day, 1 July, the occupying power proclaimed a state of 
military emergency in Copenhagen. It drew armoured troops and artil-
lery to the town and deployed fighter aircraft over the rebellious quar-
ters to demonstrate German power. Taking up key positions in various 
parts of the city, it bombarded the barricades with cannons. The next 
day the rebellion was crushed, the Danes having incurred losses of 60 
persons killed and about 350 wounded in only a few days of fighting.
There is no evidence of a general plan or a central organization 
of the rebellion. While the Communist leadership warned against an 
open challenge of the occupying power, all the big resistance organi-
zations ordered their members to refrain from taking part. If there was 
a degree of organization it seems to have been at the local rather than 
at any higher level. The list of casualties indicated that it was mainly 
young  workers who bore the brunt of the battles. It was also youths 
who, at the height of the crisis, took the lead in attacking and punishing 
collaborators, Nazis and female friends of Germans, as it was youthful 
groups who, ignoring the warnings of the Communist leaders and the 
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freedom council, vandalized and looted a number of food stores and 
tobacconist’s shops – not all of which belonged to collaborators.
For the Danish police, those days presented a particularly difficult 
situation. While most of them privately may have sympathized with the 
national protest movement, their task and orders were to maintain law 
and order. This meant not only preventing or forcefully dealing with 
cases of vandalism and attacks on persons but also taking action against 
the building of barricades, in so far as this could be done without becom-
ing involved in actual battles between German patrols and rebels. Since 
the police made many arrests and occasionally used their truncheons or 
fired warning shots, many of the activists were inclined to treat them as 
being with the enemy. On the other hand, the German authorities were 
dissatisfied with the performance of the police, which became an issue 
in Danish– German negotiations during the strike.
Though the street rebellion had been crushed, the strike contin-
ued for a few days more. After the imposition of the state of emergency 
the freedom council had intervened by proclaiming the strike to be 
continued till the Germans had lifted the restrictions imposed and had 
withdrawn the Schalburg Corps from the streets. The following day 
spokesmen representing the Danish authorities and organizations and 
the politicians, all of whom were inclined to be afraid of the Communists 
and nervous of the freedom council, sent out an appeal for resumption of 
work the next day, which had been approved by the German authorities. 
The freedom council, recognizing this as a proposal for unconditional 
capitulation, distributed handbills opposing it and calling for a contin-
uation of the strike. Despite very strong pressure from the municipal 
authorities, the strike continued the following day and, moreover, began 
to spread, with sympathy strikes breaking out across Zealand. At this 
point Werner Best agreed to lift the emergency and keep the Schalburg 
Corps and German patrols off the streets. The same evening the leading 
politicians and organizational representatives made a second appeal to 
the public, this time over the wireless, calling on the strikers to avoid 
catastrophe and resume work the next day, 4 July. However, the free-
dom council, demonstrating its authority, declared the strike on for yet 
another day. A very large proportion of the strikers chose to follow the 
instructions of the council and ignore the appeal of the politicians and 
organizations.
In the allied world, the whole event was hailed as a victory for 
Copenhagen over the occupying power. Spread over 10 days and involv-
ing about 700 casualties, it became the foremost confrontation between 
the Danish public and the German authorities. That it turned out to be a 
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success for the protest movement was partly a consequence of German 
self- restraint. While the police forces of the occupying power resorted 
to torture, executions and terror in the fight against sabotage and its 
military forces used cannons to suppress street rebellions, the political 
representative of Germany eventually decided to compromise to put an 
end to strikes. He seems to have recognized that the practical circum-
stances of the ostensible peace occupation of the country still required a 
degree of cooperation with the Danish authorities, if the production and 
export of goods essential for Germany had to continue. At that stage of 
the war, there may also have been other reasons for not allowing a fur-
ther deterioration of the political and social order of the country.
Whatever the nature of Best’s reasons for making a few conces-
sions at a crucial stage, the conclusion of the crisis indicated that indus-
trial strike, especially when managed by the freedom council, remained 
a useful weapon for the resistance movement. It was used again sev-
eral times during the next month or two. In the middle of August the 
freedom council set off three- day strikes across the country in protest 
against the shooting of 11 members of the resistance movement, said 
by the Germans to have been trying to escape from custody. A month 
later railway workers near the Danish– German border went on strike 
in protest against the deportation to German concentration camps of 
195 internees from the Frøslev camp, which the German police had 
set up for Danish prisoners who should remain in Denmark. When the 
strike started to spread to other parts of the country the freedom council 
assumed control. Only a few days later, when German soldiers attacked 
the police stations across the country and disarmed and arrested, and 
eventually deported, about 2,000 policemen, the freedom council again 
proclaimed a strike of limited duration. Perhaps the most important 
result of the waves of strikes in the summer and autumn of 1944 was to 
consolidate the authority of the freedom council in conflicts between the 
Danish public and the German authorities, and to strengthen its hand in 
the rivalry with the politicians of the old parties.
The initiative for the setting up of a properly organized resistance 
army, which went on throughout the last 18 months of the occupation, 
came from London. The considerations motivating the British were 
partly of a military and partly of a political nature. In the later stages of 
the war, it was important for the allied powers to have in Denmark, as 
in other occupied countries, a substantial body of men ready and able to 
assist the allied forces if and when the need arose. In the earlier months 
of 1944, it was also essential to leave the Germans in uncertainty as to 
the location of the projected Anglo- American invasion of the Continent, 
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and hence expedient to create the impression that Denmark, too, was 
being prepared for the arrival of invading forces.
The political considerations of the British related ultimately to the 
post- war situation of Denmark. Having come to regard that country as an 
important part of a future British sphere of influence on the Continent, 
they were concerned that the transition from occupation and resistance 
to liberation and restoration of democratic government should come as 
smoothly as possible, and at an early stage lead to stability in domes-
tic affairs and pro- British orientation in foreign relations. Hence they 
were worried by the tension and issues between the Communist and the 
more rightist wings of the resistance movement as well as by the conflict 
between resistance leaders and certain remains of official Denmark, in 
particular the general staff of the army and the more prominent politi-
cians of the defunct coalition government. A substantial army recruited 
across party- political divisions, officered by both professional soldiers 
and resistance fighters and ultimately under British or allied control, it 
was thought, could help deal with such difficulties and prevent a disor-
derly and violent transition followed by lasting political instability.
When Muus, the resident SOE chief, returned to Denmark in 
December 1943 he was under orders to organize a nation- wide under-
ground army divided into six regions, each with a separate structure and 
own leadership. The deadline was 1 March 1944. The freedom council 
set up a military committee to carry out the plans. In practice, however, 
the committee limited its activities to Copenhagen and the eastern parts 
of the country, while leaving the organization of the three regions of 
Jutland in the hands of Flemming Juncker.
The leadership of each region was intended to consist of three per-
sons, namely a member of the Communist party, a member of Danish 
Unity and one who belonged to neither, together with an officer to pro-
vide military expertise. In practice, however, it often proved difficult 
to follow this pattern, especially in the Jutland regions where Juncker 
in effect set up a joint leadership round himself and his two helpers, 
Anton Toldstrup and Vagn Bennike. After his departure for Sweden and 
England a bitter rivalry, as we have seen, developed between Toldstrup 
and Bennike, in which the resistance leader, who had proved an out-
standingly efficient reception chief, had the support of SOE and the offi-
cer had the backing of the illegal general staff of the army.
The general tendencies in the regions were for the leadership to 
grow larger and for the professional officers to become more influential. 
After the arrest of the police in September 1944, a representative of the 
illegal remnants of the police was in several cases attached to the regional 
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leaderships. In the following months liaison officers from SOE, too, were 
added. From the end of the year representatives of the other two major 
resistance organizations, Frit Danmark and the Ring, were also among 
the leaders. While the professional officers originally were intended to 
act as guides and instructors, by the end of the war, the chief of each of 
the seven regions (including the island of Bornholm organized as a new 
region in September 1944) was an officer.
The regions were divided into sections, towns, districts, coun-
ties, etc., each with its own leaders. As a result of pertinacious German 
efforts to roll up sections of the resistance army and arrest its members, 
it frequently became necessary to replace leaders, whether at local or at 
regional levels. Thus, region 3 (southern Jutland) was totally uncovered 
twice in 1944, while region 6 (Copenhagen) needed complete reorgani-
zation in March 1945.
The basic unit of the army was a group of six persons, typically 
young men living in a town or a market town. The first groups were 
mostly recruited either from members of the Communist party or from 
supporters of Danish Unity. Indeed, well before the launch of the SOE 
drive both the Communists and Danish Unity had started setting up 
separate task forces, some of which now became units of the projected 
army. From the spring of 1944 the Ring played an important part in both 
the organizing and the manning of the army. Through its network of 
contacts across the country, it helped to broaden the party- political base 
of the organization. In some towns it created a counterweight to the 
Communist groups by setting up military groups of Social Democratic 
workers.
To some extent, the professional army, too, contributed to the 
broadening of the political and social base. The so- called 0- groups, 
military task forces made up of professional soldiers or members of 
associations and clubs linked to the army which since the beginning of 
1944 had been attached to the small general staff, were formally placed 
under the command of the freedom council. However, while in the pro-
vincial regions most such groups in July 1944 became integrated with 
the civilian military groups, in the Copenhagen region they remained 
a separate force directly under the control of the small general staff. 
Moreover, they secured their own supply of weapons, smuggled in from 
Sweden, which gave them an advantage over the civilian groups. Thus, 
rather than helping to unify the anti- German forces in the country, this 
arrangement in the capital served to accentuate the tension between 
the freedom council and the leadership of the professional army and its 
political masters.
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The line of command within the resistance army, and in the move-
ment as a whole, was not only a subject of conflict among the parties 
directly involved but also an issue between Denmark and the allies. 
Initially SOE and SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Forces) intended to give orders directly to each of the regions. The free-
dom council, however, insisted that all orders from SHAEF to the Danish 
resistance should go through its military committee. To facilitate such 
a procedure, the council replaced that committee, in June 1944, with 
a high- powered command committee, which included two of the most 
prominent members of the council (Fog and Jakobsen), the resident 
SOE chief, two officers representing the army and the navy and, after 
the dissolution of the police force, a representative of the illegal police. 
The idea was that the command committee should handle all orders 
from the allied powers prior to an invasion of Denmark, at which point 
SHAEF would assume direct control of the resistance forces.
In practice, however, the command committee became a link 
merely between London and regions 6 and 5 (Copenhagen and the 
islands east of the Great Belt). Toldstrup in region 1 retained direct con-
tact with London, as did Bennike, who till the end of the occupation 
controlled telegraphic communication between the rest of Jutland and 
England. Orders from London to region 4 (Funen), too, went directly. 
To some extent, this confusion of the British– Danish line of command 
reflected conflicts of allegiance and divisions of loyalty within sections 
of the anti- German forces of the country. The most divisive conflict was 
between professional officers of the regular army and civilian leaders 
of the resistance movement. Although general Gørtz, with the approval 
of the politicians, in December 1943 had agreed that the task forces of 
the army should be coordinated with the civilian military groups then 
under organization, and all be placed under the command of the free-
dom council, the majority of officers engaged in illegal activities, prom-
inent among them Bennike in Jutland, still saw the small general staff 
as their superior authority. Recognizing it as a makeshift agent of the 
hibernating government, the ultimate legal authority of the country, 
they looked to that body for instructions and guidance, rather than to 
the freedom council of self- appointed resistance leaders.
Another line of command with potential for undermining the 
authority of the freedom council and its various committees was that of 
the Communist party. While the leaders and members of the party, very 
much pioneers of resistance in Denmark, had entered into cooperation 
with other illegal groups and organizations in accordance with their 
doctrine of popular front against fascism, they still looked to Moscow 
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for ideological inspiration and moral support. Highly disciplined, they 
could not allow their engagement in the national struggle against Nazi 
Germany to eclipse their commitment to the Communist cause. Their 
dual loyalty found expression in the propaganda of the Communist ille-
gal press as well as in the way in which their leaders and representa-
tives in the resistance were appointed or replaced. All of them had to be 
approved by the leadership of the party. With the liberation of Denmark 
and the end of the war approaching came a growing concern in non- 
Communist circles about the nature of the post- war economic and polit-
ical programme of the Communist party. Such anxieties were reflected 
in the planning and preparations of Danish political and military leaders 
in the later stages of the occupation, and also seem to have been at the 
heart of British policy and initiatives towards Denmark, both before and 
after the allied invasion of France.
Despite the various disagreements and difficulties, the organiza-
tion and arming of the resistance army went on at a rapidly increasing 
pace. The total number enlisted in May 1945 has been estimated at about 
49,000, nearly twice what it had been the previous December. Probably 
less than half of them were armed, largely with weapons received from 
Britain in the last months of the war. Yet numerically, the army at that 
stage was by far the most substantial section of the whole resistance 
movement.
The link to the allied forces was consolidated when SHAEF, in 
September 1944, set up a liaison mission to Denmark under the com-
mand of major general R.H. Dewing, and two months later accepted a 
Danish mission to SHAEF representing lieutenant general Ebbe Gørtz. 
On the initiative of SOE, and with the approval of the freedom coun-
cil, Gørtz had been designated commander- in- chief of all Danish resis-
tance forces, to assume command in case of allied military operations 
on Danish soil, when he would be acting under the orders of the supreme 
commander, general Dwight Eisenhower.
The diplomatic background to the SOE decision to seek the des-
ignation of general Gørtz was the failure of a British attempt earlier in 
the year to persuade its allies to accept Denmark as an ally. Formalizing 
the link between the Danish resistance and allied forces might be 
another way of boosting the morale of the resistance movement, 
securing SOE control of the entire organization, easing the transition 
from occupation to liberation and protecting British interests in post- 
war Denmark. Mainly in an attempt to secure and maintain its grip on 
the resistance organization, the Danish section of SOE arranged for 
a directive to be drawn up to define the limits of Gørtz’s freedom of 
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action. The drafters of the directive, particularly concerned about the 
risk of serious divisions arising within the movement as a result of 
shifts in the balance of power between a weakened freedom council 
and a usurping small general staff of the army, warned against cen-
tralizing tendencies in the lines of command and communication and 
stressed the need to keep the various parts of the whole organization 
separate.
The first paragraph of the directive stated briefly that Gørtz, when 
commander- in- chief of the resistance army, had to obey orders com-
ing from general Eisenhower. The final paragraph dealt at some length 
with the status of the Danish Brigade stationed in Sweden and known 
as Danforce. This unit had been set up on the initiative of the small gen-
eral staff and in accordance with an agreement reached between Social 
Democratic leaders and the Swedish government. Intended by its found-
ers and sponsors as a police force ready to deal with any chaotic situation 
which might arise as a result of the collapse of German rule in Denmark, 
it had been put under command of officers loyal to the dethroned poli-
ticians and kept at the disposal of the latter. To dispel lingering uncer-
tainty about the deployment of the unit, the directive now stated bluntly 
that Danforce was part of the resistance forces under Gørtz’s command, 
and formed a tactical reserve with the primary role of assisting in the 
liberation of Copenhagen and/ or Zealand. Thus the brigade, which by 
May 1945 counted about 5,000 well- trained and armed conscripts and 
volunteers, would be ultimately under the command of SHAEF, like the 
rest of the Danish resistance forces.
As part of its attempt to regain control of developments in the field, 
SOE decided to send a new chief organizer to Denmark. Muus’s second 
period in this position had come to an end in December 1944 when 
he, personally run- down and hotly pursued by the Gestapo, had been 
ordered to return to London for consultation and rest. Earlier in the year 
he had played an important part in the reorganization of the resistance 
movement and the establishment of the resistance army. However, in 
the course of this work he had distanced himself from the freedom coun-
cil and moved closer to members of the small general staff, especially 
Schjødt-Eriksen, and to friends of leading politicians, in particular the 
influential Herman Dedichen. Rumours of financial irregularities and 
aspects of his lifestyle had further affected his standing among the lead-
ers of the resistance movement, as well as his relations with some of his 
SOE masters.
The man who had been trained to take Muus’s place, should 
the need arise, was Ole Lippmann. A  young businessman with an 
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international education and strong anti- totalitarian views, he had been 
one of Svend Truelsen’s closest collaborators in the running of the ille-
gal intelligence service after the evacuation of the army officers. Hand- 
picked by Juncker and Truelsen, rather than by lieutenant commander 
Hollingworth who preferred to send Muus back to the field, Lippmann 
was more on the side of the civilian than of the military section of the 
resistance movement in the rivalry that was intensifying with the pros-
pect of a German collapse. Well- briefed by his British superiors, he 
arrived in Denmark early in February 1945 and brought with him the 
directive drawn up for general Gørtz.
A fourth category, that of individuals enrolling in the armed forces 
of an allied power and joining the fight against Nazi Germany and its 
allies, completes the range of militant reactions to German occupation 
presented here. The most obvious cases were those of men trained by 
SOE and sent to Denmark as organizers and leaders of the resistance, as 
experts and instructors in sabotage or as radio telegraphists responsi-
ble for establishing and maintaining contact between British headquar-
ters and the field. Like other Danes in British service, they had enrolled 
in the Buffs, the East Kent Regiment, in which the Danish king was an 
honorary colonel. Thus, they were under British orders when serving 
in Denmark. In the course of the war a total of 53 SOE agents were dis-
patched to Denmark, most of them dropped by parachute and some 
transferred by sea. More than half were evacuated, imprisoned or killed, 
leaving 23 active in the field in April 1945.
The first SOE leader, dropped over Denmark on 28 December 1941, 
was the ill- fated captain C.J. Bruhn, whose parachute failed to open. 
Captain C.M. Rottbøll followed in April 1942, but was killed in a scuffle 
and exchange of fire with Danish police in September the same year. 
Six months later his place was taken by captain, later major, Flemming 
B. Muus, who in October 1943 was called back to London for consulta-
tion. Two months later he was in Denmark again, where he stayed till his 
evacuation in December 1944. The last SOE leader, major Ole Lippmann, 
remained in Denmark till the end of the occupation.
Periodically, two other agents took over the leadership of SOE 
activities in Denmark. One was Mogens Hammer, who belonged to the 
first batch of Danish volunteers reporting for SOE training in January 
1941. Parachuted into Denmark together with Bruhn, he found him-
self in the role of the only SOE agent in the country after the death of 
his superior. When eventually he, hotly pursued, returned to London 
in September 1942, he was asked to go back to Denmark immediately 
and assume provisional leadership after the death of Rottbøll. This 
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position he held till the arrival of Muus in March 1943. Returning to 
England the following month, he spent the rest of the war serving in 
the British army. The other acting leader was captain Ole Geisler. Like 
Hammer an engineer by profession, he was parachuted into Denmark 
in February 1943 as leader of a team of four men. After a long period 
in Jutland, he moved to Copenhagen, where he became a member of 
the freedom council’s military committee and later of its sabotage 
committee. Occasionally standing in for Muus as SOE’s representative 
and later keeping in close touch with Lippmann, he acted as SOE’s 
second in command.
Of the remaining agents serving in Denmark, only a few failed 
to live up to expectations, their main shortcoming being lax security. 
Especially in the first years of the occupation the Danish section of 
SOE had problems with the number and quality of its recruits. With no 
Danish exile government in London to attract suitable volunteers, the 
organization had to draw mainly on stranded sailors and Danes living 
abroad. Later, when refugees from Denmark began to arrive in England, 
mainly via Sweden, the recruitment situation improved somewhat. 
Another problem, however, was that a few of the most suitable of the 
men who had been trained at SOE schools preferred to serve with British 
forces elsewhere, rather than hang about, often for months, waiting for 
an opportunity to enter active service in Denmark.
Other Danes served SOE in an administrative capacity. The first 
was W. Michael Iversen, who, after 20 years managing a plantation in 
Malaya, happened to be in London in April 1940. His reaction to the 
German occupation and Danish policy was to rally Danes in Britain and 
encourage them to make an active contribution to the war. In touch with 
some of the people engaged in setting up SOE, he became the manager 
of the Danish section’s recruitment office. After retiring in 1943, he spent 
the rest of the war serving in the British army, with the rank of captain. 
E.  Borch Johansen came to SOE with a different background. Having 
been very active in transmitting intelligence and organizing resistance, 
he had been arrested by Danish police for his part in arranging the ille-
gal departure for Britain of the Conservative leader Christmas Møller 
in April 1942, but had been allowed to escape. Together with Hammer, 
he canoed to Sweden, and made his way to London, where the Danish 
section wanted him to help with planning the drops of men and material 
over Denmark. He left SOE in 1943 and spent the rest of the war in the 
British army, with the rank of major.
The work within the Danish section of Flemming Juncker, from 
May 1944 in charge of organizing parachute drops, and of major Svend 
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Truelsen, from about the same time attached to SOE’s head office in 
charge of intelligence work and later on the staff of the Danish sec-
tion with responsibility for systematizing, processing and transmitting 
Danish intelligence, has already been mentioned. Together they became 
a formative influence on the policy towards Denmark of SOE (or Special 
Forces, as the organization became known after the fusion with the 
American OSS in May 1944) in the last year of the war.
Other Danes, acting independently of SOE, took great personal 
risks in attempting to escape to England to enrol in the British forces. 
Four outstanding cases may be mentioned. After 9 April 1940 lieutenant 
colonel T.P.A. Ørum took leave of absence without pay. Later in the year 
he decided to make for England and volunteer for active service in the 
Royal Air Force, having already encouraged others to take the same 
course. In December, however, he was arrested in Berlin and charged 
with espionage for Britain and treason, Denmark being deemed part of 
the German operational area. By a concession on the part of the German 
authorities, he and his accomplices were tried by a Danish court. In 
January 1941 he was dismissed from the Danish forces and sentenced 
to prison for life.
Flying officer Kaj Birksted was more successful. Only a few days 
after 9 April he managed to escape to Sweden and make his way to 
northern Norway, where he fought on the Norwegian side till the allied 
forces were evacuated, and he was transported to England. Eventually 
he was able to reach a Norwegian training camp in Canada known as 
‘Little Norway’, where he trained as a fighter pilot. Having joined the 
Norwegian section of the Royal Air Force, he took part in several hun-
dred missions over enemy territory and fought countless battles in the 
air, reaching the rank of wing commander and ending up as chief of the 
Norwegian section. In 1943 he joined the general staff of the RAF, and 
the following year took over as chief of its operational section.
A particularly daring escape from Denmark was that of lieutenant 
Thomas Sneum, who, together with a fellow officer, assembled a tiny 
sports plane near Odense and, in June 1941, managed to fly it to England. 
Here his aim was to join the armed forces. However, already well known 
to British intelligence authorities for important material he had gathered 
in Denmark and passed on to them – in particular information relating to 
a novel type of radar installation set up by the Germans on the island of 
Fanø on the Danish west coast – he was asked by SIS to return to Denmark 
and continue his intelligence work. Dropped by parachute in September 
1941, he established contact with the cautious Danish intelligence offi-
cers, who soon found him too daring to work with. A situation developed 
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in which Sneum, hotly pursued by the Danish police, again had to aban-
don his work on Danish soil. In March 1942 he made his way across the 
frozen- over Sound to Sweden and returned to England. Like Birksted, he 
spent the rest of the war serving with the Norwegian forces in the RAF.
The Dane who attained the highest distinction in British service 
was a seaman who joined a commando unit. Already in April 1940 
Anders Lassen, ordinary seaman on one of A.P. Møller’s tankers then 
in foreign waters, decided to volunteer for the British forces. Through 
Michael Iversen he secured a place among the first Danes to be trained 
as SOE parachutist agents. However, dissatisfied and impatient, he wel-
comed a transfer to special training for an amphibious commando unit. 
Ending up in a special training boat squadron, he took part in or led 
raids and campaigns in the Mediterranean region, especially Greece. 
He was awarded the Military Cross and two Bars to the Military Cross, 
and reached the rank of major. Fighting in the allied offensive in north-
ern Italy, he lost his life a month before the end of the war in Europe. 
Posthumously he was awarded the Victoria Cross.
In addition to heroes still remembered, an unknown number of 
Danes, estimated to be in the region of 1,000 to 2,000 with 10 per cent of 
them women, joined the armed forces of the Commonwealth Countries 
or the United States and engaged in operations in various theatres of war. 
Without an exile government in London to attract and organize them, 
they fought alongside soldiers of other nationalities and played their part 
in allied efforts to defeat the enemies in Europe and the Far East.
The continuum of Danish reactions to German occupation pre-
sented above, ranging from wholehearted support for the occupying 
power at one extreme to armed resistance at the other, roughly corre-
sponds to the historical development of such reactions over the five- year 
period. Wholehearted support of the Germans, always minimal, became 
negligible after the elections in March 1943. Willing cooperation, not 
motivated by ideological sympathy but by necessity and prudence, 
reached its highest point after Scavenius took over the foreign ministry 
is July 1940, and became much more discreet after the retreat of the 
government in August 1943. While opposition to the German authori-
ties was largely passive in the first period of the occupation, later it fre-
quently took decidedly active forms. With the rise and organization of 
the resistance movement, and the establishment of the freedom council 
in September 1943, various kinds of militant or armed resistance came 
to the fore. While the policy of limited cooperation with the Germans 
in the first years had been largely accepted and supported by the pop-
ulation, it subsequently became less popular. In the last few years, 
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especially the final six months of the war, active resistance, armed as 
well as unarmed, rapidly gained considerable public support.
However, this tentative correspondence between the logical 
arrangement and the historical trend of Danish reactions is somewhat 
marred by the important development taking place during the last 
period of the war. With the liberation of Denmark approaching, leaders 
of the old political parties, all men associated with the policy of coop-
eration, moved closer to the leaders of the resistance. From one point 
of view, this development may be seen as part of the broad trend from 
cooperation to resistance. In its effects, however, it can also be recog-
nized as counteractive in relation to that trend, in the sense that it led 
to compromise and some cooperation between the politicians and the 
resistance movement, and thus brought about a relationship in which 
the politicians, with their parties and organizations, eventually gained 
the upper hand.
The underlying concern of the political leaders at that stage of the 
war was to keep their political organizations intact, ready to assume 
their traditional roles in Danish politics as soon as the country had been 
liberated and the democratic system re- established. For that purpose 
the party leaders needed to recover their authority in the country and 
restore some of the credibility they had lost among the allies during the 
years of governmental cooperation with the enemy. It was after the gen-
eral strike in Copenhagen in the summer of 1944, in the management 
of which the freedom council had demonstrated its authority and influ-
ence among the public, that the politicians took the more decisive steps 
to establish relations with the resistance movement. Having declined 
earlier invitations to secure representation of their parties in the free-
dom council, they now decided to have two of their men join a contact 
committee set up by the council in August 1944. They were H.C. Hansen 
from the Social Democrats and Aksel Møller from the Conservatives, 
both younger leaders who already had been involved in various forms of 
illegal activities. In the initial period of the work of the new committee, 
Aage Schoch and Børge Houmann represented the freedom council.
Within Denmark, the driving forces behind this whole develop-
ment were Herman Dedichen and Flemming Muus. While Dedichen, in 
close touch with both the politicians and the officers and enjoying the 
confidence of the British, for long had worked for some reconciliation 
between the political and military establishment and the resistance, 
Muus, largely sharing the views of his close collaborator Dedichen, had 
moved closer to the politicians at the expense of his relations with the 
freedom council.
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Abroad, the idea of contact and coordination between the two 
camps in Danish relations with the German authorities at this stage of 
the war had the support of the Western allies, especially Britain. The 
Foreign Office, mindful of its post- war interests in Denmark and the 
region and uncertain about Soviet policy and intentions for that coun-
try, wanted to end the occupation with a minimum of internal tension. 
Hence Britain tried to steer a middle course between the political and 
military establishment and the resistance movement, which in practice 
meant seeking to rehabilitate the former while occasionally checking the 
latter. This was the policy that first Muus and later Lippmann, both under 
British orders, pursued in the field, the former leaning towards the old 
establishment and the latter identifying more with the freedom council.
For all the parties most concerned, the old politicians and the 
freedom council as well as Britain, the two most important matters to 
be resolved were the status of Denmark in relation to the allied pow-
ers and the composition and programme of its government immediately 
after liberation. The problem of status was complicated by the conflict 
between the peacefully- occupied role of the state and the militant activ-
ities of the resistance movement and by the absence of the government 
and the non- existence of an exile government. Already in the earlier 
months of 1944 Britain and the United States had negotiated a joint 
declaration which practically recognized Denmark as an ally. However, 
they had failed to secure the assent of the Soviet Union, which had not 
forgotten that the Danish government had broken off diplomatic rela-
tions with Moscow immediately after the German attack in 1941. In the 
autumn of 1944, a few months after Thomas Døssing had been accepted 
in Moscow as representative of ‘the fighting Denmark’, the king and the 
leading politicians, without consulting the freedom council, had sent 
a message to the Soviet government in which they apologized for, and 
tried to explain, the diplomatic rupture in 1941 and the subsequent sign-
ing of the Anti- Comintern Pact.
When this approach, presumably mediated by Døssing, drew no 
response whatever from Moscow it finally became clear to the politicians 
that in matters of diplomacy they had to cooperate with the freedom 
council and, in relations with the Soviet Union, show their united sup-
port for the resistance movement. After considerable debate about the 
basis for their cooperation, the politicians and the freedom council pre-
pared a joint appeal for allied status, which early in January 1945 went 
off to the Danish representatives in London, Washington and Moscow. 
A  lengthy negotiation, involving many parties followed. For long, the 
greatest obstacle was Døssing, who found it difficult to accept the recent 
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reconciliation between the politicians responsible for the policy of coop-
eration and the resistance movement he represented. Refusing to pres-
ent and recommend the appeal to the Soviet authorities, he at one stage 
tried to impose new conditions for accepting the discredited politicians 
as partners of the freedom council. Here he could point out that his 
demands were in line with the attitude of the Soviet government. When 
the Germans capitulated and the occupation came to an end the matter 
of Denmark’s formal status was still pending. Later in May, however, its 
government received an invitation to take part in the San Francisco con-
ference, where allied powers would meet to set up the United Nations.
Since the joint appeal to the three great powers was intended as a 
diplomatic demonstration of national unity behind Danish resistance, 
it presupposed a degree of political agreement between the parties. To 
achieve this at that stage proved very difficult. When the politicians ini-
tially insisted on first agreeing on the text of the diplomatic document 
and only later discussing the political issues, a vehement debate ensued. 
The basis for the discussions became a memorandum prepared by Frode 
Jakobsen and Børge Houmann on behalf of the freedom council. It dealt 
with two crucial issues in particular, namely the composition of the lib-
eration government and its programme for the post- war period, and also 
presented certain demands.
As to the composition of the future government, it was too soon 
to reach a detailed agreement, even on the relative strength of repre-
sentation of the two sides. The previous winter the political parties had 
prepared a list of future ministers which was made up entirely of politi-
cians from the parties of the former coalition government, and included 
some names that were unacceptable to the resistance movement. In the 
meantime, the idea of such a government had become quite unrealistic. 
The memorandum presented by the freedom council demanded repre-
sentation for the four major resistance organizations, Frit Danmark, the 
Communists, Danish Unity and the Ring, as well as for the ‘free Danes’ 
abroad, and pointed towards an equal representation of the two sides. 
All that could be agreed now, however, was that a government would 
have to be formed in unison, and with participation of both sides.
As for the political programme of the post- war government, the 
memorandum presented three major demands: punishment of all per-
sons who during the occupation had committed treason or other crimes 
which it had been impossible to deal with at the time; compensation 
for all who had suffered loss as a result of German persecution; and the 
end of Denmark’s traditional and isolated neutrality and its full and 
binding entry into the projected United Nations. Those conditions the 
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politicians found largely acceptable. Thus, for the purpose of drafting 
the joint appeal to the allied powers, the parties were able to agree on a 
formula which stated that they were united ‘in seeking to maintain the 
solidarity of the Danish people also after the war, by forming the first 
free government of the country and determining its basic programme in 
unison’. At that stage, it was mainly the freedom council that laid down 
the terms for cooperation between the resistance movement and the old 
political parties. Four or five months later, a liberation government led 
by Vilhelm Buhl and composed half of politicians and half of represen-
tatives of the ‘free Danes’ abroad and the leading resistance organiza-
tions took charge. Before long the professional politicians managed to 
re- establish their control of the political process.
Diplomatically, Denmark’s efforts during the last winter of the 
war were less than successful, its joint appeal for allied status getting 
stuck somewhere in Moscow. Yet, it did enjoy the diplomatic support and 
receive the implicit recognition of the two great Western allies.
Politically, Denmark managed to reach an understanding and 
develop a form of partnership between the old political establishment 
and the leadership of the resistance movement. This achievement, 
though perhaps less than convincing to the Russians, was acceptable 
to the Americans and more than welcome to the British. Indeed, the 
Foreign Office and SOE, now working together, had for long sought a 
reconciliation between the forces of tradition and continuity and the 
revisionist tendencies and ambitions in Danish politics, with a view to 
reaching a political equilibrium of national unity which would be stable 
enough to protect the country against divisive influences and interven-
tionist initiatives from the Soviet Union, and durable enough to prepare 
it for a pro- British role in post- war Europe.
Militarily, the resistance army, organized on SOE initiative, was 
coordinated with the allied forces. Through the designation of general 
Gørtz and a series of declarations, directives and missions following the 
allied invasion of north- western Europe, both the civilian and the pro-
fessional forces of the country were potentially integrated in the forces 
at the disposal of SHAEF. Thus Denmark, despite its passive conduct in 
the early years of the occupation, ended up firmly within the camp of the 
Western allies. While encouraged, guided and supported by Britain and 
other allies, it did so essentially through its own efforts.
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3
Since 1945: From resistance 
to collaboration
While the history of Danish reactions to German occupation presented a 
broad development from cooperation to resistance, the huge historiog-
raphy that since 1945 has been devoted to the subject has gone through 
a thematic movement more in the opposite direction. As regards focus as 
well as commitment, scholarly work on the occupation years has passed 
through three stages.
The historians writing in the first post- war decades concentrated 
on the Danish– German conflict and took less interest in divisions on the 
Danish side. Imbued with the anti- German feelings which had affected 
the overwhelming majority of the Danish people since the invasion in 
1940 and impressed with the national solidarity that had emerged in the 
year of liberation, they were inclined to belittle the tensions and conflicts 
which had developed between official Denmark and those who were 
against the policy and practice of negotiating and cooperating with the 
German authorities. Acknowledging the historical coexistence of coop-
eration and resistance, such writers looked for some concord between 
the two kinds of reaction to German occupation. While some found an 
implicit compromise, others detected an underlying continuity between 
the earlier policy of cooperation and the later commitment to resistance. 
As presented, each notion implied a degree of complementarity between 
opposite reactions. The concept of complementarity helped historians 
and other writers to sustain the image of a nation united in opposition 
to the German enemy.
Later historians, writing in the 1970s and 1980s, were less impressed 
with the national concord of anti- German opposition and more aware 
of the divisions within the occupied nation. Shifting the focus from 
Danish– German conflict to Danish disagreements, they questioned 
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some basic assumptions behind the earlier presentation of the history of 
reactions to occupation. Dealing with resistance and cooperation sepa-
rately, they examined the former more critically and assessed the latter 
on its own merits. Thus they revived the conflict that had divided the 
nation in the middle years of the occupation.
The 1990s brought a second revisionist wave, which took the schol-
arly debate beyond the conflict between resistance and cooperation. 
Addressing the conduct of relatively minor groups of people who during 
the war, in some way or other, had collaborated with the Germans, and 
who had been largely ignored by earlier writers, a new generation of 
historians highlighted the moral dimension of Danish conduct during 
the war. On the one hand, they distanced themselves from the stand-
point of the resistance movement by condemning some of its practices, 
especially liquidation of informers and others. On the other hand, they 
went well beyond accepting the policy of cooperation when they dealt 
sympathetically with the parts played by marginal groups hitherto not 
only excluded from scholarly consideration but also broadly condemned 
by the public. Thus the younger historians introduced a new note of dis-
cord both in scholarly and public debate about Danish behaviour during 
the German occupation. At both levels, that debate continued till well 
into the twenty- first century.
3.1. Concord
The historians who were inclined to present cooperation and resistance 
as alternate and ultimately complementary ways of opposing the German 
authorities included some who viewed the relationship between the two 
ways primarily from the angle of active resistance and some who saw it 
more from the perspective of limited cooperation. For the former, typically 
identifying with the resistance movement, it was bound to be difficult to 
accept the policy of cooperation in its entirety. For the latter, sometimes 
personally committed to that policy, it could be hard to endorse all of the 
practices of the resistance movement. Yet all such writers shared, at least 
to some extent, the idea of essential complementarity between reluctant 
cooperation and active opposition to the occupying power.
A clear case of presenting and assessing reactions to German occu-
pation from a resistance perspective was that of Jørgen Hæstrup, who 
became the foremost historian of Danish opposition. A charismatic and 
enterprising history master in one of Odense’s upper secondary schools, 
he had himself been active in the resistance. Like many others with a 
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similar background, he became concerned about the emergence in the 
first post- war years of a so- called counter- movement, opposed to the 
resistance movement. Its supporters, many of them people with a less 
than heroic wartime record and some with an axe to grind, were critical, 
in particular, of the severe, and sometimes arbitrary, treatment meted 
out to collaborators by the Danish judicial system after the liberation. 
More generally, they seemed set to undermine the immense popularity, 
and considerable political influence, enjoyed by the resistance move-
ment after the war.
However, any serious attempt to counter such efforts of denigra-
tion seemed bound to be thwarted by the obvious lack of factual knowl-
edge about the structure, organization and activities of the resistance 
movement. To secure its rightful recognition in the long run, it became 
clear to Hæstrup in the spring of 1947, some historical research would be 
required. From his contacts with the SOE agent on Funen in 1943– 44 he 
knew that the men trained in England and sent to Denmark to assist the 
resistance movement had maintained telegraphic contact with London, 
sending reports to headquarters and receiving instructions. Such writ-
ten material, presumably filed in England, could be important sources. If 
it was not available, personal reports by the agents and others involved, 
whether they were written by themselves or were obtained by way of 
interview and gathered while the events were still relatively fresh in 
their memories, might help fill the gap in information about that period 
of Danish history.
Having received the consent of an initially rather sceptical keeper 
of the Danish public records and having secured the support of Aage 
Friis, then nestor of historical research, Hæstrup arranged to take a cou-
ple of months leave from his teaching duties towards the end of 1947. 
Confident that the wartime relationship with British military authori-
ties offered the best entry to a study of the organization and activities of 
the Danish resistance movement, he decided first to visit London. After 
an instructive weekend with Flemming Juncker in Jutland and a useful 
meeting in Odense with Sir Bruce Lockhart, who had been in charge of 
British propaganda in the war, he left for England, armed with a suitable 
letter of introduction to Sir Colin Gubbins from Per Federspiel, SOE’s 
paymaster in Denmark and now a member of the government.
In two weeks in London, Hæstrup met not only people who 
had held  top positions within SOE, namely, in addition to major gen-
eral Gubbins, Lord Selborne and Sir Charles Hambro, but also some 
of those who had run the Danish section of the secret organization, 
including lieutenant commander Ralph Hollingworth, Reginald Spink, 
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commander Frank Noel Stagg and major Lawrence Lassen. The argu-
ments he advanced for securing the SOE archives relating to Danish 
resistance were that they constituted a vital chapter of his country’s his-
tory and ought to be in the custody of a Danish institution, and that it 
was not in British interests to withhold information about the activities 
of SOE in the occupied countries. If the efforts and achievements of SOE 
in such countries remained unknown or were forgotten the goodwill 
still enjoyed by Britain in Europe would evaporate. Here he went as far 
as suggesting a scholarly country- by- country presentation of the organi-
zation’s achievements.
Of course, Hæstrup did not manage to have the SOE files, or a 
copy thereof, transferred to Danish custody, or even to secure access 
to this material. It was a time when the papers of that organization 
were still marked ‘top secret’ and, indeed, its very existence was being 
kept secret.1 However, major N.G. Mott, responsible for watching over 
those archives, did help him in his work, by writing to the officers of the 
Danish section and authorizing them to speak freely to him, irrespective 
of their pledge of secrecy. Moreover, Mott referred him to professor W. J. 
M.  McKenzie at Oxford, who had been charged with preparing a full 
account of the work of the Danish section. McKenzie, no stickler for War 
Office secretiveness, allowed him to read his 300- page report, and later 
sent him a copy confidentially. Thus, Hæstrup could return to Denmark 
confident that he had secured British approval for his research project. 
However, nearly all his contacts had been with SOE people. Only later 
did he become aware of the rivalries between that organization and 
other British bodies, which sometimes had different ideas about the con-
duct of the war in northern Europe.
Back in Odense and ready to start collecting reports from SOE 
agents and resistance leaders, Hæstrup soon discovered that there 
were rather more important sources of Danish occupation history to 
be located. Despite the need for secrecy and the rules of security, many 
important members of the resistance movement had stored away writ-
ten material about their activities. For some, especially those running 
large organizations, it had been necessary for the efficient continuation 
of their work to retain records of various kinds. For others, in partic-
ular those stationed in neutral Sweden, it had been relatively safe to 
do so. Now such contemporary material, he found, was often stored in 
unsuitable places by people not fully aware of its significance. To secure 
it and make it available for future historians became his most urgent 
task. The next few years he came across, and secured for the public 
record office, 27 such collections of material and, in each case, sorted 
 
 
 
s InCe 1945:  from res Is tanCe to Coll abor at Ion 135
   135
the papers, decoded messages and listed the contents, thus turning the 
collection into a proper archive. Twenty- five years later the total number 
of archives prepared and deposited had grown to 80.
In his account of this part of the research, Hæstrup drew attention 
to four archives in particular, namely those of Lorens Arne Duus Hansen, 
Erik Seidenfaden, Herman Dedichen and Ole Lippmann. Each of those 
men had not only been deeply involved in resistance activities but had 
also played a significant part in establishing or maintaining contact with 
sections of official Denmark. Duus Hansen, organizer and leader of radio 
communication with London and the free world, had been in close touch 
with the intelligence officers and sections of the police force. Seidenfaden, 
one of SOE’s earliest contacts in Denmark and from 1943 leader of the 
Danish Press Service in Stockholm, had drawn on excellent connections 
with influential politicians in Copenhagen. Dedichen, a businessman with 
long- standing contacts to SOE and its agents, had offered his good offices 
and become a principal mediator between the resistance movement and 
the leaders of the major political parties. And Lippmann, as the last SOE 
chief in Denmark, had been under orders to smooth relations between 
army officers and civilian leaders of the resistance movement and to facil-
itate cooperation between the politicians and the freedom council.2
Among the many collections of documents that turned up at later 
stages of his research, Hæstrup singled out Ebbe Munck’s, describing it 
as both the largest and the most important of all the archives that had 
been deposited in the public record office. Since 1940 Munck had been 
stationed in Stockholm, where he had served as unofficial link between 
both official bodies and illegal organizations in Denmark and various 
authorities in London and other capitals of the free world. Thus, in the 
earlier years he had represented the general staff of the army in dealings 
with the British legation in Stockholm, and in the later years the free-
dom council in its relations with the SOE office in the Swedish capital. 
Involved in some way or other in most of the more important secret nego-
tiations and transactions with neutral Sweden and the allied powers, he 
had become a corner stone of Danish opposition to German occupation. 
Describing him as having been motivated from the very beginning of the 
occupation by a determination to transform Denmark from a country of 
capitulation to a country of resistance, Hæstrup went as far as claiming 
that Munck’s efforts amounted to one of the most significant and deci-
sive contributions to Danish foreign policy in the twentieth century. Like 
Seidenfaden in the last years of the war, he had worked from an office 
which was out of the reach of the Germans, and had been able to keep 
his files intact.3
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Collecting reports from individuals who had been engaged in resis-
tance turned out to be a task much more demanding, in terms of both 
time and effort, than expected. Since he had decided to concentrate on 
what he regarded as the main organs of the movement and their leaders, 
Hæstrup sought out people who had been associated with the Danish sec-
tion of SOE. Thus, roughly four out of five of the 78 reports he managed 
to secure between the autumn of 1947 and the spring of 1949 were by 
SOE officers and their contacts. Even when he interviewed Communist 
resistance leaders, such as Mogens Fog, who represented the popular- 
front Frit Danmark in the freedom council, and Børge Houmann, who 
represented the Communist party and the sabotage organization BOPA, 
his point of departure was their relationship with SOE.4 As the work pro-
gressed, he came to see the reports as supplementary to the archives, 
often using them to fill gaps in the documentary material available.
Only a small minority of the 78 informants wrote their reports 
entirely on their own, and even so only after an exchange of letters with 
Hæstrup. Several dictated their accounts to a secretary, or to a stenog-
rapher sent to them by Hæstrup. In most cases, however, he had to fall 
back on the interview method, meeting the informants in their offices or 
homes, or in his own home in Odense, and usually taking close notes in 
longhand but sometimes using the services of his stenographer. It was 
a method which allowed him occasionally to guide an informant and 
help him to focus on what was deemed significant. After the interview, 
the report was typed out and sent to the informant for corrections, and 
finally for signature. The first phase of Hæstrup’s research came to an 
end in April 1949, when he deposited all archives and reports so far 
gathered in the public record office. The material was in principle kept 
secret for 25 years, but in practice soon made available selectively for 
historical research.
Having finished the pioneer work of discovering and procuring 
source material for a history of the resistance movement, Hæstrup 
returned to full- time teaching at Sct. Knuds Gymnasium. It was not till 
about two years later that he, after overcoming personal hesitations and 
professional considerations, decided to accept the challenge of writing 
the first part of the history himself. His major motivation was still, he 
explained later, to counter the growing disparagement of the resistance 
movement.5 For any work to have the proper impact on the public debate, 
it would need to be of a strictly scholarly nature. He started research 
and writing in the summer of 1951. Though uncertain about the atti-
tude to contemporary history of the academic authorities, he eventu-
ally decided to present the result of his work to Aarhus University in the 
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form of a doctoral dissertation. In 1954 it was submitted and formally 
accepted, and in accordance with Danish practice, subsequently printed 
and published. Its title was Kontakt med England 1940– 43.
The book immediately became a best- seller. Drawing on sources 
hitherto unknown and revealing a central relationship between Danish 
resistance and allied military and political efforts, it was a decisive con-
tribution to knowledge of contemporary history and became a point of 
departure for further research. Very well written, with a wider reader-
ship in mind, it told a dramatic story about recent events, which acknowl-
edged the patriotism of ordinary people and highlighted the heroism of 
outstanding individuals. The public defence of the dissertation attracted 
close to one thousand people, many of them prominent members of the 
resistance movement, and became a media event.
The two officially appointed opponents devoted some time to crit-
ical comments on the use of personal reports as historical sources. One 
of them, professor Sven Henningsen from Copenhagen University, also 
pointed out that the candidate had not consulted German sources. More 
important, Henningsen attacked him for obviously acting as spokes-
man for the views of the resistance movement and showing little under-
standing of the conduct of the politicians. In particular, he objected 
to the candidate’s violent criticism of Erik Scavenius and his policy, 
and also pointed out that he had failed to give the politicians credit 
for their refusal to comply with German demands on 28 August 1943. 
The latter accusation led to a lengthy argument between Hæstrup and 
Henningsen, which was often interrupted by the applause of the largely 
pro- resistance audience.
However, reactions from the floor, while generally very support-
ive, also included some criticism and suggestions by prominent former 
members of the resistance movement. Flemming Juncker thought that 
the radio service had not been done full justice; Ebbe Munck stressed 
the need for viewing Danish resistance in a wider context; and Borch 
Johansen was sarcastic about the contributions of the intelligence offi-
cers. Børge Houmann, in a review of the book in the Communist paper 
Land og Folk, had already questioned the wisdom of choosing SOE activ-
ities as the starting- point for a treatise on Danish resistance.6
The following years Hæstrup continued his search for material 
about the resistance movement, now with the explicit support of the 
public record office. Again he secured a large number of individual 
reports, but soon gained the impression that the memories of the 
informants were not quite so reliable as those of the people he had 
approached half a dozen years earlier. Thus, the additional collections 
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of contemporary papers, of which he now located, put in order and 
deposited as many as he had done in the late 1940s, gained in impor-
tance as sources. He was particularly pleased with the archives of 
Frode Jakobsen, the longest- serving member of the freedom council; 
of Thomas Døssing, the representative of ‘the fighting Denmark’ in 
Moscow; and of Svend Truelsen, in charge of intelligence work from 
1943 to 1945, first in Denmark and later in the SOE headquarters in 
London.
While in his earlier search for material, as in the writing of Kontakt 
med England, he had focused on SOE activities, Hæstrup now turned 
his attention to the central organs of the resistance movement. He was 
particularly interested in documents and reports throwing light on the 
origins, development and role of the freedom council, the intelligence 
service, the foremost reception organizations and the centrally orga-
nized radio communication. More detailed studies, of for example the 
history of sabotage, the illegal press, the illegal boat service and the 
great strike movements, he left to later historians. Nor did he devote 
much time to exploring the relationship between leading politicians and 
the resistance movement, an omission he later regretted.7
However, while focusing on the structure and organization of the 
Danish movement, Hæstrup took the first steps towards a more compar-
ative approach to the subject. Conversations with two young Norwegian 
historians engaged in similar research in their country had helped to 
broaden his conception of resistance. Soon he started to read up the rap-
idly growing literature about resistance in other European countries, 
including the Soviet Union, Greece, Yugoslavia, France, Holland, Poland 
and even Nazi Germany. The memoirs of British scholars and writers 
who had played heroic parts as liaison officers to resistance movements 
in the Balkans he found particularly absorbing. Soon he established 
contact with C.M. Woodhouse in London and F.W. Deakin in Oxford as 
well as with heads of institutes in Amsterdam and elsewhere devoted to 
research on anti- German resistance.
At this stage of his reading, Hæstrup was struck by the distinction 
between two levels of warfare in the Second World War. At the higher 
level, you had the regular war among states, fought with huge armies 
and other uniformed and organized forces and marked by decisive bat-
tles and important conferences. At a lower level, you had the struggle 
of peoples, in both Europe and Asia, resisting the forces of occupation 
and engaging in sabotage and other forms of underground activities, 
sometimes amounting to organized irregular warfare. While the former 
sort of warfare was highly visible and well known, the latter was largely 
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covert and still fairly unknown. Yet, the struggle of subjugated peoples, 
he thought, was at least as important as the war among states.
Though thus well aware of the distinction between the arena 
of inter- state relations and the sphere of popular reaction, Hæstrup 
insisted on entitling his two- volume work on the Danish resistance orga-
nization in the 1943– 45 period Hemmelig alliance (Secret Alliance). This 
had been the original title of his dissertation, but had been rejected by 
the committee set up by Aarhus University on the grounds that alliances 
existed only between states, not between a state and scattered illegal 
groups in another country. When he now revived the title for what he 
presented as a continuation of his dissertation he was stressing the cen-
tral theme of all his work, namely the bond between Danish resistance 
and British efforts in the allied struggle with Nazi Germany. Hemmelig 
alliance appeared on 16 September 1959, the official birthday of the 
freedom council.8 Like the dissertation, it attracted enormous attention, 
from scholars as well as the public. The first print run, of 5,000 copies, 
sold out the day of publication.
After completing a couple of briefer and more specialized treatises, 
Hæstrup started preparing his third major work on Danish reactions to 
German occupation, the first volume of which appeared in 1966 and the 
second in 1971. Entitled . . . til landets bedste (for the good of the coun-
try), it outlined the history of the quasi- governmental functions that the 
permanent heads of the central administration, in the absence of an act-
ing government, carried out from August 1943 to May 1945.9 This work 
represented a departure from the author’s rather exclusive preoccupa-
tion with the resistance movement and showed a novel appreciation 
of the contribution of those who had been responsible for conducting 
Danish relations with the German authorities during the last 20 months 
of the occupation. In Hemmelig alliance, he later noted, he had devoted 
only 20 lines to that side of the story.10 Now he found that the depart-
mental heads, discreetly guided by their political masters, had played a 
part which had been not only essential for the country but, in a way, also 
advantageous for the resistance movement.
In retrospect, Hæstrup now saw the last period of Danish occupa-
tion history as split into two almost entirely separate worlds, of resistance 
managed by the freedom council and of Danish– German negotiations 
conducted by a council of permanent secretaries under political guid-
ance. Acting without constitutional foundation and without prior agree-
ment, those two organs of management had seen Denmark through a 
historic crisis by engaging in a largely involuntary interplay. Despite 
their contradictory tendencies, they had become complementary actors, 
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each depending on the other. On the one hand, organized resistance 
had not only taken Denmark into the camp of the allied powers but had 
also mitigated the adverse political effects of the administration’s lim-
ited cooperation with the enemy. On the other hand, such cooperation 
had not only protected the population against the worst possible effects 
of war and occupation but had also helped to create and sustain the 
conditions that allowed the resistance movement to continue its activ-
ities. While resistance had compensated for cooperation, cooperation 
had shielded resistance.11 Thus Hæstrup, having become a historian of 
the occupation period rather than simply the historian of the resistance 
movement, perceived a concord between two opposite reactions to 
German occupation. Later historians labelled this notion the consensus 
perception of Danish conduct.
Yet, while he paid a handsome tribute to the devotion to duty 
shown by Nils Svenningsen, who as head of the ministry of foreign 
affairs intrepidly had conducted the negotiations with the German min-
ister, and praised several other heads of departments, who discreetly 
had maintained contact with resistance leaders, Hæstrup’s heart was 
still with the resistance movement. Resistance, he asserted, was essen-
tially a home- grown product. Though it developed into a movement 
which received encouragement, instructions and arms from abroad, 
this reaction to German occupation had sprung from the national will. 
Disappointed by the government’s capitulation on 9 April and increas-
ingly frustrated by the presence and pressures of the occupying power, 
individuals across the country, usually acting independently, had found 
some way of expressing their opposition to the occupying power. Soon 
contacts had been established or developed among many like- minded 
people. Gradually, in step with the fortunes of the allied powers in the 
various theatres of war, resistance had taken more active and organized 
forms, eventually developing into something approaching a national 
underground movement. However, despite all the organization and 
reorganization taking place, the movement had remained by nature a 
‘gigantic improvisation’.12
As such, it was subject to continual re- creation. When a group was 
wiped out, whether through killing, arrest or escape, another set of peo-
ple soon appeared to take its place. When a major crisis arose in Danish– 
German relations, as in August 1943 and in the summer of 1944, large 
sections of the population rose impulsively to manifest their opposition 
to the German authorities, mainly by joining street demonstrations and 
strikes. This view of the emergence, development and nature of Danish 
resistance became known among later historians as the spontaneity 
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theory. Both that and the consensus interpretation of cooperation and 
resistance were criticized, and partly refuted, by the next generation of 
post- war historians.
These historians were in a position to examine Hæstrup’s interpre-
tations in historical perspective, and see them as, to some extent, condi-
tioned, on the one hand, by the popular mood prevalent in Denmark in 
the immediate post- war years and, on the other hand, by the East– West 
tensions dominating European international politics in the first decades 
of the cold war. In their view, the consensus interpretation mirrored a 
nation- wide identification with anti- German resistance which gathered 
strength in the last stage of the occupation and reached its highest point 
immediately after the liberation. Likewise, the spontaneity theory rested 
on a profound faith in the democratic instincts and anti- authoritarian 
convictions which inspired the reactions of the Danish people, first, to 
the Nazi occupation during the war and later to the Communist chal-
lenge of the cold war.
In his identification with the patriotic spirit of the people, Hæstrup 
may have overestimated the moral and physical strength of the resis-
tance movement as well as the solidarity of the public support it enjoyed. 
With his ideological orientation towards the Western allies, in the 
world war as well as in the cold war, he could be charged with having 
undervalued the role and influence of the Communists in Danish resis-
tance, especially in its earlier years. Yet, despite the successive waves 
of revisionism that were directed against his story of occupation and 
resistance, Hæstrup’s contribution to the history of the period remains 
monumental.
His writings became points of departure for many other historians. 
In the 1950s he gathered round him in Odense a small, informal group 
of colleagues, friends and former pupils who wanted to take up particu-
lar topics not fully explored in his work. In 1959 a high- powered associ-
ation for the publication of source material and scholarly work relating 
to Denmark’s most recent history (DNH) was set up in Copenhagen with 
him as founding member. The following year he was asked to prepare, 
together with Sven Henningsen and the archivist Johan Hvidtfeldt, a 
research programme for the study of the occupation period in Danish 
history. Once the problems of access to public records and funding of 
research projects had been solved he soon found himself, together 
with Hvidtfeldt, in the role of academic supervisor of the programme. 
As such, he became the principal source of inspiration and encourage-
ment for younger colleagues, most of them educated after the war. He 
exercised his influence on fellow historians more through an infectious 
 
 
 
danIsH re aC t Ions to German oCCuPat Ion142
   142
enthusiasm, seriousness and energy than through the kind of criticism 
that often goes with a more sceptical temperament. As a historian, he 
belonged to the more traditional school. Thus, he showed little interest 
in, or appreciation of, the type of historiography that draws on other 
disciplines too and, for example, combines a conventional historical 
approach and methodology with those of political or social studies.
Hæstrup did, however, venture into comparative studies. In the 
mid- 1950s he discussed with Woodhouse in London and de Jong in 
Amsterdam, head of the Dutch institute for the study of occupation his-
tory, certain ideas which he had formed about joint or collective work 
on the history of the European resistance movements and their political 
importance. Part of his motivation was a conviction that popular resis-
tance, armed rebellion and civil war, which had marked so many coun-
tries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the post- war decades, would 
also be a dominant feature of world politics in the future.
In the later 1950s and the 1960s Hæstrup was an active partici-
pant in international conferences of resistance historians arranged in 
various Western European cities. In 1976 he consolidated his position as 
a historian of European resistance with a book about what had become 
known as the fourth arm. Entitled Den 4. vaabenart, it dealt with the 
main features of the histories of European resistance movements from 
1939 to 1945. Two years later it appeared in an English translation under 
the Churchillian title Europe Ablaze.13
Despite his outstanding contribution to the study of modern 
Danish history, his lively and engaging style of writing and teaching 
and his growing international reputation, Hæstrup found it difficult to 
secure a suitable post in the Danish academic establishment. The faculty 
at Aarhus University, unwilling to offer him a professorship, apparently 
at one stage considered the possibility of finding him a position as aman-
uensis (roughly equal to assistant lecturer).14 Half a dozen years later, in 
1966 when he was 57 years old, he accepted an offer of a lectureship in 
history at a new university launched in Odense. There he remained till 
he retired.
Among those post- war historians, and other writers, who sub-
scribed to the notion of cooperation and resistance complementing 
each other, but presented that relationship more from the perspective 
of the politicians responsible for formulating and conducting the policy 
of limited cooperation than from the angle of the resistance movement, 
the foremost case was that of the Social Democratic academic Hartvig 
Frisch. Having read history and classical philology at Copenhagen 
University, taught high school for several years and won a seat in 
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parliament in 1926, he soon established himself as a leading intellectual 
of his party. As a prolific writer, on classical as well as contemporary 
topics, and a popular lecturer, he also became a major figure in Danish 
intellectual life of the inter- war period.
An important step towards his position of influential ideologist 
and political front figure in the major governing party was the publica-
tion in 1933 of Pest over Europa: Bolshevisme – Fascisme – Nazisme, which 
became Frisch’s most famous book.15 Dedicated to Thorvald Stauning, 
leader of the party and prime minister, on his sixtieth birthday, it was 
not merely a highly readable history of the emergence, rise and estab-
lishment of three ideological and political movements that were domi-
nating much of Europe in the late 1930s. It was also a forceful attack on 
totalitarian ideas and governments and a spirited defence of democratic 
politics. As such, the book represented, in terms of the split between 
Communists and Social Democrats in Danish politics, a clear commit-
ment to the processes of parliamentary democracy and a rejection of 
all ideas of a proletarian dictatorship. The book became highly influen-
tial, especially among the younger Social Democratic leaders. However, 
many of those reading its Nordic Preface may have been more impressed 
with the author’s call for political cooperation among the working- class 
parties of the Nordic countries than with its tentative suggestions for 
a strengthening of the military means of protecting those democracies 
against pressures from neighbouring dictatorships, whether in the east 
or the south.
Six years later, after the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
four major political parties set up a committee of eight to facilitate par-
liamentary cooperation. The Social Democrats were represented by 
Hedtoft- Hansen, prominent among the younger leaders of the party, and 
Hartvig Frisch. The committee of nine, formed a few months after the 
German invasion to secure the continued cooperation of the five demo-
cratic parties, again had Frisch as a member. However, his reputation as 
the author of Pest over Europa and various articles directed against fas-
cism and Nazism together with his performance in parliament made his 
position increasingly precarious. Shortly after a speech in parliament in 
November 1940, in which he berated the Danish Nazis, he decided, after 
consulting Stauning, to resign his posts as group chairman and spokes-
man of the party. In the summer of 1941 the Germans ordered him to 
stop his public lecturing activities. The following years he kept a very 
low profile in the political debate. While fully supporting the govern-
mental policy of negotiating and cooperating with the occupying power, 
he devoted most of his energy to scholarly pursuits.
 
 
 
danIsH re aC t Ions to German oCCuPat Ion144
   144
The official reason for Frisch’s resignation from his party posts 
was that he wished to complete a doctoral dissertation that he had been 
working on for a couple of years. Only a few months later he was able 
to submit his work to the department of philosophy at Copenhagen 
University. At the subsequent public examination the dissertation, 
which dealt with the constitution of ancient Athens, received praise for 
being of interest to both classical philologists and historians. Almost 
immediately he was appointed to a vacant chair in classical philosophy 
at Copenhagen University. The rest of the war he spent most of his time 
on research, writing and teaching. Now and then, however, he was able 
to publish an article or deliver a lecture which, while formally dealing 
with some classical topic, had an obvious and pointed relevance to the 
contemporary situation of his country.
Despite his anti- Nazi writings, lectures and speeches in the 1930s 
and early 1940s, Frisch never engaged in active resistance to the occu-
pying power. When Frode Jakobsen began to build up the resistance 
organization that became known as the Ring, one of the first people he 
approached for support was Frisch. In a brief conversation in the late 
summer of 1941 Frisch, initially under the impression that the plan 
merely was to start a new association of Social Democratic students 
and academics, immediately welcomed the initiative and promised his 
support. But when Jakobsen made it clear that the idea of the proposed 
organization was to go beyond stepping up intellectual and cultural 
opposition to the accommodating policy of the government and, even-
tually, engage in direct resistance to the Germans, he reacted strongly. 
According to Jakobsen’s recollection, Frisch even seemed scared of such 
a prospect, and heatedly pointed out that it was neither governmental 
nor Social Democratic policy, and could hurt the country greatly. If that 
was what Jakobsen had in mind, Frisch added, he was not the man to 
get hold of. Instead he referred Jakobsen to men like Christmas Møller.16
When Frisch, both then and later, refused to engage in active resis-
tance he seems unlikely to have taken his stand out of fear of what might 
happen to him and his family. Although, as an intellectual, he may have 
been a man of moral rather than of physical courage, his uncompro-
mising anti- Nazi record shows him as being far from faint- hearted. His 
reasons for remaining passive seem to have been partly philosophical 
convictions and partly political considerations.
In several lectures about the political interaction of the city states 
of ancient Greece which he delivered in the early years of the occupation, 
Frisch focused on the phenomenon of power. Drawing on Thucydides, 
he rehearsed the argument that justice could be attained only between 
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roughly equally strong states. As relations between powerful and impe-
rialistic Athens and small and neutral Melos had shown, to oppose and 
resist a vastly superior power could lead a state to loss of independence 
and even extinction.17
To this realistic observation Frisch later added an essentially 
moral argument against active resistance. After the growth of sab-
otage, the abdication of the government and the establishment of the 
freedom council, he made a speech to first- year students at Copenhagen 
University in which he warned against resorting to the use of force. For a 
small nation in Denmark’s present situation there were two ways ahead, 
he told the students. One was to stay within the law and strive to main-
tain and consolidate Danish democratic culture; another to adopt the 
policy of power, albeit in the inverted and distorted form forced upon 
the weaker party, and follow the law of vengeance, the law of the jun-
gle. While recognizing that the latter course had the attraction of being 
active, violent, romantic and courageous, he firmly rejected it as ‘secret 
anarchical terrorism’. Making it clear that he was referring to sabotage, 
he mentioned with loathing a recent such act which had cost three lives 
and endangered hundreds of Danes. As always, Frisch’s appeal to his 
students to respect the law rested on faith in reason and humanism.18
The biographer of Frisch, while acknowledging the classical writ-
ings and analogies on which he based his philosophy of power and 
recognizing the rationalist ideology from which he derived his argumen-
tation, found that there might be also a simpler reason for his rejection 
of illegal resistance to the occupying power. Frisch, he explained, was 
the Social Democrats’ man. His political thought was conditioned by the 
legalism and the sense of responsibility which the party, in its pursuit 
of social welfare and its identification with the national interest, had 
developed in the 1930s – a process in which Frisch himself had played a 
significant part. Accordingly, he shared the party’s commitment to keep-
ing the national institutions intact, and accepted the Social Democratic 
view that this could be achieved only by accommodating the Germans, 
not through active resistance.19
A further party- political reason for Frisch’s antagonism to the resis-
tance movement and most of its activities may be found in his relation-
ship with the Communists. In his youth, when he had been concerned 
about the split developing in the working class, he had maintained 
personal contact with some Communist circles. In the 1930s, however, 
a rupture had occurred in his relationship with DKP. Since then the 
Communists had treated him as their major tactical enemy, and he had 
built up a considerable resentment against them. When Communists, a 
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few years into the occupation, took the lead in carrying out sabotage and 
organizing strikes, they became the foremost opponents of Frisch and 
other champions of the policy of cooperating with the Germans. Now he 
rarely missed an opportunity to assail them.20
After the rupture in Danish– German relations in 1943 Frisch 
maintained his line, still appealing to reason and common sense and 
calling for national solidarity, without resistance. At a conference of 
Social Democratic leaders and deputies shortly after the mass strikes in 
the summer of 1944, he discussed the role of the party after liberation. 
Presenting the resistance movement as the principal threat to the bright 
prospects of post- war Denmark, he referred to the ‘epidemic of murder’ 
that had raged in the country since the breakdown of law and order. In 
the same speech, he described the freedom council, despite the respect it 
had gained among the allies, as a stranger in Danish democracy.21
At the same time, he was taking steps to prepare the case that 
the party would present after the war in defence of its policy and con-
duct during the occupation. As early as the autumn of 1943 the Social 
Democratic leadership had started to plan a major historical publication 
about Denmark during the occupation. Frisch had been appointed editor- 
in- chief and principal contributor. Once the plan had been approved and 
the authors, all respectable Social Democrats, selected, he could begin 
to collect documentary material and think about the contents of the 
work. One of the biggest problems facing him was how to explain the 
collapse of the policy of cooperation in August 1943. Rejecting the idea 
that it was the resistance movement which had undermined popular 
support for the government and its conduct, he found the principal cause 
in developments in other European countries that summer. The fall of 
Mussolini in July had led to major strikes in Italy, which had spread to 
other countries, including Denmark, he explained in a speech to party 
members late in December.22 About the same time he prepared a lecture 
on the Nordic countries and the war, which he gave in many parts of the 
country during the last 18 months of the occupation. Serving as a pre-
liminary sketch for his contribution to the major work projected, it again 
presented developments in Denmark, and the other Nordic countries, in 
an international political context.
In May, only about a week after the liberation of Denmark, Frisch 
gave a talk in which he, in the words of his biographer, laid down the 
double strategy which would guide him through the political diffi-
culties of the following period. While now fully acknowledging the 
efforts of the resistance movement, he warned against letting the 
glowing tribute to the members of that movement eclipse the very 
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great contribution that had been made in the first years of the war 
by those responsible for establishing and maintaining national and 
democratic solidarity. As a result of their efforts, Danish Nazism ‘had 
been ridden to death’ and a Quisling form of government prevented.23 
Five days later he flew to America to help present the Danish case for 
membership of the United Nations. In addition to Frisch, who had been 
elected by the parliamentary parties, the Danish delegation to the San 
Francisco conference included professor Erik Husfeldt, selected by the 
freedom council, and Henrik Kauffmann, the wartime ambassador in 
Washington. During the following two years Frisch participated ener-
getically in the work of the new institution as a delegate to its General 
Assembly.
While he managed to follow his double strategy on the interna-
tional scene, in the domestic politics of post- war Denmark Frisch occa-
sionally found himself in the role of outspoken critic of the resistance 
movement. Thus, he reacted negatively to popular efforts to ‘purge’ not 
only outright collaborators but also people responsible for the politics 
and administration of the country up to 29 August, and was particularly 
scathing about the vengeful passion with which some members of the 
resistance movement and, not least, many of its latter- day supporters 
pursued the drive. In a radio interview in August 1945 he drew an unfor-
tunate parallel between events in the streets of Copenhagen after 5 May 
and what he had seen in Italy in the years before the fascists’ march 
towards Rome in 1922.
Later in that interview he made some even more offensive remarks. 
He started by saying that he, in speeches both in the United States and 
after his return, had paid due respect to the resistance movement for 
its military resistance, but went on to argue that the movement in cer-
tain of its practices would one day have to submit to historical critique 
of its record. After all, the movement had for months been busy tearing 
to pieces the political parties for their policy, even though that, too, was 
a policy of resistance, only carried out under other conditions and by 
other means. The practice he singled out for condemnation was the liq-
uidation of informers. Asserting that, if he had been a member of the 
freedom council, he would have been against this kind of action, on the 
grounds that it could have led to a German campaign of terror against 
the population, he described the executions of the infamous informers 
as pure and simple murder – in the form in which they had taken place, 
he added.24
As Frisch must have expected, the broadcasting of the interview 
led to an outcry in the press and sharp reactions from spokesmen of 
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the resistance movement. The newspapers, which immediately after 
the liberation had joined in the general glorification of that movement, 
could not have been happy when he, in the course of the interview, 
reminded them that they practically all had been solidly in support 
of the cautious and protective line taken by the politicians during the 
occupation. Now they reacted by highlighting his most audacious com-
ments and generally dissociating themselves from his censure of the 
resistance movement.
The papers also opened their correspondence columns to read-
ers with something to say on the topics Frisch had raised so provoc-
atively. Naturally, spokesmen of the resistance movement reacted 
strongly to what they recognized as an attempt to criminalize the liq-
uidation of informers, maintaining that such acts could be both nec-
essary and justified in what was essentially a situation of war. Mogens 
Fog, speaking at the 29 August commemoration of those killed by the 
Germans and their helpers during the occupation, took up a more gen-
eral point made by Frisch in his recent interview. To say or imply that 
the active form of resistance grew out of a passive form, and thus pres-
ent the reactions to occupation in terms of continuation and harmony, 
amounted to a falsification of history, Fog explained. Both before and 
after 29 August there were two quite different attitudes to the occu-
pying power, each with its own view of what in the long run would 
benefit the soul of the people and the welfare of the country. Frisch, 
clinging to the policy of accommodation, had never understood, Fog 
asserted, the spirit that had carried the fight in Denmark through to a 
moral and real victory.25
Another weighty contribution to the debate was a long letter in 
the one- time illegal paper Information from Lis Jacobsen, an influential 
intellectual and close friend of Frisch. She acknowledged the consis-
tency of his attitude and the coherence of his argumentation and paid 
tribute to his moral courage in openly and publicly giving his reasons, 
but rejected as deeply unjust the association he had made between the 
post- war activities of the resistance movement and the antics of early 
Italian fascism. She went on to defend the wartime activities of the resis-
tance, including liquidation of informers which had been necessary. 
Finally, she told him very directly that his concern from beginning to 
end had been to behave as a faithful Social Democrat, which had led him 
to accept uncritically the party’s conception of its role and duty during 
the war.26
Frisch got the last word in that particular debate. In a postscript to 
his Tænkt og talt under Krigen (Thought and said during the war), a book 
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he published the following month, he clarified his position. Summing 
up his assessment of the political development during the occupation, 
he wrote,
It is my deepest conviction that if the majority of responsible Danes 
had not stayed at their post to the end, and carried out their duty 
to serve the population, the illegal movement would not have been 
able to do its job to the extent it did. And, if the military achieve-
ments of the underground movement are to remain standing as 
a true memorial in the history of Denmark, it must be possible to 
direct criticism also at events which will never attract the united 
support of the public.27
However, Frisch’s foremost contribution to the consensual interpre-
tation of the period of Danish history was Danmark besat og befriet 
(Denmark occupied and liberated), the major work planned by the 
Social Democratic leaders soon after August 1943. Designed as a schol-
arly project with a broad popular appeal, it had a political purpose, 
namely to justify the line of cooperation pursued by official Denmark 
and, in particular, to defend the role played by the Social Democrats. 
The first volume, written by Frisch, appeared in the autumn of 1945 and 
took the story up to the eve of 29 August.
In presenting the case for the governmental policy of those years, 
Frisch dissociated himself from the line adopted by Scavenius when he 
became foreign minister in July 1940. Convinced that Germany would 
win the war and devoid of illusions about Danish neutrality, Scavenius 
had deemed it to be in the national interest to engage in active coop-
eration with the occupying power, and had declared his willingness to 
do so. Frisch labelled this policy ‘collaboration’, and found that Danish 
policy at that stage, when Germany was at the height of its power, had 
been motivated by opportunism. Here, however, he made a distinction 
between an opportunism enforced by perceived necessity and one moti-
vated by desire and applied by choice. While Scavenius and his support-
ers in the government had been moved by an opportunism of the former 
kind, a number of individuals, mostly not in official positions and typi-
cally of anti- parliamentarian persuasions, had been guilty of the latter 
kind when they cultivated representatives of the occupying power.28
The policy of less deliberate and more limited cooperation 
favoured by the Social Democratic leaders and ministers was motivated 
more by prudence. Frisch presented it as a tactical measure, designed 
to prepare for a managed rupture of diplomatic and political relations 
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with the occupying power. In support of his interpretation, he quoted 
a speech by Hedtoft- Hansen in February 1941, after the Germans had 
forced him and H.C. Hansen to resign their posts within their party. 
Addressing the party’s executive committee and parliamentary group, 
Hedtoft- Hansen asked rhetorically how long the apparently unprinci-
pled practice of humouring the Germans could go on. It was political 
tactics, he explained, partly aimed at an expected rupture of the rela-
tionship, preferably brought about jointly by all the democratic parties, 
and partly intended to prevent the formation of a Nazi government, 
which would force the country into partnership with the Axis powers. 
Those words, Frisch suggested, clearly expressed the special Danish 
complex of problems, which had not come to a head till 1943, when it 
reached a conclusion through the electoral victory in the spring and the 
final rupture in the autumn – after the Danish Nazis had been ridden 
to death. This connection between compromises with the Germans and 
fight against Nazism, he concluded, should always be kept in mind if one 
wanted to understand Danish democratic politics.29
Later historians have taken Frisch to task for quoting selectively 
from Hedtoft- Hansen’s speech and creating the impression that he was 
looking for a rupture of relations with the Germans, whereas the speech 
read as whole shows that he did not want such an outcome. Like other 
Social Democratic leaders, and indeed Frisch himself, he preferred to 
continue the existing relationship with the Germans till the end of the 
occupation. Frisch has also been accused of exaggerating the danger of a 
Nazi take- over in his attempt to justify the policy of the government and 
the party. By such means, he managed to convey a degree of continuity 
between the policy of cooperation in the earlier period and the rise of 
resistance in the last years of the occupation, and to suggest some com-
plementarity between the endeavours of the politicians and the activi-
ties of the resistance movement.
Frisch’s identification with the policy of cooperation – or the pol-
icy of negotiation as he preferred to call it – and his adherence to the 
fiction of neutrality were revealed most clearly in his chapter about the 
sabotage that started in the summer and autumn of 1942. Discussing 
the reluctant reactions of the Danish population to Christmas Møller’s 
call for sabotage broadcast by the BBC in September, he found that 
Christmas Møller had come to be seen as a man who, after starting his 
time in London as a Danish patriot, had developed into an English pro-
pagandist, who no longer considered the interest Denmark had in main-
taining law and order. If Danish policy should be changed, which might 
well be a possibility, the decision should be taken, Frisch added, by king, 
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government and parliament and not by irresponsible private individu-
als. He went on to discuss Vilhelm Buhl’s radio appeal to the popula-
tion, broadcast some days before Christmas Møller’s BBC talk, in which 
the prime minister warned of the serious consequences a continuation 
of sabotage might have and urged members of the public to assist the 
authorities in the clearing up of such evil acts. Pointing out that Buhl’s 
appeal should be seen in the context of its time, Frisch explained that 
it was all a matter of policy, and that a policy must rest on a morality. 
If Denmark should go on having a government, he concluded, it would 
have to be able to maintain the legal order of the country.30
The two further volumes of Danmark besat og befriet did not 
appear till three years later. The middle volume, written by 17 mostly 
prominent Social Democrats, dealt with economic and cultural aspects 
of the occupation. The third volume, again written by Frisch, presented 
the political history from 29 August 1943 to the liberation of Denmark 
20 months later. Drawing on very many sources that had become avail-
able in the meantime, and which may have produced little evidence in 
support of his construct of a deliberate rupture by the party leaders of 
Danish– German relations, he did not elaborate, and seems totally to 
have abandoned this interpretation. He did, however, continue to pres-
ent the politicians, and their discreet activities under the informal lead-
ership of Buhl in the new situation, in a favourable light.
In Frisch’s attitude to the resistance movement there was a marked 
change. While still highly critical of the injustice of liquidations, scath-
ing about the provocative effects of what he called the policy of demon-
stration pursued by sections of the illegal press and reluctant to credit 
the freedom council with the management of the general strikes in 
1944, he now found it easier to accept what he called active resistance. 
Noting the tacit approval by the political parties and the legal press of 
sabotage in the months after August 1943, he paid tribute to the courage 
of the young people engaged in that activity and to the efficiency of the 
men who issued the orders.31 Later, dealing with the last months of the 
war, he described with some enthusiasm the wave of intense and effec-
tive sabotage of railways and factories in the months from New Year 
1945 to the German capitulation, and deemed it the most brilliant mil-
itary contribution of active Danish resistance.32 Along the way, Frisch 
also found a way of correcting the impression left by his speech to first- 
year students at Copenhagen University in November 1943. His passion-
ate denunciation of ‘secret anarchical terrorism’, he could now explain, 
had referred to reckless acts endangering innocent lives, not to strategic 
sabotage.33
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While the first volume of the work had focused on the relationship 
between the Danish government and the German authorities, in this 
volume Frisch paid increasing attention to relations between official 
Denmark and the growing resistance movement, in particular between 
politicians of the dormant coalition government and members of the 
increasingly influential freedom council.
In tracing the emergence of that body, he quoted with emphatic 
approval Erling Foss, a founding member of the council, who in the sum-
mer of 1943 had warned of the dangers of getting at cross purposes with 
the political parties, who ‘at heart work along the same lines’.34 In dis-
cussing the later work of the freedom council, Frisch paid tribute to the 
influence of Herman Dedichen, who became an important contact and 
mediator between the council and the party leaders, especially Hedtoft- 
Hansen and Buhl, and departmental heads. Noting that earlier attempts 
by the freedom council to secure permanent representation of the 
principal political parties had been rejected because neither the Social 
Democrats nor the Conservatives wanted to compromise the legality 
of their parties, Frisch admitted that the general strikes in the sum-
mer of 1944 had demonstrated the need for a formal link between the 
two sides. Overcoming the animosity, suspicions and jealousy that had 
affected the party’s relations with ‘those anonymous men who so boldly 
acted as a Danish government’, the Social Democratic leaders decided 
at a meeting in July to establish the necessary contact. They realized, 
he explained, that, unless such a connection was established, the col-
lapse of Germany ‘would present them with a dualism which could be 
extremely dangerous both for the country and for its democratic system 
of government’.35 The Conservatives reached a similar decision. Thus, 
in August H.C. Hansen and Aksel Møller could join two members of the 
freedom council to form a contact committee of the council.
The theme of the concluding passages of the book was the connec-
tion between the policy carried on by the government and administra-
tion and the course chosen by the resistance movement. Surveying the 
immediate reactions of the leading Danish newspapers to the liberation 
in May 1945, Frisch quoted from what he described as a clear and well- 
balanced article in Socialdemokraten by Peder Tabor, one of the authors 
of the second volume of his work. Before 29 August there was no real 
cooperation between the legal political circles and the resistance move-
ment, the author noted. Yet, in actual fact, there was a kind of division 
of labour between the two parties. Each acting in its own way and by its 
own means, they held different sections of the front in a struggle with a 
common goal. After 29 August, contact between the politicians and the 
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freedom council was soon established, in response to external as well as 
internal needs of the country.36 The doubleness at the heart of this view 
of the history of the five years of occupation characterized also the inter-
pretation presented by Frisch, at this stage of his life.
Rather than opposing cooperation and resistance in his analysis, 
he distinguished between passive and active, or legal and illegal, oppo-
sition to the occupying power, and asserted that they had supplemented 
each other in a way which had served the country very well. In assessing 
the importance of the illegal struggle, he moved from the political and 
legal to the cultural and psychological level. The national rally and cul-
tural solidarity of the early years, when the power of Hitlerism had been 
at its highest point, had been a mild and quiet power, a sign of high cul-
ture. However, though a wonderful experience, it had not been enough. 
The underground struggle for freedom had brought its completion, 
namely virility. The problem, as always, had been to balance the virtues 
of peaceful culture against the force of virile nature.
As so often when dealing with a basic issue of politics and moral-
ity, Frisch turned to classical writers, and once again drew on the wis-
dom of Socrates. Quoting from Plato’s Politicos, he presented a debate 
between the young Socrates and an unnamed stranger which turned 
on the contrast between sober- mindedness and bravery. This contrast, 
Plato said, could divide a people and lead to deep enmity. Each quality, 
if unchecked and carried to the extreme, could lead to loss of freedom 
for the state. As Frisch now saw it, that issue had been at the heart of 
Denmark’s difficulties both before, during and after the occupation. By 
its spirit and action, the resistance movement struggling for freedom 
had helped save the country from the dangers of annihilation inherent 
in the pursuit of internal and external peace and quiet at any price. On 
the other hand, there was the danger of bellicose inclinations and exces-
sive heroism leading to enmity and hostilities with powerful neighbours. 
Drawing on the experience gained and writing at the outset of the cold 
war, Frisch concluded that the task for the present as well as the future 
of the country was to find the optimal combination of sober- mindedness 
and bravery – prudence and courage.37
By the time this volume appeared, the author was minister of edu-
cation in a minority government formed late in 1947 by Hans Hedtoft (as 
he now called himself). Frisch remained in office till late in 1949, when 
he became seriously ill. He died a few months later, 57 years old.
In their contributions to the history of Denmark under occupation, 
Jørgen Hæstrup and Hartvig Frisch set out from opposite positions but 
moved closer to each other. Hæstrup started as a committed historian of 
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the resistance movement but eventually embraced also the administra-
tive relations with the German authorities after 29 August, in that way 
ending up more as a historian of the occupation years. Frisch began as an 
intellectual and politician devoted to the cause of the Social Democratic 
party and the policy of the coalition government but gradually acknowl-
edged the role of the resistance movement, eventually focusing his 
attention on the relationship between different reactions to occupation.
Both writers found a synthesis of the conduct of the government 
and the activities of the resistance. For Hæstrup, well aware of the con-
flict between accommodation and resistance, it took the form of a com-
promise, between the line favoured by the politicians and the course 
pursued by the leaders of the resistance. For Frisch, eager to reconcile 
the position taken by his party, the government and the rest of official 
Denmark in the earlier years with the attitude adopted by the people 
towards the end of the war, the synthesis found expression in the notion 
of continuity, between legal and passive opposition and illegal and 
active resistance.38 They broadly shared the notion of a complementar-
ity of limited cooperation and active resistance and the image of a nation 
united in the pursuit of freedom. Thus, Hæstrup and Frisch may be seen 
as fathers of the consensus interpretation of occupation history.
Their interpretations of recent history reflected the general mood 
of the Danish population in the period of liberation. After years of sup-
pressing deeply rooted anti- German feelings and hiding growing pro- 
allied sympathies, and with the ignominious memory of 9 April 1940 
still in mind, most Danes were able to enjoy the ecstasy of May 1945, and 
perhaps even share the triumph of victory sweeping through Western 
Europe when the Germans finally capitulated. Other Danes, by now 
aware of having been clinging too long to governmental policy and hav-
ing been less than forthcoming in their support for the resistance move-
ment or perhaps, in some cases, even having something to hide about 
their past conduct, had their own reasons for joining in the general jubi-
lation. Whether moved by relief and triumph or more by regret and even 
shame, the bulk of the population experienced a rush of patriotic emo-
tions, which turned into a wave of national solidarity broad enough to 
submerge, for a while, most recent divisions of policy and attitude.
The consensus interpretation was also conditioned by the interests 
and concerns of the principal actors on the political and social scene 
of post- war Denmark. For the major parties and their leaders, eager to 
reassert their authority in the country, the notions of complementarity 
of cooperation and resistance, and of continuity between passive and 
active opposition, were welcome representations. So they were for much 
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of the rest of official Denmark, including the royal family, the central 
and local administration, the armed forces, the remains of the police 
force and the major economic organizations, many of whose representa-
tives felt that the difficulties they had faced during the occupation often 
had not been fully appreciated by the public they represented. Even for 
the resistance movement and its leaders there were advantages of a his-
torical interpretation which stressed the quality of concord between dif-
ferent reactions to the occupation. It not only served to legitimize the 
existence and wartime activities of that movement but also presented it 
as the spearhead of opposition to the Germans, thus reducing the gov-
ernment and politicians to a preparatory function and secondary posi-
tion in the struggle.
In the post- war months the foremost manifestation of compromise 
and consensus between the two sides was the composition of the lib-
eration government, half politicians and half resistance leaders. Even 
in subsequent years there was some correspondence between the his-
torical interpretation and the political situation of the country. From 
the later 1940s, Danish politics were conditioned externally by global 
tension between the superpowers and their allies, East– West division 
of Germany and Europe, and Danish membership of the US- led military 
alliance NATO. In such circumstances, the consensus theory of recent 
history had certain advantages, both as a means of coming to terms with 
the immediate past and as a guide in dealing with the current situation 
of the country. First, it rested, implicitly or explicitly, on a firm commit-
ment to the democratic form of government, as developed in Denmark 
and other Nordic countries since the nineteenth century. Second, it was 
directed against Nazi Germany and its supporters and sympathizers in 
Denmark. Both Hæstrup and Frisch excluded collaborators from their 
analysis and interpretation of occupation history. Even Scavenius, with 
his policy of willing and active cooperation with the Germans, was 
considered beyond the pale. Third, the consensus construction gave 
less than full credit to the crucial work of the Communists in the resis-
tance. Frisch’s account was coloured by a degree of animosity towards 
the Communist party, the long- standing rival of the Social Democrats in 
the competition for working- class support. Hæstrup’s focus on the link 
between SOE and Danish resistance gave his treatment of the period a 
marked list towards the Western allies.
Thus, in relation to both domestic and international politics, the 
consensus interpretation of Denmark’s occupation history was not out 
of tune with the circumstances prevailing in the post- war years and the 
first decades of the cold war. For a long time, it remained the standard 
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interpretation. It characterized various other scholarly works about that 
period, whether written by historians, journalists or politicians, and 
influenced many personal memoirs as well as numerous works of post- 
war fiction. Thus, it played a decisive part in the shaping of the nation’s 
collective memory of its most traumatic experience in the twentieth cen-
tury. It was not till the 1970s that a younger set of professional historians 
first challenged the consensus construction.
3.2. Conflict
Jørgen Hæstrup and Hartvig Frisch, and other writers of the post- war 
decades who had lived through the occupation, had experienced the 
conflicts that had divided the nation during much of the war and had 
also followed the developments that had shaped public opinion after the 
liberation. Their writings, whether motivated by a duty to honour the 
resistance movement or a concern to justify the political leaders, may 
be seen as attempts to come to terms with political and moral issues 
which had been raised by years of Nazi occupation, and which still were 
troubling the nation. In their search for a synthesis of cooperation and 
resistance, they tended to pass lightly over the political passivity and 
national introspection which had characterized most of the dismal first 
years after the invasion. Sometimes they were also inclined to gloss over 
the deepening divisions that had marked politics and society in the dra-
matic year leading up to the turning- point in Danish– German relations. 
They preferred to highlight the patriotic spirit and national solidarity 
that had come to the fore in the invigorating last period of the occupa-
tion, and had carried Denmark through the liberation and into the post- 
war period.
Most of the next generation of historians had only childhood mem-
ories of the occupation, and knew its history mainly from the writings 
and teaching of their elders. Not so influenced by the résistancialism, 
which in Denmark, as in other occupied countries, had coloured most 
post- war thinking about recent history, they were freer than earlier 
writers to scrutinize critically the efforts of resistance and to examine 
dispassionately the policy of cooperation. Sceptical about the notion of a 
national concord of opposition, they were able to recognize the conflict 
between opposite reactions to German occupation. Highly professional 
in their approach, they questioned various assumptions made and chal-
lenged some findings reached by the first scholars in the field. Thus they 
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helped to dispel certain myths which for some time had seemed set to 
become part of the national heritage.
The revisionist wave got off to a dramatic start with a doctoral dis-
sertation submitted to Odense University in 1971 by Aage Trommer, a 
member of the private group of former pupils, colleagues and friends 
formed round Hæstrup, and inspired by him to explore various aspects 
of occupation history.39 Since 1960 Trommer had been researching the 
history of resistance in south Jutland, the part of Denmark known as 
region 3 in SOE’s division of the country. In the course of this work, he 
had developed a special interest in sabotage, particularly railway sabo-
tage, and had decided to carry out a separate study of this form of resis-
tance, not only in that region but in all of Jutland and other parts of the 
country.
His aim was to assess the military significance to the allied pow-
ers of the railway sabotage carried out in Denmark during the Second 
World War. The assumption had always been that the two most import-
ant Danish contributions to the allied cause were the supply of military 
and political intelligence throughout the war and the anti- German sabo-
tage in the last period of the occupation. Earlier writers dealing with the 
subject, foremost among them Hæstrup, had asserted, or assumed, that 
sabotage of the railway system had been an activity of considerable tac-
tical significance, primarily because it delayed the transport of German 
troops from Denmark, or from Norway through Denmark, to various 
theatres of war south of the country. Sabotage leaders, including Vagn 
Bennike and Anton Toldstrup in Jutland, had expressed similar views, 
reinforcing their convictions with quotations from statements or mes-
sages from allied sources. Thus, Bennike could quote ‘a high- ranking 
British officer’ who had told him that, while earlier it had been assumed 
that the Germans could take two divisions through Jutland in a month, 
after the sabotage had reached its peak that figure had been reduced 
to only half a division.40 Such writers, whether historians or resistance 
leaders, could also argue that the reactions of the Germans had demon-
strated just how important it was for the occupying power to prevent or 
suppress such acts of sabotage.
In an attempt to verify claims of this nature, Trommer carried out 
a statistical examination of the effects of railway sabotage in Denmark. 
His most important primary sources were the archives of the Danish 
State Railways (DSB), which included timetables, lists of traffic move-
ments, surveys of completed movements and reports of acts of sabo-
tage, whether expected or carried out. To help him identify the army 
units carried, he used German military archives (available in the Danish 
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national archives). Supplementary sources included a number of illegal 
wartime archives, including Vagn Bennike’s, as well as some post- war 
reports provided by former members of the resistance movement.
Linking the identity of the German units carried by rail with the 
delays and disturbance caused by sabotage, he found that the effect had 
usually been minimal and the tactical importance nearly always insig-
nificant. In his analysis, he applied a distinction used by the British in 
the development of their tactics of serial bombardment, between attri-
tion and interception. The principle of attrition, aimed at the gradual 
wearing down of the general capacity of the railway system through 
numerous local actions, had been behind a good deal of Danish sabo-
tage. However, it had proved practically ineffectual. To hold up German 
traffic that way, Trommer explained, was like trying to shoot an ele-
phant with the pellets of an airgun.
The way of interception, designed to stop or delay certain traffic 
at a particular place and time, had been potentially more promising. 
But it required reliable advance information about the nature and tim-
ing of individual German movements as well as careful planning and 
coordination of the action required. To meet those conditions had rarely 
been possible. Except for two acts of sabotage, one in early February and 
another in mid- April 1945, which had created delays of possible tacti-
cal importance, such sabotage, he concluded, seemed to have had little 
effect on German movements.
Some of the responsibility for the poor result, he pointed out, lay 
with SOE, whose officers might not fully have thought out the tactics 
of railway sabotage. While encouraging and supporting such activities 
in the occupied countries, they also seemed to have failed to set up the 
organizational framework for effective sabotage of the intercepting 
kind. It was even possible, he suggested, that SOE, known to have been 
engaged in rivalry with other military bodies in Britain, for reasons of 
its own might have been inclined to exaggerate the importance for the 
allied cause of anti- German sabotage in general.41
Trommer stressed that his investigation was confined to the mil-
itary effects of railway sabotage, and admitted that a detailed exam-
ination of the political or of the moral and ideological results of such 
sabotage might lead to different conclusions. Yet, in a postscript, he did 
touch upon the political importance of sabotage. In regard to domes-
tic politics, he discussed its possible effects in the crisis of August 1943. 
Rejecting the common view that it was sabotage, of various kinds, which 
had triggered off the strike movement of that month, he asserted that 
it was only one among several possible factors leading to the strikes. 
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The primary significance of sabotage in that particular political context, 
he suggested, was to help prepare minds, on both the Danish and the 
German side, for recognizing that the days of the policy of negotiation 
were fast running out.42
In the international political context, too, it was difficult to sepa-
rate sabotage from other influences at work. In Danish relations with 
the Soviet Union this form of resistance, in the earlier period very much 
the work of Communists, might have played a part in securing repre-
sentation for the ‘fighting Denmark’ in Moscow, but apparently was not 
important enough to gain Soviet recognition of the state as a de facto 
ally. In relations with the Western allies, he concluded tentatively, sab-
otage was no more important than supply of intelligence and formation 
of military groups, both of which occasionally seemed to enjoy priority 
in allied military control and planning. Another factor of possible signif-
icance, he noted, might have been the anti- German and pro- allied atti-
tude of the Danish public.
The public defence of the dissertation, which attracted about 800 
people and lasted five hours, caused a stir. The candidate not only had 
to deal with the normal academic scrutiny of sources, methods and find-
ings. Born in 1930, he also had to face verbal attacks and sarcastic com-
ments from former members of the resistance movement, who could not 
reconcile his judgements on their work with their own recollections and 
convictions. Tage Kaarsted, an officially appointed opponent, and others 
criticized him strongly for having based his work almost entirely on sta-
tistics and contemporary reports, when so many of the actors involved 
were still alive and available. Another professor wondered whether 
railway sabotage had not been of military significance by tying down 
German troops who could have been useful at the fronts. Trommer 
denied this, arguing that the soldiers patrolling and guarding tracks 
and stations had been useless convalescents, but admitted that he had 
not examined this matter closely. The more passionate reactions to the 
dissertation came from former freedom fighters and others who identi-
fied with the resistance movement. They aimed their criticism mainly at 
the candidate’s lack of personal experience of resistance. ‘Unfortunately, 
sir,’ Jens Toldstrup said pointedly about his work, ‘you have overlooked 
the fact that a war was going on.’ 43
Two years later came Trommer’s Modstandsarbejde i nærbillede 
(resistance activities close- up), a detailed account of the emergence, 
development and organization of the resistance in region 3.  The sec-
tions dealing with the growth of resistance there cast a new light on 
recruitment for illegal work. Indeed, the author explicitly contradicted 
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the notion of spontaneous recruitment advanced by Hæstrup. Thus, by 
implication, he dealt a blow to the conception of a people united in active 
or potential struggle with the occupying power, which was inherent in 
the consensual interpretation of occupation history.
Trommer showed convincingly that the typical origins of the resis-
tance movement were not spontaneous reactions of numerous lone indi-
viduals exasperated by foreign occupation, but willing engagement of 
a limited number of members of certain political parties. On the whole, 
such activists came from the towns, while people rooted in the coun-
tryside gained a reputation for being more passive and, for a long time, 
reluctant to become engaged. Yet, even in the towns, until well into 1943, 
it was only a small number who became actively involved. The political 
parties to which most of them were affiliated were on the extremes of the 
political spectrum, the Communists on the left and Danish Unity and an 
activist wing of the Conservative youth organization on the right. The 
two first parties had for long been opposed to the parliamentary system, 
often accusing it of being out of date and corrupt. The reputation of such 
people could be a handicap in recruitment from among people with less 
extremist political views, especially in the earlier period.44
The pioneers in the resistance were the Communists, who were 
forced into illegal existence in June 1941. The others came mostly 
later, after the involvement of SOE, and often through cross- country 
clubs, scout associations and other youth organizations. Though the 
recruitment broadened and the numbers grew after August 1943, the 
Communists and Danish Unity, both represented in the freedom coun-
cil, often maintained their leading roles. The initiatives for illegal activ-
ities in the region nearly always came from outside and from above, 
ultimately from Copenhagen, rather than from the level of groups and 
individuals. The major part of the work of the local leaders was to orga-
nize and, especially, to reorganize in order to repair the structural dam-
age caused, in one town after another, by arrests, made first by Danish 
police and later by the Gestapo. In a certain sense, Trommer found, ille-
gal work in south Jutland never went beyond the organizational stage.45
Another doctoral dissertation with revisionist aims appeared 
in 1979. Hans Kirchhoff’s three- volume work Augustoprøret 1943  – 
Samarbejdspolitikkens fald (The August revolt 1943  – The collapse of 
the policy of cooperation), based on 10 years of painstaking research, 
described the causation of the break with the policy of cooperation and 
analysed the political and ideological dimensions of the conflict between 
resistance and cooperation. The author started by making it clear that 
his exposition was revisionistic in relation to the consensual conception 
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characteristic of earlier national historiography. Rejecting the claimed 
concord between the popular uprising in August and the governmen-
tal rejection of German demands, he questioned the spontaneity of the 
strike movement and disputed the determination of the politicians, and 
others in positions of authority, to breach relations with the occupying 
power.46
After grass- roots research in all of the towns affected by anti- 
German demonstrations and strikes in August 1943, Kirchhoff was 
able to answer the question whether the movement was spontaneous 
or organized. He started by pointing out that when historians resort to 
describing a complicated course of events, such as a mass strike, as spon-
taneous, it is usually because they have omitted to examine the matter 
more closely, and have failed to appreciate that such an occurrence sim-
ply cannot come about without at least a certain amount of organiza-
tion. On the other hand, when journalists or politicians use the same 
descriptive term, it is more likely to be for political reasons. Thus, when 
Communists, some writing at the same time and some later, stressed 
the spontaneous nature of the strikes, he thought, it was because they 
wanted to make them fit into their political programme of popular front. 
It was for the same reason that they invented the term folkestrejke (pop-
ular strike), which eventually took the place of ‘general strike’ in com-
mon parlance as well as in much post- war writing.47
Kirchhoff found no evidence to support the view, common at the 
time, that the rebellion was set off and managed by some ‘general staff’ 
in London or Copenhagen. The British authorities, caught by surprise, 
found it hard to catch up with the explosive developments in Denmark. 
In Copenhagen, even the committee of the Communist party was prac-
tically isolated from the rebellion, which was largely confined to major 
and minor provincial towns, and left out nearly till the end of the strikes. 
In the towns affected, the Communist leadership tended in the begin-
ning to be cautious and reluctant to become involved, only jumping 
on the bandwagon when the strikes had already started seriously. For 
the party as a whole, committed to the tactics of popular front, it was 
important not to put obstacles in the way of the projected united front 
of the working class by appearing too aggressive for the comfort of the 
Social Democrats. However, once the town strikes were established, and 
supported by some sections of the wider public, the party stepped in and 
assumed control where it could, pressing for continuation of local strikes 
and calling for a general strike.
The real initiators and organizers of the local strikes seem to have 
been at the lowest level of decision- making, the factory floor. Here a 
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dedicated Communist or a Social Democratic activist, perhaps encour-
aged by articles in illegal papers or by members of a local sabotage 
group, could take the first steps towards organizing a strike. Whether, 
as in the mass strike in Copenhagen the following summer, the initia-
tive came from a Communist shop steward acting independently or from 
another worker of radical convictions, he did not stand alone in the sum-
mer of 1943. In building up, and maintaining, support for a strike, he 
could draw on fellow workers by then motivated by a potent mixture of 
feelings and beliefs – dissatisfaction, frustration and animosity as well 
as hope and expectation. Here the two most favourable conditioning 
influences at work in generating support for the strikes seem to have 
been a shared hatred of the Germans and all they stood for and a grow-
ing expectation that they would lose the war and be out of the country 
before long. Thus, the origins of the strikes may be seen as a match of 
individual initiative and spontaneous response.
In relation to enmity towards the Germans as a conditioning factor 
in the causation of strikes, Kirchhoff revealed another myth about the 
occupation. In 1943 and later it was widely believed that the occupying 
forces were pursuing a policy of deliberate violence in the streets and 
gratuitous brutality towards the demonstrators, from which it followed 
that the Danish youths involved in demonstrations and caught in clashes 
were essentially reacting to the conduct of the German troops. However, 
he found that the aggressive side in the clashes was usually the youths, 
and that the German forces, at all levels of command, showed consid-
erable restraint practically everywhere. The Danes interpreted the 
German reaction as a sign of weakness and pushed on with their demon-
strations and strikes. Paradoxically, German caution thus became an 
incentive to Danish challenge and resistance.48
Having dealt with the notion of the August rebellion as a sponta-
neous manifestation of the national spirit, a gigantic public improvi-
sation, Kirchhoff turned to the reactions of those whom he described 
collectively as the opposition to the protest movement. They included 
practically all the authorities of official Denmark, government, parlia-
ment, central administration and local government as well as trade 
unions and other major economic organizations. Contrary to some later 
representation, they were all largely against the escalating street vio-
lence and spreading strikes which they recognized as a challenge to 
the government and an attack on the conduct of its relations with the 
German authorities. However, many civilian individuals, especially at 
local levels of administration, were caught in a conflict between their 
official duties and their private sympathies. So were many members and 
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units of the police forces across the country. While in some towns the 
police made themselves very unpopular by reacting violently to revolts 
in the streets, elsewhere many officers rather took the side of the rebels, 
which angered politicians and many leaders of organizations – and did 
not escape the attention of the Germans either.
Throughout, the overriding concern of the trade union lead-
ers was to put an end to the crisis. While claiming to be moved by 
responsibility for the welfare of the population, they also had nar-
rower considerations in mind, namely to protect their organizations 
and influence against both external and internal enemies. They were 
afraid of a German take- over and much disturbed by the growing 
influence of the Communists. While the German threat turned out 
to be unjustified, the danger of the Communists remained. For the 
Social Democratic leaders, in the trade unions as in the party, the 
Communist tactic of united front was a challenge to their organiza-
tions, their power and their policies. Hence they were against sabo-
tage, street demonstrations and illegal strikes, all of which appeared 
to them as exercises in united- front tactics initiated and managed by 
Communists. The hostile reaction to the rebellion found clear expres-
sion in the Social Democratic press across the country. One of the 
many papers quoted by Kirchhoff was Sydsjællands Socialdemokrat, 
which stated that ‘we, as Danes, have no interest in helping the war-
ring parties in this terrible war, we have only our country, ourselves 
and our families to consider, and there must be no other consideration 
when we act’.49 The Radical Liberal press took the same line, though 
the tone was more moderate.
The trade unions were not the only organizations hostile to the 
rebellion. Most of the employers’ associations and the chambers of com-
merce wanted to maintain the political and diplomatic status quo of the 
country. This view was reflected in the Liberal and the Conservative 
press, though their support for the governmental policy of cooperation 
was qualified, especially in some articles in Conservative papers.
Though the strikes spread to shops, offices and other non- industrial 
places of work and attracted a good deal of middle- class support, the 
rebellion never became a case of a united people taking up resistance 
against an occupying power, as it was later represented. Most people 
were passive, Kirchhoff concluded from his analysis, many were hes-
itant and uncertain and, most important, large groups of people with 
position and power actively opposed the rebellion. Thus, the crisis 
became a profoundly divisive experience for the nation. The aim of 
the August movement was to put an end to the policy of cooperation. 
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The concern of the establishment was to maintain the existing relation-
ship with the German authorities. The basic issue was between two dif-
ferent reactions to occupation, defiance and resistance or negotiation 
and cooperation.
In his later writings, Kirchhoff made his findings available to a 
wider public. His main theme was not, as in most earlier writings about 
the occupation, the struggle between Danes and the occupying power. 
As indicated in the title and subtitle of a book published in 1987, Kamp 
eller tilpasning. Politikerne og modstanden 1940– 45 (Struggle or adapta-
tion. The politicians and the resistance 1940– 45), his concern remained 
the division within the nation.50 Such a conflict, he pointed out in the 
introduction, could not be solved by a historian. It was essentially an 
issue of moral and existential nature. All a historian could do was to 
analyse the character and course of the conflict, reveal its forms of 
appearance and its motives, and try to outline its consequences. Even 
that, however, was not an easy task. It was a struggle against ignorance, 
prejudice and myths.51
One of the many myths he unmasked in this and later writings was 
that of the Social Democratic leaders all along wanting a rupture with 
the German authorities. Refuting Hartvig Frisch’s tendentious presen-
tation and interpretation of Hedtoft- Hansen’s speech on 13 February 
1941, he showed that the Social Democratic leadership, guided by the 
party’s own survival strategy, was determined to postpone and avoid 
such a rupture and to continue the policy of cooperation with the occu-
pying power.52 When the government, under Buhl’s leadership, decided 
to reject the German demands in August 1943 and accept the conse-
quences, it did so primarily for reasons of domestic policy, namely fear 
of the growing influence of the Communists. In terms of the relationship 
with the Germans, the ministers always regretted the breach. Indeed, 
they managed discreetly to continue their practice of negotiating and 
cooperating, only operating through the central administration.
Both his earlier and his later works leave the impression that 
Kirchhoff’s heart is not with the men responsible for the policy of cooper-
ation. In a brief and personal passage in the introduction to his disserta-
tion he went as far as offering the opinion that cooperation had outlived 
its day by 1943. Its sacro egoismo and its ever more explicit defence of 
certain political interests, and a certain political system, he explained, 
had led him to reject it.53 A look at Trommer’s major works from the early 
1970s rather leaves the opposite impression of the personal attitudes of 
this author. Devoting many years to revealing the narrow recruitment 
for the early resistance and to questioning the military significance of a 
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particular kind of sabotage – incidentally also casting doubt on its polit-
ical importance – would scarcely be a likely research programme for a 
historian with an emotional commitment to the resistance.
However, there is no suggestion that political bias or personal 
motivations undermined the scholarship and compromised the find-
ings of either of the two historians. Offensive or unwelcome to various 
interested parties though their conclusions might be, they could not be 
ignored. They played an important part in dispelling myths about the 
origins and achievements of active resistance as well as about the atti-
tudes and conduct of the political parties and the major organizations 
before, during and after the rebellion of August 1943.
Once the practice of negotiating and cooperating with the occupy-
ing power no longer was seen, or at least presented, as complementary 
to active resistance, it became possible not only to explore the actual 
conflict between opposite reactions to occupation but also to examine 
the policy of cooperation by itself and assess it on its own merits. One 
result was a shift of focus in some revisionist writings towards the ear-
lier years of the occupation. Several younger historians turned their 
attention to the period after the invasion, when there was no resistance 
movement and when negotiating and coming to terms with the German 
authorities to the great majority of people seemed the most reasonable, 
and perhaps the only possible way of dealing with the occupying power 
in the given national and international situation.
Here one of the earliest and most significant studies was Henrik 
S. Nissen’s 1940. Studier i forhandlingspolitikken og samarbejdspolitikken 
(1940. Studies in the negotiation policy and the cooperation policy), 
which appeared as a doctoral dissertation in 1973. It took the form of 
a number of more or less separate studies of relations among the five 
old political parties and of interaction between the government and the 
German authorities from April 1940 to January 1941. In the introduction 
to the book, the author indicated his revisionist intentions by stressing 
that he would not follow established historical practice and deal with 
Danish occupation politics from the point of view associated with the post- 
1945 judicial reckoning, which basically reflected the victory of the allied 
powers in the war. Rather than apportioning praise and blame according 
to moral and legal criteria developed in very different circumstances, he 
would view the policies of 1940 in terms of the conditions applying at 
the time when they were formulated.54 At that stage of the war, the basic 
external influences conditioning Danish policy and conduct were the 
highly successful German military campaigns and the apparently very 
slim prospects of ultimate victory for Britain and its allies.
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Another indication of Nissen’s insistence on not passing judgement 
from hindsight was his tentative choice of terms for the two policies he 
studied. He avoided linking the word cooperation to Danish– German 
interaction in 1940, and thus departed from the terminology introduced 
by the illegal press in the later years of the war, and followed by post- war 
critics of wartime governmental policy as well as by many historians of 
his own generation. Instead he chose the more neutral term negotiation 
policy, which had been introduced by the officials of the foreign minis-
try and retrospectively used by Scavenius in his memoirs, and readily 
accepted by other politicians who had been involved in the post- invasion 
relationship with the Germans. Negotiation, and the accompanying 
words accommodation and concessions, seemed more suitable for a 
state of affairs in which neither the Danish nor the German party was 
quite clear about the form their interaction would take and the conse-
quences it would have. It was only later, when the fortunes of the war 
had changed decisively, that the conduct and policy of the government 
in 1940 could be recognized as the beginning of an established relation-
ship of cooperation between unequal parties, and thus be condemned as 
in several ways advantageous to the enemy.
The term cooperation Nissen reserved for the relationship among 
the five political parties, which soon after the invasion managed to over-
come their differences and form a coalition government. Their policy of 
cooperation enjoyed wide popular support, and became the basis for the 
government’s policy of negotiation with the occupation authorities.55
Nissen recognized that Danish negotiation policy was conditioned 
by international and national circumstances, ultimately by the course of 
the war among the great powers and more immediately by the situation 
of a small nation occupied by a great power. However, he also knew that 
policy is made by human beings deliberately acting and reacting within 
the limits of the situation in which they find themselves. Thus, he could 
analyse the disagreement between P. Munch, Radical Liberal foreign 
minister during the first few months of the occupation, and Christmas 
Møller, chairman of the Conservative party. Munch, adopting a prag-
matic approach, pursued negotiations with the Germans as a way of 
settling matters that had to be dealt with. Christmas Møller, more con-
cerned than most of his fellow ministers about the Danish image abroad 
and afraid that the country might be accused of collaborating with the 
enemy, warned of the dangers of being on a slippery slope of negotiating 
and giving way to the Germans.
Subsequently, in a long chapter about the negotiations in July and 
August about German plans for a future customs and monetary union 
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and the Danish initiative in that respect, Nissen presented the con-
frontation between Scavenius and Christmas Møller about Danish pol-
icy. At a crucial stage of the negotiations Scavenius, moved by a cool 
small- state realism and guided by his principle of removing the nearest 
danger, insisted on accepting the German demands, while Christmas 
Møller, basing his case on German promises to respect Danish indepen-
dence made on 9 April, refused to accept a voluntary renunciation of cer-
tain Danish rights involved in the projected post- war European order.
Such, and many other, debates about Danish policy in 1940 
involved a range of politicians and sometimes also a few organizational 
leaders. Narrating the exchanges in some detail, Nissen made a point of 
presenting the position and arguments of each party sympathetically. He 
recognized that disagreements were essentially about the tactics to be 
employed in dealing with the Germans, and acknowledged that all par-
ticipants were motivated by a determination to defend Danish interests. 
He accepted the policy of negotiation, which rested on the capitulation 
agreement of 9 April, and did not question the need to make concessions 
to accommodate the Germans in the country. Indeed, he saw no accept-
able alternative. If the negotiations with the Germans broke down, the 
worst result, he believed, could be either direct rule by the occupying 
power or a collaborationist government based on the small Danish Nazi 
party, neither of which would be acceptable to the public, the great 
majority of which supported the negotiation policy. Moreover, the wave 
of a self- defensive national awakening sweeping the country in the sum-
mer and autumn of 1940 soon reinforced support for both the king and 
the coalition government as well as for its policy towards Germany.
Nissen did not see the negotiation policy as a step towards, or 
preparation for, active resistance to the occupation power. From the 
outset, its most important result was simply that negotiations did take 
place, and that the Danish authorities thus avoided becoming merely the 
administrative agents of Germany in an occupied country. The policy 
worked as long as it was possible to persuade the German authorities 
that they, too, had an interest in negotiating. The drawback was that 
it entailed concessions which tended to compromise what remained of 
the asserted Danish neutrality.56 Thus, the policy became an exercise 
in maintaining the notion of sovereignty at the expense of the image of 
neutrality.
Nissen assumed that the policy of negotiation and the policy of 
cooperation were interdependent, and that both were dependent on 
the development of the world war and the state of public opinion in 
Denmark. The negotiating position of the Danes rested on the cohesion 
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of the coalition government and on its parliamentary support. The coop-
eration of the political parties was based on shared recognition of a prac-
tical need to negotiate with the Germans and, in some respects, also on 
calculated advantages of doing so. As long as there was no prospect of an 
early German defeat in the war, he concluded his analysis, the political 
leadership and the Danish public were largely united in support of the 
policy of negotiation, provided concessions to Germany could appear as 
being necessary.
The two parties to the negotiations shared an interest in their con-
tinuation. The Danish negotiators, anxious to secure some acceptance of 
the sovereign rights of the state, defended or pursued diverse national 
interests in a changing situation. The Germans, preferring to secure 
control of the occupied country with a minimum of efforts, sought 
administrative, propagandist and, eventually, also economic advan-
tages from the relationship. After various crises in the negotiations, 
in January 1941 an equilibrium was re- established, between German 
expectations and Danish willingness to make concessions. But it was an 
unstable equilibrium. Few people could then have told, Nissen observed, 
from which quarter it, in due course, would receive the decisive push.57
One step further in the historians’ rehabilitation of the policy and 
practice of negotiating and cooperating with the Germans was taken 
the following decade, with a detailed study and thorough analysis of the 
events and context of 9 April. In 1987 Hans Branner, then best known for 
his work on neutral Denmark between the great powers at the outbreak 
of the First World War, published Den 9.  april  – et politisk lærestykke? 
(The 9th of April – a political lesson?). As indicated by the title, the book 
questioned the lesson often drawn from the traumatic experience of 
that day, according to which the German invasion and Danish capitula-
tion had been largely results of the foreign and security policy adopted 
by Denmark in the pre- war period. Like his earlier work, the book was 
distinguished by the author’s willingness and ability to combine the 
approach and methods of traditional historians with those of modern 
political scientists, in particular students of international relations.
The book, Branner explained in the preface, was an attempt, on 
the one hand, to bring together existing knowledge about the back-
ground for what happened on 9 April and, on the other hand, to pres-
ent such knowledge in an overall setting, with a view to clarifying 
the basic conditions governing Danish foreign policy. At one level, he 
would give an account of concrete historical events and connections 
between them. At a higher level, he would deal with some matters 
of principle relating to the actual situation in April 1940, and would 
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discuss the freedom of action of the Danish government, the major 
factors influencing its decision- making and the broad pattern of its 
foreign policy. At an even more abstract level, he would take up the 
same questions, but in a context more detached from the immediate 
historical situation, and would discuss them in the broad perspective 
of Danish foreign policy in the twentieth century. A  major thesis of 
the book, he pointed out, was that the interpretation of the events of 
9 April which had informed both public consciousness and political 
practice was far too unambiguous.58
In the theoretical part of the book, Branner dealt first with the 
government’s freedom of action and decision- making on 9 April. He 
concluded that the decisions made in the morning of that day, namely 
to capitulate militarily, comply with the German demands and remain 
in office, were highly rational. Even with some machinery for crisis 
management in place, more reliable information available and greater 
awareness of possible alternatives, the government could not have 
reached other and better decisions, given its political objectives.59 The 
decisive concern of the principal decision- makers was survival, of the 
population in the immediate situation and of the country as an indepen-
dent state in post- war Europe. Divergent opinions, especially on the tim-
ing of the capitulation, as voiced by the army’s representative general 
Prior and apparently motivated by military and political considerations 
as well as by moral feelings, did not affect the decisions.
The opposition parties did not take part in the discussions but – 
with the exception of Christmas Møller – did not oppose the decisions 
reached. However, their tacit consent rested on policies and judgements 
very different from those of the two governing parties. According to the 
Liberals and the Conservatives, the reasons why the government found 
itself in a situation of no choice in the morning of 9 April were its defi-
cient defence policy in the 1930s and its irresponsible passivity in the 
days leading up to the invasion. In their view, 9 April marked the defeat 
of Social Democratic and Radical Liberal defence and foreign policy. 
That was the judgement which, towards the end of the occupation and 
after the war, found expression in the ‘never more a 9th of April’ slogan.
Though linked to only one particular interpretation of the expe-
riences of 9 April, that motto was used in the post- war campaign to put 
an end to defenceless neutrality and start a rearmament programme. 
However, the political influence of this lesson of the recent past had 
been grossly exaggerated, Branner argued. When Denmark in 1949 took 
leave of its long- standing security and defence policy and joined the mil-
itary alliance NATO the basic reason, he explained, was a radical change 
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in the regional international situation, which now made it possible for 
the country to secure membership of such an alliance.60
The choices made and decisions taken by king and government on 
9 April gained their real political importance by becoming the basis for 
Danish policy towards the occupying power for the following several 
years. Themselves representing a continuation of the course adopted by 
the Social Democratic and Radical Liberal coalition in the mid and late 
1930s, they prepared the way for the broader coalition government’s 
subsequent dealings with the representatives of Hitlerite Germany, in 
the more trying conditions of the period up to 1943. Thus, motivated by 
a determination to secure a degree of national independence by avoid-
ing provoking the Germans, the Danish response to the invasion gave 
the policy of negotiation a good start.
The term Branner used to describe Danish foreign policy before 
and after 9 April was adaptation policy. He had taken it from the writ-
ings of James Rosenau, who saw all conduct of foreign policy as a mat-
ter of adapting to domestic and foreign demands and pressures and, for 
comparative purposes, distinguished various types of adaptation. In the 
concluding chapters of his book, Branner went on to examine the Danish 
policy in a comparative frame and present it in a historical perspective. 
Here he drew on, and contributed to, both the comparative analysis of 
foreign policy – admittedly one of the more problematic branches of the 
study of international politics  – and the growing body of theoretical 
writings about the international conduct of small states.
During the occupation, when Denmark enjoyed only nominal 
independence and could maintain no more than a semblance of neutral-
ity, its foreign policy could be seen as an extreme version of a particular 
type of adaptation. However, taken as a whole, Danish policy before and 
during the war was not unique, but in its essence comparable to that of 
a number of other European small states. In the later 1930s half a dozen 
such states, all affected by growing disillusionment with the League of 
Nations and rising tension among the great powers, took much the same 
course as Denmark and moved closer to a neutral position. However, 
their neutrality developed some novel characteristics. At the expense 
of the classical ideals of impartiality and equidistance, which had been 
associated with traditional neutrality, they allowed themselves to seek 
protection against the risk of being drawn into future hostilities by 
favouring the power that represented the greatest threat to peace. As in 
Denmark, their concern with security took precedence of their ideolog-
ical sympathies with the democratic Western powers. Since Germany 
had become the strongest and most aggressive power in Europe, the 
 
 
 
 
s InCe 1945:  from res Is tanCe to Coll abor at Ion 171
   171
partiality of those small neutrals also ran counter to traditional balance- 
of- power principles of foreign policy. The ultimate concern of the neu-
trals leaning towards Germany was about their survival as independent 
states after a major war.
In a closer comparison of Danish, Swedish and Norwegian pol-
icy and conduct towards Germany before and during the war, he again 
found parallels. Here, of course, there were some obvious differences 
between Denmark and its Scandinavian neighbours, in matters of both 
politics, diplomacy and defence. However, when viewed in the context 
of the three countries’ location in relation to the great powers, those dif-
ferences seemed less glaring. The underlying principle of adapting to the 
international environment by avoiding to provoke Germany and steer-
ing an anti balance- of power course operated in both the Swedish and 
the Danish case. The more general principle of adapting to the great- 
power constellation in the vicinity might again be seen at work in both 
the Danish and the Norwegian case in the days before and after 9 April 
1940, even though Denmark was squarely within the German sphere 
of interest while Norway was of greater interest to the British. Whether 
compared with other neutrals in general or with its neighbours in par-
ticular, Branner concluded, Danish policy was not fundamentally differ-
ent from that of comparable states. When, in conditions of crisis, it took 
different decisions and ended up in a different situation the basic reason 
was its greater dependence on Germany.
However, this defence of Danish policy towards Germany up to 
1943 did lead the author to enquire how far adaptation could be taken 
without becoming meaningless. If its ultimate aim was to defend the 
independence of a country against not only military but also economic 
and cultural threats, such adaptation, if carried too far, could itself 
undermine national independence. From this point of view, he admit-
ted, the more extreme form of adaptation policy adopted by Denmark 
in the 1930s and 1940s was of a character rather different from that of 
many other small states.
To broaden the basis of his analysis of small- state behaviour in cri-
sis situations, Branner expanded the historical perspective and, in the 
concluding pages of the book, presented a brief overview of more than 
a hundred years of Danish security policy. Here he identified four differ-
ent ways of reacting to threats to national security, three of which had 
come into play in the foreign policy of the Social Democratic and Radical 
Liberal coalition government of the 1930s. One, which had forerunners 
in the decades after 1864 and in the period before the First World War, 
had been described as pilot- fish policy, and involved steering close to 
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the nearest great power. Another, also dating back to the nineteenth 
century, was known as lie- as- dead policy, calling for extreme passiv-
ity in international politics. The third, associated in particular with the 
inter- war period, and sometimes described as demonstration policy, had 
a more active character. Relying on joint action by small states, it was 
aimed at reforming international society by basing it on the rule of law 
instead of on the exercise of power. The three lines of policy coexisted 
till the end of the 1930s, when the pilot- fish course decidedly gained the 
upper hand in Danish foreign policy.
The fourth way of dealing with threats to Danish security, namely 
the policy of strength, had its roots in the earlier centuries of modern 
European history, when Denmark– Norway was still a major power in 
regional politics, but did not seriously come into play till 1949. By joining 
NATO, Denmark committed itself to a form of balance- of- power policy. 
Over the next several decades it participated politically and militarily 
in the activities of the American- led alliance, though with a number of 
significant reservations, which again were motivated mainly by a con-
cern not to provoke the threatening great power and potential enemy. At 
the same time, it also continued to pursue, with other small states, the 
demonstration policy, mainly through active participation in numerous 
international organizations.
One of the most salient points made by Branner, in both his ear-
lier and his later work, was that small states, even in situations of cri-
sis, often have rather more freedom of action in foreign policy than 
their political leaders realize or acknowledge. Even those politicians 
who, typically in the name of small- state realism, invoke the doctrine 
of necessity have made a political and moral choice, he observed. Thus, 
though the forces of external compulsion were particularly strong on 
9 April, the course taken by the Danish decision- makers was not the 
only possibility. However, the decisions they made he found the best 
possible in the circumstances. Nor does he seem to have any quarrel 
against the policy of defenceless and pro- German neutrality that led 
up to the Danish reactions to German invasion, or indeed against the 
policy of negotiation and concessions that flowed from the compli-
ant decision- making that morning. The resistance movement, whose 
leaders and members, in later and, admittedly, far more favourable 
international situations, made different moral and political choices, is 
barely mentioned in the book. In his personal engagement, Branner, 
like Nissen, seems to be more with the government of negotiation and 
judicious accommodation than with the movement of defiance and 
armed resistance.
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While Hæstrup and Frisch, both accomplished stylists with an edu-
cational mission, had aimed their writings at a wider public, the first 
generation of revisionist historians, self- consciously scholarly in their 
critical analysis, wrote more for each other, and of course for members 
of the public seriously interested in the debate about the occupation 
years of Danish history. Some of the works of the earlier writers are clas-
sics in the more literary tradition of Danish history- writing. The princi-
pal publications of those revisionist historians stand out as contributions 
to professional historiography.
3.3. Discord
The second wave of revisionist writings about the occupation period 
in Danish history developed in the 1990s, and was still running high 
well after the turn of the century. Largely the work of younger histori-
ans without personal recollections of the occupation and its aftermath, 
such writings left behind the major themes that had occupied the two 
previous generations, namely the shifting relationship between the 
Danish and German authorities and the resurgent conflict between 
official Denmark and the resistance movement. Untouched by wartime 
pressures and animosities and unmoved by post- war anti- German pas-
sions, the new generation of historians turned their attention to vari-
ous groups of collaborators who had been largely ignored or given short 
shrift by earlier historians. Reacting to the harsh treatment some such 
people had suffered during the war and the severe sentences many of 
them had received soon after the liberation, those historians set out to 
examine the cases of groups of individuals who had been deemed guilty 
of unpatriotic conduct during the occupation.
Collaboration took many forms. A  distinction has been made 
between economic and other ways of collaborating with the occupy-
ing power and its agents. While the former on the whole presented a 
grey area both morally and legally, the latter types appeared to be more 
clear- cut cases of unpatriotic behaviour. Economic collaboration cov-
ered companies and individuals gainfully supplying goods or services 
to German parties as well as workers providing labour for German 
employers whether in Germany or in Denmark. Both kinds were gener-
ally motivated by varying combinations of need, opportunity and offi-
cial encouragement.
The last factor became a consideration of some importance in the 
judicial reckoning that, at the demand of the freedom council and on 
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the basis of retroactive laws, took place in the post- war years. Many so- 
called værnemagere, especially some larger ones with long records of col-
laboration, could plead that they had traded with the Germans with the 
permission or encouragement, sometimes even at the explicit request, 
of the government or one of the established trade organizations, and 
thus had acted in the national interest as perceived at the time. For the 
workers it could be said that they, in a situation of high unemployment, 
not only had been driven by personal need but also strongly encouraged 
by their trade unions, and in some cases even pressed by ministerial 
authorities to accept work from the Germans.
Yet, a small number of værnemagere were punished for initiating 
what was called improper economic cooperation with the occupying 
power, while a larger number were sentenced to return profits deemed 
unlawful. A good many, especially larger companies, avoided being 
charged or escaped being convicted. Among the workers who had been 
in German employment, only those who had done uniformed guard 
duties in Germany were prosecuted. At the time, the judicial treatment 
of economic collaborators was a frustrating experience for supporters of 
the resistance movement, and for those actively engaged in the prose-
cutions. In retrospect, however, it can be seen that a more thorough ret-
ribution for economic collaboration had to be impeded by the fact that 
such private collaboration was an inevitable concomitant of a public pol-
icy committed to cooperating with the occupying power.61
At its worst, economic collaboration was driven by greed and 
opportunism. Nazi or pro- German sympathies were rarely, if ever, a 
motivation. In the non- economic forms of collaboration, however, such 
sympathies were often a defining characteristic. This applied not only 
to the political activities of the German minority population in south 
Jutland and of the Danish Nazi party (DNSAP) but also to the conduct of 
the four groups of collaborators to be considered here.
Most of the Danes who voluntarily enrolled in a German army 
unit and fought in the war or who joined a German police force oper-
ating in Denmark were ideologically motivated, though some were 
anti- Communist rather than pro- Nazi. The same may have been true of 
many of those individuals who acted as informers against the resistance 
movement. However, pro- German sympathies harboured by the women 
who associated with German soldiers seem more likely to have been of 
an emotional than of an ideological nature. Whatever the quality and 
degree of pro- German sympathies entertained by the last two groups of 
collaborators, their motivations may have been tempered with a mea-
sure of opportunism. Mixed though the motivations of the four groups 
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of collaborators seem to have been, through their acts they all became 
identified with the German cause. Thus, they were roundly condemned 
by the public as traitors, and many of them prosecuted and severely pun-
ished after the liberation. Half a century after those deeds were done, 
historians could examine the conduct of such collaborators more dispas-
sionately, if not downright sympathetically, than had been possible at an 
earlier stage.
In 1998 Claus Bundgaard Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen and Peter 
Scharff Smith published a book which was based on the dissertation 
submitted for their finals at the Institute for History and Social Science 
of Roskilde University Centre. Entitled Under hagekors og dannebrog. 
Danskere i Waffen SS (Under the swastika and the Danish flag. Danes 
in the Waffen SS), it told the story of approximately 6,000 Danes who 
volunteered to fight in the German Nazi military organization, their 
background, training, roles in the war and fate after the German capit-
ulation. Based on archival material in Denmark, Germany and a few 
other places and on letters, diaries and unpublished memoirs as well as 
interviews with some veterans, it became a contribution to both Danish 
wartime history and German military history.
The authors corrected the popular image of the Danish corps of 
the Waffen-SS as largely made up of antisocial and callous individuals. 
Mainly recruited through the German minority and DNSAP, the great 
majority were Nazis when they enrolled. As a result of intensive indoc-
trination during their training, a large number ended up as confirmed 
adherents of the Nazi ideology, confident of belonging to a superhuman 
elite of political soldiers inspired by high ideals. Some, however, were 
motivated more by anti- Bolshevism. This was characteristic especially 
of those who had fought for Finland in the 1939– 40 war with the Soviet 
Union, and who after June 1941 decided to continue the crusade against 
Bolshevism by joining the German army units deployed on the Eastern 
front.
Some Danish officers and men joined the units of the Waffen-SS 
more out of antipathy to the defence policy of their government in the 
1930s and frustration with the shameful capitulation on 9 April 1940. 
A smaller number joined up essentially to escape unemployment in 
Denmark, and others no doubt to exchange the boredom of the early 
years of occupation for a life of adventure on the battlefields abroad. 
Finally, the recruits included a group of social misfits in trouble with 
the local authorities in Denmark. Sociologically, the authors found, the 
members of those units on the whole represented a broad cross section 
of the Danish population. Contrary to what many people claimed in later 
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years, they did not include a higher proportion of the criminal and the 
retarded than the rest of society did.
Nearly all the Danish volunteers in the Waffen-SS served in one 
or more of three units on the Eastern front, namely Division Wiking, 
Frikorps Danmark and Division Nordland. Frikorps Danmark, set up 
in connection with the attack on the Soviet Union, was formally non- 
political, which meant anti- Communist rather than Nazi- oriented. Also 
known as the Danish Legion, its flag and language of command were 
Danish. Its first commandant, C.P. Kryssing, was a Danish officer, not a 
member of DNSAP, who tried to steer a non- political course. When he 
resisted SS demands for indoctrination of the troops he was opposed by 
a group of Nazis within the corps, and eventually replaced by C.F. von 
Schalburg, former leader of DNSAP’s youth section and a fanatical Nazi 
who hated Communists and Jews. When Schalburg was killed, in one of 
the earlier battles of the corps, his place was taken by K.B. Martinsen, 
also a convinced Nazi.
Danish volunteers took part in the attack on the Soviet Union, 
and experienced the Blitzkrieg with its rapid advances in the summer 
of 1941. In the following years, they were involved in a series of bloody 
defensive battles with the advancing Soviet army. In early May 1945 sev-
eral hundred Danish SS volunteers participated in the German army’s 
last stand in the streets of Berlin. Throughout the volunteers fought 
bravely, losing about 2,000 men, a third of the Danish force. In battle, 
their performance was marked by the brutality and ruthlessness that 
became characteristic of the war on the Eastern front. Thus, in an attack 
shortly after the killing of Schalburg they shot an unknown number of 
Russian prisoners of war.
Inevitably some Danish volunteers became involved also in the 
more political activities of the Waffen-SS, which were pursued in accor-
dance with the ideological programme of Heinrich Himmler’s broader 
SS organization. The authors of the book mention that about 100 Danes 
served in German concentration camps, that some Danish officers acted 
as observers when an SS extermination unit shot Jews and other civil-
ians, that Division Wiking took an active part in the extermination of 
Jews in the western region of Ukraine, and that Frikorps Danmark at 
one stage was chosen to assist an SS brigade in atrocities against the 
civilian population of White Russia.62 Earlier books about the exploits 
of the volunteers in the war, mostly written by SS veterans, had failed 
to mention this side of their activities, but had described in considerable 
detail the battles in which they fought, the heroics they displayed and 
the decorations they received.
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Having read many of the volunteers’ diaries and letters from the 
front and interviewed a number of veterans, the three authors were able 
to explain the conduct of the soldiers, in terms of their ideology and ide-
als as well as in relation to their experiences and situation. Like so many 
other things that had happened in the war with the Soviet Union, kill-
ing prisoners out of revenge was against the Geneva Conventions and 
clearly inhumane. For SS volunteers, however, Russian soldiers were 
Communist enemies who, according the Nazi ideology, belonged to a 
lower race. Exterminating Jews, and certain other categories of civil-
ians, had become an essential part of the Nazi programme, and hence a 
primary task for sections of the SS organizations, including units of the 
Waffen-SS. Thus, those Danish volunteers unfortunate enough to have 
become involved in such actions might have been not only following 
orders but also acting in accordance with their political convictions.
That the Danish volunteers went on fighting long after the decisive 
defeats of the German forces and in the face of the relentless advance 
of the Soviet army, some persevering to the very end of the war, was 
not simply a result of their ideological convictions and political commit-
ment. Among other reasons mentioned by the authors were the fighting 
spirit of their Danish officers, the bonds of solidarity uniting the soldiers 
of the corps and, perhaps not least, the lack of an alternative. Many were 
afraid of what might be in store for them if they returned to Denmark, 
where they knew they all were regarded as traitors.
After the liberation of Denmark and the end of the war more than 
3,000 returning volunteers were sentenced by Danish courts, typically 
to two years’ imprisonment, for having fought on the German side. The 
legal basis for the prosecution was the so- called penal code amend-
ment of 1 June 1945, which retroactively made their participation in 
the war illegal. Thus the volunteers were punished for an act which had 
been lawful at the time when it was committed and, moreover, could 
be deemed consistent with Danish policy and diplomacy towards the 
occupying power. Giving in to German pressure, the government had 
signed the Anti- Comintern Pact, and thus at least ideologically lined 
Denmark up with Germany and its allies against the Soviet Union. 
Again in response to German pressure, it had allowed Danish officers 
to take leave of absence to join the Waffen-SS. The government had 
even agreed to let the Danish army be represented at various events 
for Frikorps Danmark on Danish soil. Indeed, the whole line taken by 
the government in relation to the recruitment for the Waffen-SS, the 
authors suggested, could be seen as an outstanding manifestation of 
the policy of cooperation.
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The hostility the returning soldiers met from the population and 
the harsh and unjust treatment they received from the political and judi-
cial system, on top of the suffering and losses they had endured during 
the later years of the war, further strengthened the solidarity of the 
former volunteers. Instead of regretting their choice and actions, some 
could see themselves as idealists who openly had fought for their ideo-
logical convictions and bravely lived up to their soldierly norms – only 
surrounded, now as then, by opportunistic politicians and a manip-
ulable public. Such uniformly positive views of the volunteers’ role 
in the Second World War found clear expression in the veterans’ own 
historiography.63
Even more hated by the public than the Danes who had volun-
teered to fight abroad together with the Waffen-SS were the men who, 
in the last two years of the occupation, had decided to join the Schalburg 
Corps in Denmark. Set up in April 1943 on the instructions of Himmler 
and called after the heroic commandant of Frikorps Danmark, it was 
originally meant to recruit and train soldiers for the Waffen-SS as well 
as to Germanize Denmark in preparation for the Greater German Reich 
projected by Nazi ideologists. Divided into 10 main sections or depart-
ments, the corps covered a wide range of activities, including military, 
civilian and political undertakings, propaganda, intelligence and terror-
ism. Soon its principal function became to assist the German authorities 
in the fight against growing resistance in the country. Not least through 
its intelligence service (ET), the corps became deeply involved in terror-
ism and other acts of violence. Such activities, directed against both the 
public and the resistance movement, culminated with the general strike 
in the summer of 1944. As a result of difficulties with recruitment and 
disputes between the occupying power and its Danish leadership, the 
corps was dissolved on 1 February 1945.
The public, having noted that the Schalburg Corps went beyond 
fighting the resistance through acts of retaliation and deliberately 
worked to terrorize the population, was inclined to ascribe to the corps 
all destructive explosions and violent incidents for which the resistance 
could not take responsibility. The illegal press reinforced this tendency 
by constantly and indiscriminately accusing the corps of what became 
known as schalburgtage. The most provocative action of such a kind was 
the destruction of the concert hall and other parts of Tivoli, the historic 
and popular amusement park at the centre of Copenhagen, in late June 
1944. It was clearly in revenge for the series of spectacular acts of sabo-
tage preceding the demonstrations and general strike. The illegal press 
immediately accused the corps of being the perpetrator.
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The hatred and scorn of the public was reflected in the severity of 
the punishments meted out to members of the corps in the first post- war 
years. Under a section of the retroactive legislation, dealing with uni-
formed service in the German police corps, about 700 Schalburg men 
received prison sentences ranging from two years to life, the typical sen-
tence being four years simply for membership of the corps. Those guilty 
of torture, violence, robbery, murder, explosions, terror or treason 
received much longer sentences. Ten members, including the chief of 
the corps K.B. Martinsen, were executed. In 1948, however, the courts 
started to pardon those with shorter sentences. The last long- term pris-
oners were released in 1960.
The animosity and contempt for members of the Schalburg and 
similar Danish corps, which culminated in the period immediately after 
liberation when nearly everybody identified with the resistance move-
ment, were shared by most post- war writers, including the first histo-
rians of the occupation years. While many simply ignored or dismissed 
its members as traitors, some writers went out of their way to condemn 
their character and question their motivation. Prominent among the 
latter was Vilhelm la Cour, who during the war had provoked both the 
Danish and the German authorities with a number of pamphlets writ-
ten in the spirit of traditional anti- German nationalism. In a book about 
Denmark during the occupation, published in 1947, he fervently dealt 
with the terror committed by the Schalburg Corps and accused its mem-
bers of being criminal and insane.64 Fifty years later a young historian 
revised this assessment.
In 2000 Andreas Monrad Pedersen published Schalburgkorpset, a 
history of the corps and its members which was based on the dissertation 
submitted for his finals at Copenhagen University. He started by tackling 
the demonization of National Socialism and its henchmen immediately 
after the liberation and demonstrating its effects on Danish post- war 
society. This attitude, he acknowledged, was quite natural at that stage, 
after Germany had lost the war and the Nazi crimes against humanity 
had become public knowledge. To accept, let alone understand, people 
who had supported Hitler’s regime was then impossible. To its contem-
poraries, the Schalburg Corps appeared as simply a servant of the occu-
pying power and an instrument for arbitrary terror, and its members 
as generally criminal thugs and subnormal individuals, all engaged in 
treacherous activities.
This inclination to demonize and disparage, he pointed out, served 
an important social function in post- war Denmark. It helped to shift the 
responsibility for years of Danish cooperation with the occupying power 
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on to a tiny minority of marginal Danes who, in a very obvious way, 
had collaborated with the Germans and fought the resistance. Drawing 
attention away from the economic, political and other forms of cooper-
ation engaged in by much larger sections of the population, it played a 
part in maintaining the retrospective façade of a united nation stead-
fastly committed to opposing the occupying power. Thus, the tendency 
to demonize the collaborators, he noted, had a much needed healing 
effect on the Danish psyche. It allowed the nation to face the future with 
a clearer conscience.
Previous writings on the collaborators, the author pointed out, had 
been characterized not merely by demonization but also by a tendency 
towards sensationalism. The focus had generally been on the most spec-
tacular events and the loudest statements. This approach had stood in 
the way of a strictly historical treatment of the Schalburg Corps. Now 
the time had come to see and present the corps in a new light, not in 
order to excuse and explain away the misdeeds of the Schalburg men, 
but to analyse the background, history and context of the activities of 
the corps and to examine the character, motivation and life of individual 
members.65
Pedersen’s research into the organizational history of the corps 
showed a growing attachment to the occupying power in the period up 
to the general strike in September 1944. Schalburg men assisted German 
police in the raids and arrest of Jews in October 1943, and the intelli-
gence service worked with German terror gangs in the earlier stage of 
the demonstrations and strikes in 1944. However, the majority of the 
killings and explosions that took place in the last years of the occupation 
were not the responsibility of the corps. They were mostly the work of 
terror groups organized by the Germans themselves, though sometimes 
carried out in accordance with information and advice about victims 
and locations supplied by ET. Thus, the explosions in Tivoli were not a 
case of schalburgtage but the work of the notorious Peter group, which 
later gained the reputation of having been the most violent and destruc-
tive terror gang operating in Denmark during the war. Though led by a 
former Schalburg man, it was part of the German security service.
In accordance with the defensive tactics employed by the German 
authorities at the height of the general strike, members of the corps were 
withdrawn from the streets of Copenhagen and barracked. In the later 
months of the occupation the corps, now under tighter German control, 
continued to take part in the activities of the German police, notably 
in connection with the action against the Danish police in September 
1944. Its members also committed a variety of fairly minor and isolated 
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acts of violence and thefts, especially in the final stage of the occupation. 
Thus the Schalburg Corps retained its function as the national scapegoat 
for practically all acts of violence and terror deemed to be pro- German 
or anti- resistance. As such, it served first the propaganda purposes of 
the illegal press and later, according to the author’s interpretation, the 
psychological needs of the Danish population.66
Pedersen’s sociological analysis of the membership of the corps 
showed that Schalburg men were not radically different from the rest of 
the population. While the officers came from the middle or upper- middle 
class, the men belonged to the lower social classes. Typically young and 
often poorly educated, they were normal both psychologically and intel-
lectually. A high proportion (42 per cent) were unemployed when they 
joined, half had done civilian work for Germany and a quarter had a 
criminal record. The general picture was that of a marginalized group of 
young people in an insecure social situation who tried to improve their 
life by collaborating with the occupying power.
Though love of adventure and opportunism no doubt played a role 
in some cases, by far the most common motivation for joining the corps 
was ideological, typically pro- Nazi, anti- Communist and anti- Semitic. 
More than a third were members of DNSAP. Two thirds came from an 
environment which was marked by National Socialist ideas, whether a 
family, a political party, a German factory or Frikorps Danmark, and in 
which the Schalburg Corps was regarded as a respectable organization. 
The corps naturally produced its own esprit de corps, which reinforced 
the commitment of the members. In this connection it was worth noting 
that actual violence and terrorist activity was the responsibility of only 
a few departments of the corps and were carried out by a hard core of 
troops, and that service for the ordinary Schalburg man usually meant 
guard and patrol duties.
In discussing the sources of recruitment for the Schalburg Corps, 
Pedersen did not fail to draw attention to the parallel with the resistance 
movement. Both found most of their recruits in politically marginal 
groups of people who were dissatisfied with the existing system and 
state of affairs. While the corps drew heavily on the National Socialist 
milieu, the resistance movement, as Aage Trommer had shown, found 
its members in Communist circles and Danish Unity.67
The two revisionist historical works discussed here, on Frikorps 
Danmark and the Schalburg Corps, sought to redress the inadequate or 
savage treatment the two organizations and their members had received 
from earlier historians, who had been possessed by the ethos of resis-
tance. Another book, also by a young historian and published about the 
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same time, went one step further when it took up for reconsideration 
the sensitive subject of informers. It vehemently attacked politicians and 
writers who after the war had defended the practice of liquidating secu-
rity risks. In doing so, it questioned the entire ethos of resistance.
In his Stikkerdrab. Modstandsbevægelsernes likvidering af danskere 
under besættelsen (Killing of informers. The resistance movements’ liq-
uidation of Danes during the occupation), which was based on the dis-
sertation he had submitted for his finals in history at Aarhus University, 
Stefan Emkjær challenged the traditional conception of Danish resis-
tance and questioned its political and moral context. In the title of the 
book he used the plural form of movements, he explained, because the 
singular stood for a construction which did not conform to the reality of 
resistance in Denmark. Even at the end of the occupation there was no 
unified and organized resistance movement.68
Nor could he accept the idea of an antithesis between resistance 
and cooperation which was supposed to present the population with 
a stark political and moral choice. Since the myth of peace occupation 
offered some protection for resistance activities, it allowed resistance 
and cooperation to coexist. Thus, the situation in Denmark was not so 
much an either- or as a both- and case. Even the international context of 
Danish resistance presented a degree of political and moral ambiguity. 
Since the primary cause of the Second World War, as Emkjær saw it, 
was the injustice of the Versailles treaty imposed on Germany, the war 
between the allied powers and the Axis was not so clear a case of good 
battling evil as generally assumed at the time.69 Thus, those identifying 
with the resistance and defending its activities were not always entitled 
to claim the moral high ground.
Emkjær’s position in respect to the post- war debate about the liq-
uidation of informers and other security risks was clearly with the so- 
called anti- movement rather than with the resistance movement. His 
book was more than a historian’s attempt to analyse and categorize all 
known cases of liquidation. It was also a dismissive critique of the free-
dom council, which had taken formal responsibility for all or most such 
killings, and a scathing attack on Frode Jakobsen, who after the libera-
tion as resistance leader and minister had stood in the way of a proper 
examination of a large number of doubtful cases. Thus, the author man-
aged to pass judgement, implicitly on those involved in the liquidations 
and more explicitly on those defending and protecting them.
Starting with the first known liquidation, which took place in May 
1943, and drawing on archives available up to November 1947, Emkjær 
counted 409 cases. This list was not complete and excluded unsuccessful 
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attempts, of which he had come across 96 cases. Of the 409 victims, 39 
were women. About 70 per cent of all killings took place in the last six 
months of the occupation. His first concerns were to ascertain the orga-
nizational level at which the order to kill was given and the nature of the 
decision- making process preceding the order.
Contrary to what people had been led to believe in the post- war 
years, he found the orders usually came from a resistance group, typ-
ically from its leader but sometimes even from an individual member, 
and only rarely from a higher level of the organization. Though the 
group leader occasionally might have reported to his immediate supe-
riors, the freedom council and the regional leaderships seemed unlikely 
to have been kept informed of individual liquidations, even though they 
carried the overall responsibility. Thus, the decision- making process 
would usually have been brief and informal.70
Having gone through the papers available, the author concluded 
that the vast majority of killings had been carried out on quite a sum-
mary basis. Only a small number of the victims (little more than 10 per 
cent) had been members of a terror corps or had acted as informers in 
a big way. As for the rest, the company a person kept could be a deci-
sive consideration. Membership of a Nazi party, for example, could be 
deemed a legitimate ground for a liquidation. Though in some cases var-
ious forms of preliminary investigation, such as observation, searches, 
tests and interrogation had taken place, on the whole liquidation of 
security risks was done on the basis of suspicion rather than proof. In 
certain cases, revenge for the loss of fellow members of a group could 
not be ruled out as a motive.71
When Emkjær moved on to review the post- war debate about 
liquidations, he made it clear that he was on the side of those who, in 
response to claims made by relations of persons thought to have been 
killed unjustly, had pressed for presentation of documentary material 
about wartime executions. He criticized resistance leaders and politi-
cians who, for reasons of their own, had refused to make such mate-
rial available for a judicial case- by- case examination. In particular, he 
attacked Frode Jakobsen, who had supervised a cursory review of 125 
cases and had produced only nine exonerations by the ministry.
The presentation of such a small number of public rehabilitations 
was motivated by political concerns, Emkjær argued, and might be 
taken to imply that the rest of killings had been justified and necessary. 
Now, having gone through the archives himself, he could state that this 
was far from the actual situation. Indeed, in many cases he found it diffi-
cult to see the difference between the killings that had been exonerated 
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and those that had not. On the whole, the basis for the executions was 
flimsy.72 That the ministry of justice later issued 20 ‘tarnished’ declara-
tions of rehabilitation, acquitting the victims of informing but asserting 
that they, through their conduct, had placed themselves in the danger 
zone, did not help much.
The reason Frode Jakobsen, and other members of the freedom 
council and the liberation government, had given for denying access 
to documents relating to liquidations was that the individuals who had 
carried out or ordered the killings needed protection. Emkjær did not 
accept this explanation. The real reason, he insisted, had been that it 
was considered essential for the authority of the freedom council and 
the image of the resistance movement that people should go on believ-
ing that the order to shoot informers and other security risks had come 
from a high level and that the decision had been reached only after 
careful examination of each case. For the same reason, the liquidators – 
some of them apparently professional assassins or others with links to 
the criminal underworld  – had been instructed after the liberation to 
keep quiet about this side of their wartime activities. If the source of 
orders, the basis for decisions, the character of killers and the proportion 
of mistakes became generally known, the idea of a united and organized 
resistance movement managed and controlled by the freedom council 
would be unmasked as a fiction. The glory of one and the aura of the 
other would be gone.
Having already called Frode Jakobsen the spider at the centre of the 
web of culpable investigations set up after the liberation and described 
the liquidations as the dirty linen of the resistance movement, he wound 
up his argument with a few parting shots at the freedom council. With its 
academic discussions and public proclamations, it had existed in a polit-
ical world of theory and dreams, not in the real world of men of action.73
In presenting a dark chapter of Danish resistance in a new light, 
Emkjær had the advantage over earlier historians of distance in time 
from the events and people he was judging. Not sharing the prejudices, 
convictions and commitments of the preceding generations of writers, 
he was free to cast doubt on the cause of the allied powers, to question 
the performance of the Danish resistance movement and to deny the 
conflict between resistance and cooperation, and could even allow him-
self to indulge in iconoclastic attacks on entities and individuals that 
acted in situations which were beyond his own experience.
But the distance in time was also a handicap. When he disquali-
fied Danish resistance as a movement as well as when he condemned 
on moral, and would- be legal, grounds the practice of liquidation he 
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tended to apply peacetime norms and rules to wartime conduct. Thus, 
he showed little understanding of the needs and norms of a resistance 
movement which, operating in a small, flat and densely populated 
country occupied by enemy military and police forces, depended on the 
loyalty of its members and the discretion of the public. In his censori-
ous enquiry into summary liquidations of actual and potential security 
risks, Emkjær was inclined to allow later moral reactions to overshadow 
contemporary martial needs and political considerations.
An earlier neo- revisionist contribution to Danish occupation histo-
riography, about another group of individuals who during and after the 
occupation had been punished or condemned for unpatriotic behaviour, 
also had a pronounced moral dimension. In Tyskerpiger – under besæt-
telse og retsopgør (Pro- German girls  – during occupation and judicial 
reckoning), Anette Warring examined the conduct, role and treatment 
of young Danish women who had engaged in intimate relations with sol-
diers of the occupation forces. A  Ph.D.  dissertation from the Institute 
for History and Social Science of Roskilde University Centre, it rested 
on police records and judicial sources as well as interviews with women 
involved. In approach and analysis, it drew on concepts from sociology, 
psychology and, not least, women’s studies.
Instead of tyskertøse (pro- German tarts), or other offensive terms 
used during and after the war, Warring called the fraternizing women 
tyskerpiger (pro- German girls). She thought that there were perhaps at 
least 50,000 of them in the five years of the occupation – a figure roughly 
equal to the size of the resistance army at the time of the liberation. In a 
country in which the large majority of the population accepted that the 
correct behaviour towards members of the occupying forces was that of 
the cold shoulder, the public image of such women could not be flatter-
ing. They were generally taken to be stupid, ugly and of easy virtue, an 
image which remained long after the war and found expression in films 
and literature, even in some historiography. Warring, however, found 
that the fraternizing women formed a heterogeneous group. Coming 
from all social classes, they differed in most respects, including intel-
ligence, appearance, age, marital status and political orientation. Yet 
most of them, she thought, were probably young women who did not 
live with their parents and who socially and educationally were below 
the average for the population.
She distinguished five types of pro- German girls, namely the pros-
titute, the woman who loved one soldier only, the woman who frater-
nized with one soldier after the other, the woman who openly engaged 
in general interaction with Germans, and the woman who was with 
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Germans out of pro- German attitudes and Nazi beliefs. Her analysis 
of their reasons for associating with German soldiers did not show any 
shared political or social motive, or point to any shared psychological 
characteristic. Yet, whatever the reasons, their decision to keep company 
with Germans in a situation of military occupation became an act vested 
with a degree of political significance. In particular, the behaviour of 
women who openly and publicly mixed with German soldiers appeared 
as a signal of sympathy for them and acceptance of their presence in 
the country. Through their conduct, the fraternizing women placed 
themselves on the side of the collaborators and in opposition to those 
who pursued the cold- shoulder line or engaged in active resistance.74 
However, only a tiny proportion of such women, about 300, seemed to 
have been guilty of informing for the Germans.
Much like Emkjær half a dozen years later, Warring was as inter-
ested in the motivation and role of those who passed judgement and 
carried out punishment as in the conduct of those who suffered the con-
demnation and retribution. As in other occupied countries, the typical 
punishment inflicted on a fraternizing woman was a cropping of her 
hair. Sometimes she was also stripped naked, and perhaps subjected 
to other forms of sexual humiliation. The first cropping recorded had 
already taken place in 1940; but it was in connection with the public 
disturbances in August 1943, and again in the days of the liberation, 
that the practice became more common. Sometimes such incidents led 
to street fights between German soldiers and Danish men, which left the 
Danish police in a difficult situation. The clashes also complicated rela-
tions between the Danish and the German authorities responsible for 
managing the fraternization.
The perpetrators of the punishments were mostly young men, typ-
ically workers, apprentices and errand boys. But they enjoyed the tacit 
understanding and acceptance of substantial sections of the public. In 
the months leading up to the August rebellions several Communist ille-
gal papers helped to prepare the way for persecution of the pro-German 
women. When the punishments became more common occurrences the 
party refrained from intervening. Moreover, it was Communists who in 
several towns were behind a demand for the dismissal of female employ-
ees guilty of fraternization. Thus, Warring concluded, the Communist 
party and its members carried part of the responsibility for the harsh 
treatment of the women that summer.
During the following months the leadership of the Communist party 
warned its members against ‘outright sadistic excesses in the treatment 
of the girls’, which Warring saw as an indication that the party was well 
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aware of the mixed nature of the motives behind the cropping actions, 
part patriotic and part gender- moral, sexual or private. Throughout the 
occupation, the harassment of pro- German women was a manifestation 
of the conflict between collaboration and resistance. However, it contin-
ued after the liberation, and became even more frequent and brutal. At 
this stage, the author thought, the motive was pure vengeance.75
Like other categories of collaborators, fraternizing women were 
rounded up and interned after the liberation, partly for their protection 
and partly for the purpose of possible prosecution. The public thirst for 
revenge for the most obvious form of collaboration was great. According 
to a Gallup poll carried out a month after the end of the occupation, as 
many as 75 per cent thought that pro- German women should be pun-
ished in some way. 1.3 per cent, more women than men, even wanted 
them executed. However, the retroactive laws passed by parliament did 
not include mere fraternization in the list of treasonable acts. So, unless 
charged with informing or some other criminal action, the interned 
women were set free, to live the rest of their lives with the shame and, in 
some cases, a guilty conscience.
The croppers, the men who in the days of liberation had attacked and 
punished pro- German women, were treated more mildly than under the 
occupation. Most cases were not reported to the police, and those that did 
go to court were dealt with in a rather arbitrary and inconsistent manner, 
and usually settled with a lenient sentence. The author noted that no orga-
nization, not even those representing women, protested against the treat-
ment inflicted on such women, and concluded that this, together with the 
very mild sentences, showed that the Danish society largely accepted the 
croppings. Yet such acts even when carried out by members of the resis-
tance movement exasperated at seeing various kinds of collaborators going 
unpunished, violated those democratic principles of law which Warring 
thought needed to be restored after five years of Nazi occupation.76
Fraternizing with German soldiers was not against the law during 
the occupation and was not deemed criminal in the post- war legisla-
tion. It was, however, regarded as in breach of the unwritten rules of 
the prevailing morality of the time. That morality, in Warring’s analysis, 
had a national, a gender- related and a sexual component. The offend-
ing women had challenged each of those sets of norms. In a situation 
in which the acceptable political line was to cold- shoulder or to resist 
the occupying forces, they had acted unpatriotically by entering into 
intimate relations with German soldiers. Here they had made their 
choice and, whatever their personal motivations, had joined the ranks 
of collaborators.
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In their breach of gender role and sexual morality, however, those 
women had been victims of a traditional mentality which linked women 
and their behaviour with the honour and fate of the nation. As moth-
ers, educators and symbols, women were seen as having an important 
part  to play in the processes which secured the nation’s cohesion and 
identity as well as its independence and distinctness in international 
relations. By engaging emotionally and sexually with enemy soldiers, 
and thus implicitly rejecting Danish men, the women presented a threat 
to the established social and national order. The treatment of pro- 
German women after the liberation, Warring concluded her analysis, 
rested on ‘the conception of women’s sexuality as national property’.77
Focusing on their breaches of conventional morality, rather than 
on their admittedly unpatriotic conduct, allowed the author to intro-
duce and apply concepts and criteria which had been developed decades 
after the women’s fraternization and the croppers’ lawless retaliation. 
Drawing on a modern gender ideology which focused on the role and 
rights of women, she could present the women of the 1940s as victims of 
an outmoded social mentality. Though she did not absolve the fraterniz-
ing women of their guilt of sexual collaboration, she directed her moral 
reprobation mainly at those who had punished and abused them.
Here a degree of similarity with Emkjær’s work on informers and 
their killers might be noted. Inclined to apply his post- cold- war demo-
cratic legal and moral norms to a situation of wartime occupation half 
a century earlier, he denounced those guilty of approving or carrying 
out liquidations of suspected informers, and suggested that most of the 
men and women killed in this way had been more or less innocent. Both 
historians managed to place their group of collaborators in a better light 
by censuring their killers and tormentors. The result of their revisionist 
scholarship was a more nuanced picture of the collaborators, as well as 
of their castigators.
The four books presented in this section examined marginal 
groups of people who, in the heady times of the 1940s, had been deemed 
traitors, or at least considered beyond the pale of the professed national 
solidarity against the occupying power. Their authors were young histo-
rians who, lacking personal experience of the occupation, had no strong 
anti- German feelings. With at best early childhood memories of the 
post- war decades, they were not moved by the claimed national concord 
and not particularly interested in the manifest conflict between coop-
eration and resistance, the two themes that had marked earlier periods 
of historiography. Their contribution was to bring groups of former out-
casts to the fore and reconsider their case. Revealing the identity and 
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motives and examining the roles and treatment of such people, their 
works demolished a number of myths and contributed to the under-
standing of generally despised and overlooked groups.
That wave of revisionism marked the hitherto last stage in the 
long development in Danish historiography from more or less total 
commitment to resistance to some acceptance of collaboration. It was 
a process characterized by a gradual narrowing of focus and introver-
sion of perspective, politically as well as morally. The first generation of 
historians, conscious of the importance of the country’s relations with 
the allied powers in the later stages of the war, focused on the national 
struggle with the German occupier. The second generation, more aware 
of domestic political disagreements about the way to defend Danish 
interests, based most of their work on the opposition between cooper-
ation and resistance as reactions to foreign occupation. The last gener-
ation, more interested in the fate of the outsiders in occupation history, 
devoted their attention to the character and role of groups of people who 
chose to collaborate with the Germans.
Morally, it was a regression from accepting patriotic duty in a time 
of European war with a Nazi enemy, through endorsing the safeguard-
ing of internal Danish interests in a situation of foreign occupation, to 
upholding the democratic and human rights of deviant individuals act-
ing in extreme political and social circumstances. If the theme of the 
first period of Danish historiography was national concord and, of the 
second, civil conflict, the theme of the last period, with its particularist 
focus and morally revisionist approach, became social discord.
3.4 Debate
The decade round the turn of the century, between the fiftieth and the 
sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Denmark, produced many new 
and significant scholarly publications about the period of occupation. 
So did the following and the most recent years. It may be too soon to 
detect and identify one or more further stages of the historiography 
surveyed above. However, it is possible to classify, if rather roughly, the 
bulk of such material. The most obvious distinction is between writings 
examining the external dimension and writings focusing on the inter-
nal dimension of the country’s situation in those five years. Two further 
categories of modern scholarly literature, namely that of general pre-
sentations of the history of the occupation of Denmark and that of its 
historiography of the subject, may complete the classification.
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International
Within the category of scholarship devoted to the external dimension, 
a distinction may be made between a relatively small number of works 
which clarify and analyse the formal status of occupied Denmark in 
international society and a larger group which examine its actual rela-
tions with the major belligerents of the time. While the authors of the 
former set apply legal and moral criteria, those of the latter group deal 
with political, economic and military relations. While the former seek 
to clarify status and correct misconceptions, the latter add to existing 
knowledge of the country’s interaction with the great powers of the 
region.
For some time, the formal status of occupied Denmark in relation to 
both the occupying power and other states, belligerent or not, was some-
what obscure. One difficulty, and source of confusion, was the duality 
of Danish thinking about neutrality that had developed in the inter- war 
years. One strand was that of traditional legal neutrality, the other that of 
so- called neo- neutrality.
Legal neutrality, as developed in European international relations 
of the nineteenth century and codified in the Hague Conventions from 
1907, had its supporters mainly in the Conservative and Liberal oppo-
sition parties. Neo- neutrality, rooted in the pacifism of some Radical 
Liberals and the anti- militarism of many Social Democrats and devel-
oped in the optimistic internationalist spirit of the first decade of the 
League of Nations, had its champions in the two political parties that 
governed Denmark in the 1930s. Prescribing proactive diplomacy in 
pursuit of peace, it had a pronounced moral element.
The events of 9 April 1940 put an end to the legal neutrality of the 
Danish state. Though the Germans declared that they acted in order to 
defend its neutrality, the invasion and occupation naturally negated its 
territorial integrity and diplomatic impartiality. However, for those who 
believed that Danish neutrality was more than a legal concept and a for-
mal status it was difficult to accept its sudden and total non- existence. 
Peter Munch, foreign minister since 1929 and Radical Liberal leader, 
recognized the end of neutrality as a legal attribute of the state but 
claimed that it had survived as a moral quality of the nation. For a long 
time, later Danish historians – perhaps misled by ambiguous statements 
made at the time by prominent individuals – concluded or assumed and 
accepted that the government, under reference to the notion of neo- neu-
trality, had claimed neutral status after the invasion.
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In an article investigating Denmark’s international legal status 
during the war, published in English in 2011, Karen Gram- Skjoldager 
reported that her research had revealed no evidence of Munch, or any 
other member of the government, having made such a claim.78 The 
status which the government at that stage could accept was one of 
non- belligerence, a characterization which was in harmony with the 
internationalist ideology of the Radical Liberals. For Munch, of course, 
it was linked with the notion of moral neutrality. From the moment the 
king and the government on 9 April decided to give up resisting the 
invading forces the basic motivation behind Danish non- belligerence 
was, as it had been for its neutrality, to spare the country and its people 
the ravages of war.
Erik Scavenius, who at the request of the king replaced Munch as 
foreign minister in July 1940, was impressed with the German military 
victories and thought it wise for Denmark to adopt a more accommodat-
ing and even proactive attitude towards the occupying power. His years 
in office, first as foreign minister and, from November 1942 to August 
1943, also as prime minister, became another phase in the history of the 
country’s legal status. It was characterized by the concept of peaceful 
occupation. As developed by Erik Brüel, a lawyer and influential writer 
specializing in international law, that notion applied only to Denmark, 
not to countries which had been occupied belligerently. In principle, 
it protected the authority of the central political and legal institutions 
of the occupied state. Thus, the government could employ the notion 
when seeking to defend the execution of its internal sovereignty against 
intrusions by the occupying power. This became important in matters 
of jurisdiction, especially in cases involving illegal acts directed against 
the occupying authorities.
The fourth concept presented, analysed and discussed by Gram- 
Skjoldager, that of war, related to the phase in Danish– German rela-
tions that started with the events in the summer and autumn of 1943 
and lasted until the liberation in May 1945. After the growth of sabo-
tage, the public confrontations in August, the retreat of the government 
and the establishment of the freedom council the idea of Denmark being 
at war with Germany gradually gained ground. The claim, advanced 
by the freedom council and eventually supported by official Denmark, 
found some international support when Britain and the United States 
in June 1944 de facto acknowledged Denmark as an allied nation. A fur-
ther indication of allied acceptance of the claim was the invitation to 
participate in the San Francisco Conference in June 1945.
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However, the author found the matter of the possible role of 
Denmark as a belligerent party the most politicized of the legal ques-
tions pertaining to that country during the war, for the reason that it 
was closely tied to the basic political and moral dilemma between coop-
eration and resistance. Moreover, it was the most complex of the legal 
questions raised in the article, because it brought up the difficulties of 
defining ‘war’ and of determining the identity of ‘Denmark’ after the 
retreat of its government in 1943.
Having explored the informed debate that arose from those ques-
tions, she concluded the article with some general observations about 
the four concepts. Legal arguments advanced in support of neutrality, 
non- belligerence, peaceful occupation and war, she found, served as 
political instruments. As such they were closely linked with changing 
conceptions of Denmark’s international position and national interests. 
Moreover, those legal concepts gradually took on a life of their own, and 
shaped Danish perceptions and political actions. The idea of peaceful 
occupation in particular affected not only politicians and officials but 
also later historians of that period in Danish history.
The utilitarian value to Danish politicians and officials of legal con-
cepts of the formal status of occupied Denmark, with their accompany-
ing argumentation, was a major theme also of a chapter which appeared 
two years later. Written by Niels Wium Olesen for a British publication, 
it was entitled ‘The Obsession with Sovereignty:  Cohabitation and 
Resistance in Denmark 1940- 45’.79 It presented the political advantages, 
reviewed the major disadvantages and discussed the moral difficulties 
of seeking to maintain more than a semblance of sovereignty in contin-
ual interaction with the occupying power.
From the beginning of the occupation Germany granted Denmark 
the status of a sovereign state, which the Danish authorities accepted 
and utilized to the utmost. However, Danish independence was severely 
curtailed in both external and internal relations. In the former dimen-
sion hardly anything was left of Danish sovereignty. In the latter, formal 
parity between occupier and occupied was largely an illusion because 
the German military presence consistently gave it the upper hand. 
Yet, the German authorities generally left it to the Danish government 
to exercise its internal sovereignty, as long as it did not conflict with 
German interests of a military nature. Matters at issue were dealt with 
through negotiation between representatives of the foreign ministries 
of the parties.
The foremost result for Denmark of such dynamics between 
the occupier and the occupied, the author noted, was the remarkable 
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political and institutional continuity from the inter- war to the post- war 
years. Contrary to some other countries under German occupation, 
Denmark avoided a Nazi take- over of government and maintained its 
democratic system. Thus, it was able to have a parliamentary election in 
March 1943, and to keep support for DNSAP to a very low level. In some 
important matters, however, the government felt obliged to give in to 
German pressure, even when it meant violating basic democratic prin-
ciples. Accepting censorship of the press, approving expulsion of certain 
members of parliament and organizing internment of Communists were 
cardinal cases of the system doing the dirty work for Nazi Germany.
In the political circumstances of the time, clinging to the notion of 
sovereignty and maintaining a semblance of independence at such costs 
could be seen by the decision- makers and their supporters as the poli-
tics of the lesser evil. But active members and supporters of the growing 
resistance movement would not accept that. Wium Olesen concluded 
with a brief presentation of the moral issue involved.
Bringing in Max Weber’s distinction between the ethic of responsi-
bility and the ethic of conviction, he distinguished between those guided 
by probable consequences and those guided by principles. Apparently 
tending to side with the former, he went on to add to the list of laudable 
results of the ‘Danish line’ with the Germans. Still, a problem remained.
Official Danish– German transactions had a touch of mutuality and 
voluntariness. Though largely fictional, they were not entirely without 
substance, since nobody really forced the Danes to negotiate. The ten-
sion was between the element of compulsion and the threat of a much 
worse alternative on one side and the element of voluntariness and 
mutuality along with a degree of complicity on the other side. That was 
the moral framework within which most discussion about the policy of 
negotiation and cooperation had taken place since 1940.
The occupation of Denmark suddenly put an end to practically all 
diplomatic, economic and social relations with Germany’s enemies, but 
gradually broadened and deepened such relations with the occupying 
power. Since the turn of the century Danish– German interaction and 
cooperation in the economic sphere in particular have attracted the 
attention of many Danish historians and given rise to a number of schol-
arly debates. Again the underlying concern of the participants has often 
been with the moral dimension.
In 1998 Philip Giltner published a book entitled In the Friendliest 
Manner, which was based on his doctoral dissertation in History at the 
University of Toronto. Subtitled German- Danish Economic Cooperation 
During the Nazi Occupation of 1940– 1945, it relied on both German 
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and Danish sources.80 He started by questioning Denmark’s ethical 
position in the great struggle against Nazi dictatorship, noting that 
Danes usually had been less than eager to discuss this aspect of their 
past. That Denmark had survived German occupation better than any 
other occupied country in Europe was obvious. The reasons, how-
ever, were less than clear. Two conceivable causes often cited, namely 
the importance for the German war economy of Danish agricultural 
exports and the Aryan nature of the Danish population, he dismissed. 
The real reason was that Denmark, unlike all other occupied coun-
tries, from the outset chose to cooperate with the occupying power, 
and continued to do so even after the formal retreat of the Danish 
government in 1943.
This policy suited the Germans well. To the Nazi government, the 
basic importance of Denmark was strategic. Control of Danish territory 
provided access to Norway and barred entry to the Baltic. The overrid-
ing political concern had to be to maintain economic security and social 
stability in the country with a minimum of German effort. Negotiating 
with the Danish authorities in matters of importance and leaving most 
of the daily administration to them seemed the most efficient procedure. 
For the Danes, too, the so- called negotiation policy was advantageous. 
Based on the nonsensical notion of ‘occupied neutrality’, the arrange-
ment generally left domestic matters in the hands of Danish authori-
ties. Most important, it served as a protection against a more ruthless 
exploitation of the country. Through negotiation and management, the 
Danish government and administration made themselves indispensable 
to the German authorities. Thus Denmark defended its national inter-
ests, Giltner concluded, by cooperating with one of the most odious 
regimes of the modern era.
Half a dozen years later a book on much the same subject appeared in 
Denmark. Written by Ole Brandenborg Jensen, and also based on a Ph.D. 
thesis, it was entitled Besættelsestidens Økonomiske og Erhvervmæssige 
Forhold.81 The subtitle too, Studier i de Økonomiske Relationer mellem 
Danmark og Tyskland 1940– 1945, was rather more neutral than that of 
the earlier work. In the preface the author declared that the book should 
in no way be seen as a contribution to the current competition to expose 
various industrial groups and individuals that, in the bright light of hind-
sight, could be accused of collaboration and opportunism. On the con-
trary, he stated, the book was an attempt to describe and explain the 
actions of the parties in the context of their own times.
In general, he found, economic relations between the two coun-
tries were of relatively little importance, basically because the German 
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authorities dealing with Denmark put political goals before economic 
concerns. Acknowledging the notion of Danish sovereignty in internal 
affairs, they usually left such matters to the Danes themselves. Subjects 
that did require German attention, and led to negotiation and coopera-
tion between the parties, were most of the time to do with Danish export 
of goods to and imports from Germany, and employment of Danish 
workers in that country.
Danish export of fresh fish and agricultural products was not so 
important a part of the wartime nutrition of the German nation as ear-
lier historians had assumed. Nor did it lead to significant shortages in 
Denmark. More important, it helped to pay for imports from Germany 
of goods traditionally supplied by Britain and essential for Danish pro-
duction and the national economy, especially coal, fuel and steel. Such 
imports became tied up with the supply of Danish manpower for German 
factories. Probably well over 30,000 Danish workers were employed in 
Germany at any particular stage of the earlier years of the occupation. 
For a country at war and with major shortages of manpower, this was a 
not insignificant contribution. However, it was also a convenient solu-
tion for Denmark, whose government and trade unions at that time were 
still struggling with the problems of unemployment.
Much more problematic, the author admitted, was the Danish con-
tribution, made in the last years of the occupation, to the construction 
of extensive defensive fortifications along the coast of Jutland. Forced 
through by decrees, instead of arrived at through negotiation and 
agreement with Danish authorities, it involved substantial participation 
in German military efforts. With eventually more than 100,000 Danes 
working on what became part of Germany’s great Atlantic Wall, Danish 
involvement led to local shortages of labour, especially in agriculture. 
Consisting of about 8,000 concrete bunkers, the project also required 
large supplies of cement and timber from Danish sources. However, 
since the main objective of the Danish administration always had been 
to retain as much sovereignty in internal affairs as possible, the most 
serious aspect of the whole project was the way it had been imposed on 
the country.
Very few Danes actively engaged in various forms of official nego-
tiation and cooperation with the occupying power were motivated by 
a desire to see Nazi Germany win the war. But nor were many of them 
driven by commitment to the allied cause. The overriding concern was 
simply to defend and pursue Danish political and economic interests in 
a situation of national emergency. When Brandenborg Jensen discussed 
the advantages and disadvantages for Denmark of such cooperation he 
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implicitly accepted and endorsed that attitude. Regarding the people 
who carried the responsibility in those days as pragmatists, he thought 
that they should not be judged by post- war moral scruples. Giltner’s 
work on the subject did not gain a mention in the book.
Several other economic historians contributing to the debate in the 
early years of the century were more critical of those who had engaged 
in economic cooperation with the occupying power. Their publications, 
again typically based on a Ph.D. dissertation, took up various kinds of 
such cooperation. Steen Andersen examined the history of some major 
companies of contractors from 1919 to 1947, but concentrated on the 
occupation period. His angle was their way of doing business in dif-
ficult political circumstances, and the order of priorities applied in 
decision- making.82
The record of Kampsax, one of the biggest companies, was politi-
cally ambiguous. It included major projects carried out by a subsidiary 
company for British authorities, such as road- building for transport 
of war materials to the Soviet Union before the battle of Stalingrad. 
However, the likely consequences for the course of the war were not a 
primary motive. It was more a case of the company taking on projects 
wherever it was profitable and possible.
The record of Christiani & Nielsen, another large company, was 
rather worse. It included seeking contracts in Norway for the building 
of submarine bases and plants for the production of aluminium for the 
German aircraft industry and, especially, undertaking extensive build-
ing by its German subsidiary of submarine bases and roads in France. All 
of it, the author emphasized, of obvious military importance. That com-
pany, he found, had gone well beyond the considerations dictated by the 
state of occupation. It could be deemed as showing ‘improper initiative’.
In general, Andersen found, Danish contractors put profit before 
national loyalty in their relations with German authorities, which did 
not surprise him. More remarkable was their short- sightedness. They 
tended to continue their cooperation well after changes in the fortunes 
of war had led most of the Danish population to expect an allied victory.
In a book entitled Hitlers spisekammer (larder), made up of an 
abridged dissertation and various relevant articles, reports and papers 
and published in 2005, Joachim Lund examined and discussed Danish 
economic and commercial cooperation with Germany in occupied parts 
of Europe.83 The German authorities, he found, had no wish to give 
Denmark a special role or to allocate it particular functions in the pro-
jected new order for Eastern Europe. German policy, it was clear, was 
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conditioned by short- term considerations, and seriously affected by dis-
agreement between governmental offices involved in the planning.
However, the Danish parties concerned, both the political and the 
commercial, were apparently quite willing to participate in the German 
project, whether in the Baltic states or in Russian and Ukrainian regions. 
Elsewhere in Europe too, the author found, there were German building 
projects and other planned activities which attracted Danish interest. If 
the concrete results of Danish efforts to engage in economic collabora-
tion with the occupying power were rather limited it was mainly because 
of German reluctance and, simply, time running out. Lund concluded his 
critique by noting a significant parallel between political and economic 
collaboration in the early years of the occupation.
The same year Mogens R. Nissen’s Til fælles bedste – det danske 
landbrug under besættelsen appeared.84 Dealing with the history and role 
of Danish agriculture during the occupation, it focused on the impor-
tance of food exports to Germany. Challenging Brandenborg Jensen’s 
conclusions on the matter, the author argued that such exports had a 
significant role, which grew with the duration of the war. Thus, his anal-
ysis of German statistics indicated that import of meat from Denmark 
rose from 4– 5 per cent to 10– 12 per cent of total consumption. The 
Danish contribution was relatively greatest in 1944– 45, when Germany 
lost supplies from most of the countries it had previously conquered. 
However, the real importance of this form of economic cooperation, he 
stressed, was for the political relationship between the occupier and the 
occupied. The export helped to support the Danish policy of cooperation 
and to maintain the German policy of lenient occupation.
Nissen dealt also with the moral dimension of the wartime perfor-
mance of the agricultural section of the Danish economy. Here he did not 
have an issue with Brandenborg Jensen. Neither of them saw that sec-
tion as more given to voluntary collaboration with the Germans than its 
industrial and commercial counterpart was. Neither party was conspic-
uous for making economic sacrifices in the name of national solidarity.
Through their Ph.D.  dissertations and other publications, Philip 
Giltner, Ole Brandenborg Jensen, Steen Andersen, Joachim Lund, 
Mogens R. Nissen and other young economic historians revealed, exam-
ined and discussed hitherto obscure aspects of the economic side of 
Danish– German relations. Whether reacting to prevarications or deni-
als by interested parties or testing assumptions or assertions of earlier 
historians, they cast new light on the wartime policy and practice of 
cooperating with the dominant external power.
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Danish relations with Germany’s two foremost European enemies, 
Britain and the Soviet Union, developed later in the war and remained 
secret throughout the occupation. Initially of a largely military nature, 
they eventually acquired some tentative political and diplomatic quali-
ties. The connection with Britain became the subject of Jørgen Hæstrup’s 
first major work on Danish resistance. Provisionally entitled Secret 
Alliance, Kontakt med England 1940– 43 was written without access to 
SOE archives and published in 1954. Nearly half a century later relations 
between SOE and Danish resistance, and British policy towards occu-
pied and liberated Denmark, were re- examined in Knud J. V. Jespersen’s 
two- volume work Med hjælp fra England. 1940– 1945.85 It was based on 
British sources now available to historians. Its appearance led to another 
scholarly debate, this one about resistance instead of cooperation.
It started when a young historian Peter Edelberg made his mark 
with a challenging paper published in Historisk Tidsskrift under the 
title ‘Arven fra Hæstrup’ (the legacy from Hæstrup).86 It was a critique of 
Hæstrup’s conception of history and use of sources and a probe into his 
influence on later historians. The seminal doctoral dissertation Kontakt 
med England was intended and presented as objective history but was 
in fact, Edelberg pointed out, conditioned by political and ideological 
trends prevailing at the time of writing, the early stages of the cold 
war. It turned out to be a defence of the resistance movement, which to 
that author meant resistance supported and guided by Britain. Its focus 
was on SOE, and its heroes the agents parachuted into Denmark. That 
meant largely excluding the Communists and their engagement in the 
struggle.
He also criticized Hæstrup for idealizing the motivations and 
efforts of people involved in resistance, especially the SOE agents them-
selves. All from the outset inspired by patriotism, such people, it was 
implied, simply wanted to rid Denmark of Germans. Their less flatter-
ing activities, especially liquidation of informers, and various disagree-
ments and conflicts dividing them were not dwelled upon. On the latter 
point Edelberg was well informed, having come across some ‘personal 
files’ in the SOE archives in London.
He went on to deal with the works of some of the foremost ben-
eficiaries of the legacy from Hæstrup. While well aware of some of 
the shortcomings of Hæstrup’s work, both Hans Kirchhoff and Aage 
Trommer implicitly subscribed to the master’s view of historiography as 
a process of compilation, motivated by a quest for the truth and aimed 
at conveying a correct understanding. Though belonging to the second 
generation of occupation historians, they did not seem to appreciate 
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that other scholars with different political interests and other ideologi-
cal beliefs looking at the same material might discover a different truth 
and reach another understanding. Thus, like Hæstrup, they did not see a 
need for someone else to carry out a fresh examination of the material.
However, Edelberg’s critique was directed mainly at the schol-
arship of Knud J.V. Jespersen. A specialist on the seventeenth century 
who already had written a book about the Danish brigade in Sweden, 
Jespersen had been asked by Hæstrup and Ole Lippmann, SOE’s last 
leader in Denmark, to undertake the more crucial task. Thus Edelberg 
was able to deem his two- volume work another product of the influence 
of the old- boy network of SOE and resistance veterans.
Moreover, he found that Jespersen essentially belonged to the first 
generation of occupation historians, his first volume lying end- to- end 
with the master’s writings, simply telling the story from the opposite 
angle. He was a ‘back- to- front Hæstrup’. Basing his analysis only on the 
first volume, Det lange tilløb 1940– 1943 (The Long Run- up), published 
in 1998, he argued that Jespersen failed to take account of issues raised 
by second- generation historians relating to some of Hæstrup’s theses, 
and also failed to explore the effect of political and ideological trends on 
earlier research into the occupation period.
Offered an opportunity to present a reply in the same issue of the 
journal, Jespersen rejected Edelberg’s charges and argued that they 
were based on selective reading and overinterpretations. If Edelberg 
had taken the trouble to read also the second volume of his work he 
would have seen that the author’s interpretations were not in keep-
ing with the conservative and national tendencies Edelberg ascribed 
to him. Kirchhoff’s and Trommer’s answers followed in a later issue of 
the journal.87 The former found the critique, when based on narrow, 
selective and disloyal reading, distorted in several respects. Defending 
Hæstrup he drew attention to the need for caution when writing about 
highly sensitive matters in the decades after the liberation of the coun-
try. Trommer agreed with Kirchhoff. Rejecting the charge of subscribing 
to the compilation approach to writing occupation history, he insisted 
that neither he nor Kirchhoff believed that one and only one adequate 
narrative of that period could be written. To conclude that they did was 
‘pure manipulation’. In an answer to the three respondents, printed in 
the same issue, Edelberg largely stuck to his guns, but paid tribute to 
their works as well as to Hæstrup’s. With an acknowledgement of his 
own debt of gratitude to the latter for his achievement in collecting and 
analysing sources, Edelberg closed this brief inter- generational debate 
between historians.
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As regards relations with the Soviet Union, it was again access 
to archival sources which led to fresh investigations and new findings. 
The most revealing material was the wartime communications between 
leaders of Denmark’s Communist Party (DKP) and the Comintern. 
Reports, letters and other documents cast light on the difficult years of 
the non- aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, on the 
challenging middle period of internment and growing resistance and on 
the crucial stages of liberation and transition to peacetime politics.
One important result of the research was a large volume of docu-
ments relating to the activities of DKP and the cross- party illegal paper 
and organization Frit Danmark between 1939 and 1943/ 44.88 Edited 
by two foremost historians of the first revisionist generation, Kirchhoff 
and Trommer, it revealed, in its earlier part, the difficulties experi-
enced by a political party which since 1935 had been committed to the 
strategy of popular front against fascism but which, from August 1939, 
had to justify the new Soviet policy towards Nazi Germany. The doc-
uments demonstrated how the party, while obviously far from being 
pro- German, always had to toe the line laid down by the Comintern. 
The later documents, supplemented by reports and letters from local 
branches in the country, showed how both the party and Frit Danmark 
struggled to establish and maintain the twin strategy of popular front 
and national front, which subsequently became the ordained line.
Documents pertaining to relations between DKP and Moscow 
towards the end of the occupation and in the post- war decades became 
sources for a book with a tell- tale title. In 1999 Bent Jensen, a leading 
sovietologist, published his Bjørnen og haren (the bear and the hare).89 
Having previously dealt with the gloomy role of Thomas Døssing as the 
representative in Moscow of Denmark’s freedom council and having 
explained the mysterious Soviet occupation of the island of Bornholm 
after the German capitulation, he now analysed Denmark’s relationship 
with the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1965.
Whatever the goals, policies and hopes of DKP leaders in the last 
months of the war, Jensen found no evidence of the Soviet leadership 
at that stage contemplating a military occupation of Denmark. Though 
very critical of the country’s close cooperation with Germany during the 
occupation, the Soviet decision- makers accepted from the beginning 
of 1945 the formation of a broad coalition government in Copenhagen 
led by Vilhelm Buhl and with the freedom council as well as the polit-
ical parties represented. The Soviet Union, he found, seemed to have 
come to accept Denmark as being within the British sphere of post- war 
influence. With little encouragement from Moscow and no alternative 
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international backing in sight, any radical programme harboured and 
any revolutionary initiative contemplated by DKP’s leaders in the tran-
sition from war to peace have their place more in the context of national 
politics.
national
Many scholarly historical writings, it seems, are inclined to present a 
sympathetic view of cooperation with the authorities of the occupying 
power, at least in its governmental and administrative forms. Criticism 
is usually directed more at corporate or personal instances of collabo-
ration. On the other hand, such writings often seem to show a sceptical 
attitude to resistance, especially in its armed and organized appear-
ance. Here a major concern is with the political programmes and post- 
war goals of the two political parties most closely associated with the 
resistance movement, namely DKP and Danish Unity (Dansk Samling).
From his study of Soviet sources, Bent Jensen concluded that the 
Russian masters were convinced that most of the Danish Communist 
leaders early in 1945 were intoxicated with wildly exaggerated ideas of 
their national popularity. Michael Kjeldsen, in an article analysing DKP’s 
programme for the transition period and its concept of democracy, listed 
the reasons for the leaders’ illusions.90 At the national level, the strikes, 
protests and demonstrations of 1944 had strengthened the resistance 
movement and the freedom council, and thus enhanced the political 
influence of the party. Internationally, the example set by the Soviet 
Union in the war, the defects and risks associated with capitalism and 
the political achievements accomplished by Communist parties in other 
countries were also favourable influences. The post- war programme of 
the party presented in December 1944, ‘The Will of the People – the Law 
of the Land’, made it clear that the aim was ‘to extend democracy’ and 
bring socialism within reach. The assumption of political power was 
now clearly on the post- war agenda of the party.
Kjeldsen did not think that DKP was contemplating a military 
coup. On the other hand, it could hardly be said to be firmly committed 
to the doctrines and procedures of parliamentary democracy. Rather, 
its programme was to assume governmental power through extra- 
parliamentary efforts. By stirring propaganda and political action of 
many kinds, it would mobilize the masses and build up an overwhelm-
ing majority of people. For this purpose it was important to maintain the 
solidarity of the resistance movement.
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Danish Unity, too, presented a political threat to the theory and 
practice of the parliamentary system. Based on a communitarian ide-
ology with Christian and national roots, it rejected the sectarian rule 
by political parties that was bound up with parliamentary democracy, 
and championed instead elitist constitutional ideas. Though akin to the 
fascist movements emerging in inter- war Europe, it rejected German 
Nazism on both religious and national grounds. In the summer of 
1940 its leaders were in touch with the Højgaard group of conservative 
nationalist businessmen, who planned to appeal to the king to appoint 
a government of distinguished and independent individuals. However, 
eventually the party decided to put its constitutional programme on 
hold. Early in 1941 its leader Arne Sørensen firmly declared Danish 
Unity loyal to the coalition government for the duration of the occupation.
The party appealed especially to self- employed people, white- col-
lar workers, teachers, clergymen and students and attracted also a num-
ber of prominent intellectuals, notably the historian Vilhelm la Cour and 
the clergyman and author Kaj Munk. Many members and sympathizers 
joined local resistance groups, some establishing contact with SOE and 
reaching leading positions within the movement. When the freedom 
council was set up the party was offered a representative post, along with 
DKP and the principal resistance organizations. According to Henrik 
Lundbak’s doctorial dissertation about the history of Danish Unity, pub-
lished in 2001 under the title Staten stærk og folket frit (a strong state 
and a free people), Arne Sørensen preferred to appoint a deputy, and 
did not join the council till December 1943.91 The reason for his hesita-
tion was a fear that the freedom council was a front organization for the 
Communists.
Such fears were shared not only by members of other groups and 
parties right of centre on the political spectrum of the country. The 
Social Democrats, for whom the growing Communist movement was a 
potential rival, were also concerned. Others were disturbed by Danish 
Unity itself, with its fascist origins and extra- parliamentary programme. 
Yet others in the know may have been troubled by the fact that both of 
the political parties represented on the council had unconventional 
notions of the democratic form of constitution and government.
Most ordinary people too, not committed to either of the two par-
ties represented or engaged in active resistance, were at first sceptical 
about the nature and role of the freedom council, which they first heard 
about in the illegal press in October 1943. However, its performance in 
the dramatic events of the following summer led to a marked change in 
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the general attitude. Now accepted as the managing authority in situ-
ations of crisis, the freedom council had the backing of public opinion.
In recent years public attitudes and opinion have become a sub-
ject of serious study by Danish occupation historians. In 2000 Henning 
Poulsen published a humorous and ironic essay with the title ‘Hvad 
mente danskerne?’ (What did the Danes think).92 Starting with German 
reports on the changing attitudes of individual Danes during the occupa-
tion, he went on to discuss critically the population’s reactions to the two 
lines in Danish politics, cooperation and resistance. Speculating that the 
division between them might not have been so clear at the time, he sug-
gested that the Danes in general supported both sides, though perhaps 
with changing emphasis. It was perfectly possible to regard resistance as 
desirable and political cooperation (or simply politics, as he sometimes 
prefers to call it) as comforting.
Seven years later a rather more substantial work on the subject 
appeared. Written by Palle Roslyng- Jensen and entitled Danskerne og 
besættelsen (The Danes and the occupation), it was based on about 70 
diaries and other contemporary material from the six years of the war.93 
With diaries kept by individuals in positions with supreme responsibil-
ity, whether in the administration or in the resistance, excluded, the 
collection of diarists comprised a rich variety of ordinary Danes of that 
time. The analysis was presented chronologically in a dozen chapters, 
each structured round military and diplomatic developments in the war 
and political and social events in Denmark.
As a source of information about the attitudes, reactions and opin-
ions of ordinary – though articulate – people, the book is a contribution 
to the comparative study of the formation and influence of public opin-
ion in wartime Europe. However, with its many insights into the private 
lives of a broad range of diarists, it may also be seen as a composite and 
intimate account of everyday life in occupied Denmark. This social angle 
became a feature of some recent scholarly writings about that period of 
national history.
General
In 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Denmark, two 
books appeared to mark the occasion. They had three qualities in com-
mon. They provided an overview of all major aspects of the occupation, 
embraced all levels of Danish society and presented the five years in 
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the context of the preceding as well as the following period of Danish 
history.
Historical continuity had already been the professed theme of the 
substantial Festschrift published two years earlier, under the title Fra 
mellemkrigstid til efterkrigstid (From inter- war time to post- war time). 
The continuity presented in the two later works may be described more 
precisely as the development, defence and restoration of the democratic 
tradition of the nation.
Nearly half of Bo Lidegaard’s major work Kampen om Danmark 
1933– 45 (The fight about Denmark) is about the years before and the 
time after the occupation.94 The central part is broadly about a great 
national struggle of a coalition made up of successive governments, 
major institutions and the majority of the population against the forces 
supporting the totalitarian ideologies of Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Here all sections of the resistance movement are counted as part of the 
victorious democratic front. 1945, in this interpretation of Danish his-
tory, marks not only the victory of the democratic coalition but, signifi-
cantly, also the return to normality.
The other major general work of that year also presents the coun-
try under occupation as a product of the Denmark of the 1930s, which 
was broadly shaped by coalition governments of Social Democrats and 
Radical Liberals. Here the historical continuity may be identified as 
largely Social Democratic. In dealing with the catastrophic impact of the 
invasion on 9 April, the authors stress the importance of the many social, 
economic and administrative institutions that survived and managed to 
continue their work under occupation, and beyond liberation. A revised 
edition of a work first appearing in 1995, and revised again in 2015, it 
is entitled Danmark besat:  Krig og hverdag 1940– 45 (Denmark occu-
pied: war and daily life).95 About 800 pages long, it is the work of four 
historians with a wide range of scholarly specialities: Claus Bundgaard 
Christensen, Joachim Lund, Niels Wium Olesen and Jacob Sørensen. 
Regarded as the standard work on the occupation period, it is used at all 
universities in Denmark.
Not all recent general works plough the continuity furrow. 
Henning Poulsen’s brief and readable Besættelsesårene 1940– 1945 (The 
occupation years) of 2002 starts with 9 April and ends with the resto-
ration and the judicial reckoning in 1945  – and a one- line paragraph 
about life going on.96
The books discussed or mentioned in this sub- section are a small 
selection from a large number of recent historical publications on the 
subject. A critical review of scholarly occupation literature of the last 
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decade of the twentieth and first half decade of the present centuries 
is available in the form of three articles which appeared, with five- year 
intervals, in Historisk Tidsskrift. Written by Palle Roslyng- Jensen, they 
examine significant contributions, discuss analytic distinctions, bring 
out major themes and, sometimes, point to promising fields for new 
research.
The theme of the first article, which appeared in 1995, is ‘idealists 
and “materialists” in the occupation research’.97 Devoted to the anni-
versary of the liberation and the latest literature in the field, it takes up 
the conceptual distinction between consensus and conflict, and notes 
a paradox. While the broader sections of the public, as revealed in cel-
ebrations throughout the country, have moved towards the consensus 
perspective on the occupation, the scholars have mainly accentuated a 
conflict perspective on the period. The latter tendency even makes the 
author wonder whether the distinction between the two concepts is 
becoming a stereotype.
The second article, published in 2001, is a continuation of the first 
and surveys the occupation literature since 1995.98 It again character-
izes and presents contributions according to analytic distinctions and 
themes. The general theme now is ‘a national or an ideological histo-
riography?’ The author maintains that the experience of the occupation 
remains decisive for the formation of the national identity of the Danes. 
In the post- war years structured round the national state and expressed 
in novel foreign and defence policies, it has since become associated more 
with the Danish society, and expressed in social care at home and support 
for humanitarian causes abroad. The other main angle on the occupation 
research is more ideological. Its starting- points are the cold war between 
East and West and the conflict between right and left in Danish politics, 
each with its background in the occupation period. Many, though not all, 
of the scholarly writings of the last years of the twentieth century, the 
author finds, reflect one or both of those perspectives.
For the third article, published in 2006, it has become even more 
difficult to find a general theme.99 Limiting his field to writings which 
present new tendencies in occupation research or contribute new knowl-
edge, Roslyng- Jensen settles for ‘post- modernistic variation and contin-
uing boom’. It is no longer possible, as it still was in 2001, to characterize 
a substantial part of recent literature as, in some form or other, repre-
senting a revisionist approach. The relevant writings of the last five or 
six years, he finds, cover all degrees and combinations of consensus and 
conflict views. His overview starts with various general surveys of the 
occupation, and goes on to deal with publications about everyday life 
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and consciousness history – all relatively new categories of occupation 
historiography.
On balance, the selected scholarly writings surveyed here appear 
to be oriented more towards consensus. After generations of revision-
ist scholarship featuring conflict and discord, the debate among mod-
ern historians may again be pointing towards some kind of concord in 
national reactions to foreign occupation. Signs of this may be seen in 
sympathetic views of governmental cooperation, typically deemed nec-
essary or wise, and perhaps even in critical assessments of organized 
resistance, now often found heterogeneous and inferior, as well as in 
analysis of the interaction between the two.
Attempts to evade the basic dichotomy between cooperation and 
resistance, for example by postulating the development of a functional 
complementarity in which they, in effect, shield and exonerate each 
other, may be seen as pointing in the same direction. So may various 
creative efforts to find alternative dichotomies, some involving a renam-
ing of cooperation (negotiation, politics, cohabitation). Such views and 
efforts may appear to be largely attempts to smooth over the adversity 
of the dichotomy.
Rather more significant may be the two novel tendencies in mod-
ern occupation historiography noted above, namely to broaden the 
social perspective and to extend the historical context. Examining the 
everyday life of ordinary people can bring out elements of the local 
situation and qualities of social interaction which may have remained 
largely unaffected by the occupation. Studying trends and qualities of 
Danish policy in the perspective of both the pre- war and the post- war 
period can reveal distinct continuities. From that angle the policy of 
cooperation, too, can be regarded as in some respects a continuation, 
in different circumstances, of the Danish policy of steering close to 
Germany at crucial stages of the history of the League of Nations. In 
that perspective the resistance movement may come close to appear-
ing as an aberration.
Both the interest in everyday life and the search for continuity 
indicate a preoccupation with normality. This could conceivably be 
motivated by a lingering national need to overcome the historic trauma 
of invasion and occupation. Concentrating on shared habits and estab-
lished traditions, instead of on the values and attitudes that divided peo-
ple, might assist the process. So might some of the more recent enquiries 
into consciousness and searches for a Danish identity, complemented by 
a variety of less academic intellectual and cultural exercises in national 
introspection. Thus, modern occupation history might, conceivably, one 
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day be recognized as essentially part of a national effort to negate the 
tragic quality of the five- year drama.
3.5. Discourse
For a long time, the professional debate presented in this part had only 
limited influence on contemporaneous public discourse about Danish 
reactions to German occupation. Yet, the starting- point of such dis-
course was much the same as that of professional historiography. Most 
of the personal memoirs, popular accounts and fictional works, as well 
as the films, plays and, not least, the press appearing in the first post- war 
decades presented a picture of a nation united in opposition to the occu-
pying power. Such material often seemed to suggest that more or less 
everybody – apart from small groups of Nazis and other traitors – had 
been engaged in passive or active resistance.
Like the works of the first generation of historians and other schol-
ars, public discourse at that stage claimed or assumed the existence of a 
degree of harmony which rested on some kind of compromise between 
those committed to political and administrative cooperation with the 
occupying power and those engaged in active resistance. This notion 
of national concord could be traced back to the last period of the occu-
pation and the immediate post- war situation. Another characteristic 
of such discourse was a tendency to backdate by a few years the strug-
gle against the Germans and to turn a blind eye to the combination of 
official cooperation and public passivity marking the first years of the 
occupation.
When the first wave of scholarly revisionism challenged the notion 
of national concord, whether by highlighting the conflict between coop-
eration and resistance or by dealing with the former separately and on 
its own merits, public discourse did not follow suit. In the 1960s, and 
even more so in the 1970s, the established inclination to play down any 
surviving notions of dissention between the politicians and the resis-
tance and play up the image of wartime solidarity was rather reinforced 
in the public debate. The discourse of commemoration then gathering 
strength provided the best examples of such exercises in historical pro-
jection. The trend towards national self- flattery continued in the fol-
lowing decades, perhaps reaching its climax with the parliamentary 
debates in the spring of 1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary 
of liberation.
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In an account of the occupation period as collective memory of 
the Danish people published in 1998, Claus Bryld and Anette Warring 
sought to show how, in the course of half a century, a history had been 
constructed and a memory transmitted of those momentous five years.100 
Drawing on German and other European scholarship, they introduced 
the concept of historical culture, and structured their book around its 
three dimensions, namely the political or volitional, the aesthetic or 
emotional and the cognitive. Exploring the political dimension, they 
explained how the post- war need for patriotic memories soon became 
tied up with the cold war and membership of NATO, which called for 
a demonstration of willingness to engage in military cooperation with 
democratic allies. In this setting, the image of resistance as the typical 
Danish reaction to occupation emerged.
On the aesthetic- emotional level, too, the nation needed a collec-
tive memory of its recent past which it could identify with and be proud 
of. This need, according to the authors, was met largely through the 
development of a commemorative culture. The erection of monuments, 
the celebration of anniversaries, other memorial ceremonies as well as 
various symbolic rituals helped to establish and maintain a shared tra-
dition of remembrance. Such a construction, however, had little or noth-
ing to do with the actual events of the period of occupation. As a result 
of the process, the discourse became imbued with mythical qualities.
In the cognitive dimension, the historical research carried out in 
the 1970s, together with various public debates taking place between 
1970 and 1995, did help to present a more realistic picture of the occu-
pation years. However, meaningful debate on the subject was often 
obstructed, the authors complained, by veteran circles of the resistance 
movement intervening to exclude particular lines of enquiry and seek-
ing to monopolize the interpretation of history. Here they enjoyed the 
support of politicians who did not want to fall foul of the veteran organi-
zations. Often the result was that the media simply dropped the subject 
and allowed the debate to peter out. Bryld and Warring’s book can be 
seen as an attempt to redress the balance in the public discourse about 
Danish reactions to German occupation.
In the years following the publication of that book, the balance in 
both academic debate and public discourse swung against the resistance 
movement. The challenging programme and iconoclastic style of the 
second wave of historical revisionism, then gathering strength, caught 
the interest of a wider public and brought general discourse more into 
line with scholarly debate. At both levels, there was not only a greater 
willingness to accept and endorse the policy of cooperation, and even 
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to understand and condone the actions of various groups of collabora-
tors, but also a marked tendency to denigrate the efforts of the resis-
tance movement and question the conduct of some of its leaders. The 
most obvious reasons for such attitudes were the passing away of vet-
erans and other early spokesmen of the resistance movement and the 
emergence of a new generation of historians and other opinion formers 
with no personal experience of the occupation years. However, certain 
major changes in the international political situation and some novel 
issues of domestic politics may also have been at work, as conditioning 
influences.
The end of the cold war, the collapse of the Communist order in 
Eastern Europe and the break- up of the Soviet Union made the expe-
rience of patriotic resistance to an occupying great power seem less 
relevant than it had been during the East– West political and military 
division of Europe. Nor could the memory of such resistance, which 
had been mainly nationally inspired, have much bearing on the quasi- 
globalized concerns of the Western nations with democracy, free trade 
and human rights in the post- cold war world.
On the other hand, the US- led interventions and wars to combat 
fundamentalist terrorism and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction did seem to be of some relevance to Danish debate about war-
time cooperation and resistance. Raising political issues for the Danes 
too, they could influence that debate indirectly. Those who opposed 
Danish participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, broadly rep-
resenting the left- of- centre tradition of neutrality and disengagement in 
power politics, were more likely to side with the wartime government 
in the debate about the occupation. Those who supported the case for 
taking part in the wars, in principle inclined towards engagement in 
international politics, were more disposed to see armed resistance to the 
Germans as an inspiring example. Thus the political conflict about the 
wars in Asia may have helped to harden the lines in the historical debate 
about the occupation.
Each of the anniversaries of the crisis in August 1943 and the lib-
eration in May 1945 gave rise to a flare- up of the public debate about 
cooperation and resistance during the occupation. On 29 August 2003 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Liberal leader and prime minister in a right-  
of- centre coalition government, made a speech at the naval college, 
which appeared in the national daily Politiken the same day. In what 
appeared to be something of a pep talk to the cadets and their officers, 
he started by saluting the decision of the government 60 years ago, at 
long last, to put an end to cooperation with the occupying power, and by 
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praising the action of the naval officers who had deprived the Germans of 
the Danish fleet by scuttling the ships or taking them to neutral Sweden. 
Those events, he asserted, had helped to improve Denmark’s reputation 
among the allied powers.
He went on to launch a scathing attack on the Danish establish-
ment of the time, which for three years had pursued a policy of actively 
accommodating the occupying power in the hope of retaining a degree 
of sovereignty for the country. That policy he described as politically 
naïve and morally reprehensible. It was the growing dissatisfaction of 
the public with the policy of the government, he explained, together 
with the brave efforts of members of the resistance, that had put an 
end to such cooperation, and secured a place for Denmark on the right 
side in the struggle against the Nazis. Fogh Rasmussen finished his talk 
with a tribute to those who, as members of the resistance, had fought in 
defence of freedom and democracy.
Various other writers expressed similar views in articles and 
speeches marking the same anniversary. But soon a number of histo-
rians reacted to the political and moral charges directed at the war-
time government and its policies. Perhaps the most robust retort to 
Fogh Rasmussen came from Hans Kirchhoff, otherwise better known 
for defending the resistance movement. In an article published in 
Information some weeks after the anniversary, he accused the prime 
minister and others of demonizing the policy and practice of coopera-
tion with the Germans and misusing occupation history for their own 
political purposes.
They had failed, he pointed out, not only to mention the risk of 
a Nazi coup, which had been a major motive of the policy of cooper-
ation in the first year or two, but also to acknowledge the fear of the 
Communists, who had been behind most of the sabotage and whose 
activities ultimately had threatened the proclaimed peaceful nature of 
the occupation. Is it really less moral, he asked, to want to protect dem-
ocratic institutions against Nazification, or defend the economy against 
pillage and ruination or protect the population against hunger deporta-
tions? Resistance, he explained, could not be an alternative to coopera-
tion in the first years of occupation, at least not for the politicians, civil 
servants and institutions saddled with the responsibility for the lives 
and welfare of millions of people. However, Kirchhoff finished his arti-
cle with a warm tribute to the resistance movement for having broken 
with state egotism and sided with the anti- Nazi forces.101
About 18 months later the debate flared up again, in connec-
tion with preparations for the 4th  of  May celebrations. Once again the 
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initiative came from the prime minister. In an introduction to some edu-
cational material presented on the website of the ministry of education, 
he recalled that many Danes under Nazi occupation had found them-
selves presented with the choice between resistance and cooperation, 
between doing the right thing, and thus exposing themselves to great 
personal risks, and going with the tide and putting their own wealth 
and safety first. That choice, he observed, could still bring feelings to 
boiling- point.
Subsequently Fogh Rasmussen, reacting to the hostile response 
of most historians to his views and judgements on occupation history, 
developed his arguments and answered his critics in a feature article in 
Jyllands- Posten, a leading right- of- centre daily. The sixtieth anniversary 
of liberation, as he saw it, had three messages. The Danish people owed 
a great debt of gratitude to the resistance fighters, who, through sabo-
tage against the Germans and cooperation with the allies, had defied 
the politicians and secured the country a place on the right side in the 
anti- Nazi struggle. They had saved the honour of the nation. Second, the 
policy of actively accommodating the Germans, he reiterated, had con-
stituted a political and moral failure. Denmark had got through the war 
cheaply by letting others do the work of fighting the Germans. Third, it 
was possible to learn from history, and avoid repeating the failures of 
the past. As for the critique by the historians, Fogh Rasmussen asserted 
his right to pass judgement on the policies and conduct of the occupation 
years, as people living at the time had been able to do, and stressed the 
need to acknowledge past mistakes.102
In the media debate the prime minister had the support of some 
politicians, many journalists and a few surviving members of the resis-
tance movement. In the same issue of Jyllands- Posten Bertel Haarder, 
Liberal minister of education and ecclesiastic affairs, dealt critically with 
the revisionist writings of Radical Liberal historians and denounced 
their efforts to rehabilitate Erik Scavenius and reassess his policy. They 
presented Scavenius as a political realist. Yet, as a politician who, for 
much too long, had based his policy on a misjudgement of the Nazis’ 
prospect of winning the war and who consistently had failed to take 
account of the attitude of the Danish public, he should not, in Haarder’s 
view, be deemed a great statesman, let alone be held up as a true hero of 
the occupation.
The foremost spokesman of the veterans of the resistance was the 
85- year- old Jørgen Kieler, a retired specialist in cancer research who, 
as active member of the sabotage organization Holger Danske, had 
been arrested, sentenced to death by the Germans and instead sent 
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to a concentration camp in Germany. In interviews and articles in the 
months leading up to the anniversary in May 2005 he warmly endorsed 
Fogh Rasmussen’s condemnation of the policy of cooperation. That pol-
icy, he insisted, had been mendacious from the very beginning and had 
led to a series of unnecessary and provocative initiatives in collabora-
tion. Those who were angry about the prime minister’s statements he 
labelled as adherents of the so- called anti- movement of the post- war 
years. Amply supported by many younger historians, they sought to 
disparage the resistance movement and to present collaboration as the 
most effective defence of democracy.103
The weightiest argument in support of the policies towards 
Germany pursued by the Danish governments in the later part of the 
1930s and the first years of the occupation was Bo Lidegaard’s Kampen 
om Danmark 1933– 1945, published at the height of the public debate 
in 2005. His earlier works included a book about the role of Henrik 
Kauffmann in Danish diplomacy and a volume in a major series about 
the history of Danish foreign policy. The latter work, entitled Overleveren 
1914– 1945 (The Survivor), was remarkable for its sympathetic treatment 
of Erik Scavenius and its positive assessment of his policies. It credited 
Danish policy and diplomacy in the world wars with having served the 
interests of the country and the future of its democratic system as well 
as had been possible in the circumstances. This finding served as a point 
of departure for the argument he presented in Kampen om Danmark.
There had been no reasonable alternative, Lidegaard argued, 
either to the appeasement policy of the 1930s or to the cooperative pol-
icy during the occupation. However, at both stages, the cautious and 
accommodating conduct of external relations had been compensated by 
a sharper line against Nazi and fascist tendencies within Danish society. 
Indeed, the overriding theme of the whole period he was dealing with 
had been the domestic defence of Danish democracy, against its rightist 
as well as its leftist critics and enemies within. Thus, the basic issue in 
the debate about the policy of cooperation was just how far a democracy 
can go in making concessions to an occupying power and compromising 
its legal principles without negating its essential idea and losing its legit-
imacy. That was the point reached in August 1943.104
Resistance, according to Lidegaard, had been primarily a political 
and moral, rather than a military, phenomenon. Sabotage had been a 
protest against the policy of cooperation more than an attack on German 
military power. As such it had been a demonstration of the will to resist 
the Germans. The fight for Denmark had been won through the interac-
tion of cooperation and resistance. While cooperation, judged on its own 
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terms, had been the right and sensible policy, it would have been a disas-
ter if it had not been complemented by active resistance. Like Kirchhoff, 
Lidegaard could not defend the politicians and their policy and conduct 
in the earlier years of the occupation without acknowledging the deci-
sive importance of the resistance movement in the later period.105
Seeking explanations for the recurrent attacks in more recent 
years on the policy of cooperation, typically followed by heated public 
debates between advocates of different interpretations of occupation 
history, Lidegaard went beyond current political needs and interests of 
the parties involved and considered also possible psychological moti-
vations. Here he brought in the notion of a collective survivor’s syn-
drome. Underlying the debate, he noted, was a self- accusation: where 
did we go wrong when we managed to get through the war so easily? 
The response he described as a new national epos about moral failure 
and shameful subservience in face of injustice; about a government, 
parliament and people failing to understand the innermost nature of 
Nazism. However, such views, he pointed out, ignored the develop-
ment from cooperation in 1940 to resistance a few years later, and 
did not take the Communist dimension of resistance into account. 
Passing moral judgement on cooperation and resistance, Lidegaard 
concluded, was not so easy.106
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Conclusion
During the period of occupation, taken as a whole, the basic political 
issue was between cooperation and resistance. After 1945 the relation-
ship between those opposing reactions to German occupation became 
a major theme of both academic historiography and public discourse. 
However, cooperation as well as resistance are terms which cover a 
fairly broad range of policies and conduct.
A distinction has been made between willing and reluctant coop-
eration with the occupying power. The former was characterized by 
some miscalculated diplomatic initiatives and a measure of economic 
opportunism, the latter more by protracted negotiations and limited 
concessions. Yet, both forms were motivated by a concern to protect the 
population and institutions of the country, in particular its democratic 
system of politics. At no stage was official cooperation with the occupy-
ing authorities inspired by Nazi or even pro- German sympathies. The 
policy of cooperation enjoyed the support of the government, the major 
political parties, the parliament, the king, the administration, the major 
economic institutions and, at least up to August 1943, the vast majority 
of the population.
As regards resistance to the occupying power, a relevant dis-
tinction is between unarmed and the more militant kinds. The former 
comprised services to the allied cause by the merchant navy, organized 
intelligence gathering for Britain and its allies and propaganda against 
the Danish government and the German authorities by the illegal press. 
The militant kinds of resistance took the forms of sabotage and liquida-
tions, demonstrations and strikes, organization of an army of resistance 
and active service by volunteers in the forces of an allied power. While 
most of the unarmed activities were maintained throughout the occu-
pation, the militant efforts made their mark in the last two years before 
liberation. The general shift in public opinion was from broad support 
for reluctant cooperation with the occupying power in the earlier years 
to growing identification with armed resistance in the last stages of the 
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war. While most pioneers of such resistance came from right- of- centre 
parties or the Communists, the resistance movement, emerging in the 
last years, drew its members from across the political spectrum of the 
country.
The wartime political issue between cooperation and resistance 
had a psychological as well as a moral side, both of which aspects char-
acterized also later historical debate about the occupation. In February 
1945, when representatives of the freedom council and political leaders 
were arguing about the composition of the liberation government, Frode 
Jakobsen wrote an article in which he drew attention to the psychologi-
cal dimension of the conflict. Referring to the humiliating period of the 
Scavenius policy of deliberate cooperation, he called for a very different 
national will, as well as a different sense of reality, to guide the new 
government. The old political leaders had called themselves ‘realpoliti-
cians’, he wrote, and considered the men of the resistance to be fantasts. 
But it was the fantasts, he observed, who had faced up to the hard reality 
and chosen the line that had prevailed. Whereas the realpoliticians, with 
their lack of imagination and parochial outlook, had proved themselves 
unable to look into the future, and into the world beyond Denmark.1
While spokesmen of the resistance stressed the virtues of patri-
otic emotions and courage, the politicians of the time, as well as later 
defenders of the wartime establishment, emphasized the need for 
reason and cool intelligence in the management of relations with the 
occupying power. Till a late stage, those identifying with the policy of 
cooperation were inclined to disparage their opponents as heroes and 
idealists. In broader psychological categories, the issue may be seen as a 
conflict between pessimism and optimism. While the pessimists ruled in 
the first three or four years of the war, the optimists gained support and 
influence in the last year or two, after the fortunes of war had turned 
against the German armies and the prospect of liberation had moved 
closer.
The moral dimension of the conflict between cooperation and 
resistance was related to the occupational roles of the participants. In a 
letter to Christmas Møller in London written in August 1944, soon after 
the general strike in Copenhagen, Mogens Fog touched upon the dif-
ferences of morality between the politicians and the resistance leaders. 
What divided the two sides, he said, was not different ideas about tactics 
but basic views of life. ‘The only word they know is “protect” – and at 
any price – while we are familiar with the notion of “to sacrifice”, where 
it can bring about spiritual or material benefit’. A real fight for spiritual 
values was beyond most of the old politicians.2 The true lesson of the 
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occupation, he stated in a volume of memoirs written many years later, 
was that so many people voluntarily, in response to an inner personal 
call, had given up their secure everyday life because the external cir-
cumstances had violated those higher values on which their life rested.3
The old politicians to whom Fog was referring in his letter could 
have answered his charge by claiming that they, as ministers in the coa-
lition government, carried the responsibility for safeguarding the lives 
and interests of the population and protecting the institutions and polit-
ical traditions of the country. In a situation of great danger for the nation 
and of uncertain duration, they were acting in accordance with their 
professional duty when they negotiated with the Germans, proposed 
compromises and made concessions. As long as they could continue 
the exchange with the occupying power they were keeping the country 
running, and gaining time. While the representatives of the resistance 
movement, often intellectuals or members of a profession, typically 
were motivated by an ethics of conscience, high values and courage, the 
politicians supporting the policy of cooperation were guided more by an 
ethics of responsibility, duty and caution.
The choice between cooperating with and resisting the occupying 
authorities was not one which everybody had to make. For the individ-
ual Dane, the historians Henning Poulsen and Niels Wium Olesen have 
pointed out, it was quite possible to support the policy of cooperation, 
hate the Germans and sympathize with the resistance movement, all at 
the same time.4 Thus, for many ordinary people it was more a both- and 
situation. For government employees, and those working for the major 
institutions of the country, there was, most of the time, only little choice. 
The first three years of the occupation, when resistance made little sense 
to men of responsibility, they could rarely see an alternative to following 
the lines laid down by the government and other national authorities. 
Yet, there were always exceptions, such as a civil servant who main-
tained secret contact to resistance circles, or a police officer who turned 
a blind eye or allowed a resister to escape.
However, when an alternative to cooperation did present itself, it 
was mostly individuals or groups not personally accountable to estab-
lished authorities who responded by rejecting the governmental line 
and engaging in some form of active resistance. For them, it was a real 
choice between opposite courses, both before and after August 1943. 
For the Communists, who had been lying low since the signing of the 
Nazi– Soviet pact in August 1939 but had been making some prepara-
tions for illegal existence, the decision was facilitated by Danish legis-
lation. By banning their party and interning many of its leaders soon 
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after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Danish 
government in effect played a part in driving its members into illegality 
and militancy. In the last year of the occupation, especially in the last 
months, when many other people from most walks of life came out in 
support of the resistance movement, the choice was rather easier than it 
had been at earlier stages.
Whatever the response of sections of society and individuals to the 
dichotomy of cooperation and resistance, it was the tension between 
those opposite reactions that shaped the history of Denmark under 
occupation, and structured most of the historiographical debate and 
public discourse of later generations. Both cooperation with the occu-
pying power and resistance to its presence and intrusions can be seen as 
wartime manifestations of long traditions of Danish conduct of relations 
with neighbouring great powers.
Governmental and administrative cooperation with the German 
authorities, conducted in the hope of maintaining a degree of sover-
eignty, was a continuation, in aggravated circumstances, of the Radical 
Liberal and Social Democratic policy towards Germany in the 1930s. 
This policy, derived from geopolitical determinism and faith in the 
superior virtue of Danish neo- neutrality, carried the marks of Radical 
Liberal pacifism and Social Democratic anti- militarism. It can be seen 
as a development from other policies of non- engagement in great- power 
politics pursued in still earlier periods of Danish history.
Cooperation with the occupying power served various socio- 
 economic interests of the political parties of the coalition government. 
For the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals, whose pre- war gov-
ernments had laid the foundations of a modern welfare state, it was 
essential to maintain the political structure and social legislation of the 
country, whatever the outcome of the war. Indeed, some of the more 
dedicated social reformers seemed inclined to view the occupation by 
foreign troops mainly as an interruption of their efforts to create a model 
society. For the Liberals, the economic benefits of the occupation could 
not be ignored. Many of the supporters of the party, the bulk of whom 
were farmers, found the rise in the prices of butter and bacon rather 
more interesting than the growing resistance in the towns. And most of 
those Conservatives who represented trades and industries were for 
long disturbed by the pro- resistance attitudes and activities of many 
members of sections of their party. On the whole, the material inter-
ests of the four parties in maintaining a degree of cooperation with the 
Germans weighed more heavily in the earlier years of the occupation, 
when the outcome of the war still seemed far from certain.
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Active resistance, with or without arms, can be seen as a revival of a 
tradition of engagement in international politics much older than that of 
disengagement. Though it had fallen into abeyance since the traumatic 
defeat of the country in the war of 1864, traces of it may be detected in 
the critical reactions of Conservative and Liberal politicians to the capit-
ulation on 9 April 1940 and their opposition to the foreign and defence 
policies of the 1930s as well as in the rejection by the upper house of par-
liament of successive proposals for disarmament tabled by the govern-
ments of the 1920s. Before that, the most striking manifestations of the 
survival of former preparedness to engage forcefully in European politics 
were the two patriotic wars with Prussia and the German Confederation 
over Schleswig- Holstein in the mid- nineteenth century and the less 
enthusiastic involvement in the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars. The 
origins of the tradition, however, are to be found in earlier centuries, 
when Denmark– Norway, together with Sweden, were still great or major 
powers, actively engaging in the power politics of the northern region of 
Europe in pursuit or defence of the interests of the state or its king.
While sabotage, and other militant measures employed by the resis-
tance, politically might be aimed also at the Danish authorities engaged 
in cooperation, militarily such actions were directed at the occupying 
power. They were a local contribution to the European war against the 
forces and ideology of Nazi Germany and its allies. Though motivated 
by patriotic feelings and presented as a national effort, Danish resistance 
had to be coordinated with the plans and efforts of the allied powers. 
While the Communists looked to Moscow for direction and guidance, the 
non- Communist leaders of the resistance accepted instruction and sup-
port from London. The latter relationship proved by far the more import-
ant for the development and organization of resistance in Denmark.
The general directives issued by Moscow for the benefit of 
European Communist parties naturally applied to Denmark too. Thus, 
the Danish leadership adopted the tactical principle of popular front 
against the Nazi enemy, gave priority to national liberation and engaged 
in militant anti- German activities. However, as a result of limited 
Soviet interest in the political life of Denmark and a sceptical attitude 
to its efforts at resistance, Moscow’s influence during the occupation 
became mainly ideological. Through a well- organized illegal press, the 
Communists spearheaded the Danish counter- offensive to the German 
propaganda apparatus.
Practically from the beginning of the occupation there were resis-
tance- minded individuals in Denmark who managed to maintain or 
establish contact with England, whether through neutral Sweden or 
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some other way. After the setting up of SOE, the way to the military 
and political authorities in London usually went through its Danish 
section. Thus, the reports that a group of Danish intelligence officers 
secretly started to prepare for Britain soon after the invasion of the 
country, and continued to supply till the Germans capitulated, went to 
that office, much of the time via Ebbe Munck and the SOE representa-
tive in Stockholm. When sabotage, strikes and street demonstrations 
in Denmark began seriously to affect the country’s relations with the 
occupying power, it was through the same office that British authorities 
sought to manage and control Danish resistance, sometimes encourag-
ing and sometimes restraining militant activities.5
For a long time, before Denmark had an organized movement to 
carry out sabotage, SOE, cautioned by the Foreign Office and warned 
by the Danish intelligence officers, refrained from encouraging such 
activities. It was not till the spring of 1943, well after the Communists 
had started their offensive, that SOE began to exercise real influence on 
this form of resistance. With a dynamic leader and a number of instruc-
tors and organizers, all Danes trained in England, now in place, it was 
in a position to strengthen existing and set up new groups in a number 
of major towns, supply them with necessary materials, especially plas-
tic explosives, and provide guidance about targets and timing. After a 
marked intensification of industrial as well as railway sabotage in the 
summer and later part of 1943, SOE called for a pause in such activities 
in the earlier months of 1944. The retreat of the German armies after the 
invasion of Normandy and the approach of allied forces led to a greater 
need for more selective forms of sabotage. In accordance with orders 
issued by allied headquarters, the resistance now concentrated on min-
ing German troop movements, particularly in Jutland.
During the last 18 months of the war, when the European branch of 
SOE was merged with its American counterpart OSS under the name of 
Special Forces, the primary task allocated to Denmark was to prepare its 
rapidly growing resistance movement for a local supporting role in the 
final stage of the war and the transition to peace. To secure direct allied 
control of the units of the movement, the country was divided into six 
regions, each with a separate structure and own leadership. Within this 
framework, an underground army, recruited across party- political divi-
sions and officered by professional soldiers and resistance fighters, was 
set up. It was equipped, albeit sparsely, with British and some American 
arms and materials, dropped or shipped into the country. Much of the 
work of establishing this army was carried out by a military committee 
set up by the freedom council.
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The Foreign Office, having come to regard Denmark as a significant 
part of a projected post- war British sphere of influence on the Continent, 
had a political interest in securing a smooth transition from occupation 
and resistance to liberation and restoration of constitutional government 
and political stability in the country. Thus, its relations with Denmark in 
the later stages of the war were largely directed towards managing the 
tension between the freedom council and the political leaders and loyal 
army officers, and towards avoiding hostilities between the Communists 
and other members of the resistance movement. That generally meant 
balancing between encouraging and supporting the efforts of resis-
tance and cautioning and restraining some of the leaders and represen-
tatives of the movement. This conciliatory policy found expression in 
two significant diplomatic initiatives. One was British sponsorship for 
the Danish request for allied status, presented jointly by members of the 
freedom council and representatives of the major political parties. The 
other was British acceptance and support for a liberation government 
headed by the Social Democratic leader Vilhelm Buhl and with the old 
political parties and the major sections of the resistance movement rep-
resented equally.
The later stages of the occupation and earlier post- war years were 
a period marked by compromise in political decision- making and rec-
onciliation in historical interpretation. Yet, the conflict between coop-
eration and resistance as reactions to German occupation remained. In 
the last analysis, it rested on an antithesis of mental attitudes, of intro-
version and a tendency towards national self- sufficiency against extro-
version and a disposition to international solidarity. The former, rooted 
not only in the trauma of 1864 and earlier losses but also in the gains 
of neutrality in the First World War, was manifested in a willingness to 
accept the possibility of German victory in the war and a resolve to pro-
tect narrow Danish political and material interests. The latter attitude, 
drawing on the more heroic periods and incidents in Danish history, 
found expression in faith in the ultimate victory of the allied powers and 
in courage to join the anti- Nazi struggle through armed resistance.
International solidarity and courageous engagement marked both 
Communist and non- Communist resistance. The Communists, ideologi-
cally guided by the Soviet Union in a spirit of socialist internationalism, 
pursued their socialist goals within a framework of cross- party anti- 
Nazi resistance. The non- Communist resisters, motivated by patriotic 
emotions and supported by Britain, restored national honour through 
cooperation with Western allies.
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F or five years during THe seCond WorLd War, Denmark was occupied by Germany. While the Danish reaction to this period 
of its history has been extensively discussed in Danish-language 
publications, it has not until now received a thorough treatment in 
English. Set in the context of modern Danish foreign relations, and 
tracing the country’s responses to successive crises and wars in the 
region, Danish Reactions to German Occupation brings a full overview 
of the occupation to an English-speaking audience. Holbraad carefully 
dissects the motivations and ideologies driving conduct during the 
occupation, and his authoritative coverage of the preceding century 
provides a crucial link to understanding the forces behind Danish 
foreign policy divisions.
Analysing the conduct of a traumatized and strategically exposed 
small state bordering on an aggressive great power, the book traces a 
development from reluctant cooperation to active resistance. Holbraad 
goes on to survey and examine the subsequent, and not yet quite 
finished, debate among historians about this contested period. That 
debate is between those still siding with the resistance and a majority 
more inclined to justify limited cooperation with the occupiers – and 
sometimes even condone various acts of collaboration.
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